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PLAYING WITH WORK: MUST "WORK" BE
TREATED AS A "MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITY"
FOR PURPOSES OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT?
Daniel A. McMillan*
INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,1 and
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams,2 the Supreme
Court sharply limited the reach of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA" or "the Act"),3 by narrowing the definition of
"disability" under the Act.4 In both cases the Court also signaled
that it may further narrow the definition of a disabled person, by
excluding from this definition all persons whose infirmities inter-
fere with only their ability to work, and not, for example, with their
ability to travel or socialize. Under the ADA, a "disability" is de-
fined, in pertinent part, as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual." 5 Under current agency regulations and case law in the
lower courts, "work" or "working" is considered a "major life ac-
* J.D. candidate 2005, Fordham University School of Law; Ph.D., History, Co-
lumbia University, 1997. The author wishes to thank the following persons for assis-
tance in the research and writing of this Note: Judy A. Keenan of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in New York, who suggested the topic; and
Prof. Michael Lanzarone of the Fordham University School of Law, who served as the
author's faculty advisor during the research and writing of this Note.
1. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
2. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
4. In Sutton, the Court held that the determination of whether an individual has a
disability should take into account any mitigating measures, for example corrective
lenses or prosthetic limbs. 527 U.S. at 482. The Sutton sisters, who were badly near-
sighted without eyeglasses, but who had 20/20 vision when wearing eyeglasses, wanted
to become commercial airline pilots. 527 U.S. at 475. United Airlines rejected their
application because they did not meet the company's standards for uncorrected vi-
sion. Id. at 475-76. The Court ruled that because the plaintiffs had no difficulty see-
ing with their glasses on, they were not "disabled" under the ADA, and therefore
failed to state a claim. Id. at 488-89. This decision ran directly counter to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA in its regulations, an interpretation which the Court
termed "impermissible." Id. at 482 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1990).
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tivity" for the purposes of the ADA's disability definition.6 The
Supreme Court, however, has never held that work qualifies as a
major life activity, and the Court has signaled in Sutton and Toyota
that it may hold that it does not.7 If the Court does so hold, the
social and economic impact could be devastating, leaving several
million Americans unable to claim the Act's protection against dis-
crimination in the workplace.
This Note examines and evaluates the principal arguments for
and against construing the ADA to include work among the major
life activities. 8 Part I briefly discusses the history of the ADA and
the definition of disability under the Act as explicated in regula-
tions by executive branch agencies. A discussion follows of the
Sutton and Toyota decisions and their implications for the status of
work as a major life activity under the Act. Part II critiques the
Court's reasoning in Sutton and Toyota, and then looks to two
other sources for guidance in construing the Act: the language of
the Act itself and congressional intent to the extent that this intent
is documented in the legislative history. Part III weighs the oppos-
ing arguments and arrives at a resolution. This Note concludes that
the ADA must be construed to include work as a major life activ-
ity, because any other construction would contradict both the plain
language of the statute and the clear intent of Congress.
I. BACKGROUND AND ISSUE
A. History of the ADA
The developments that led to the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act originated in part in the civil rights struggles of the
1960s.9 Inspired by the victories of African Americans and other
groups, a movement of the disabled developed in the 1970s using
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991); see 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1991); see also 49 C.F.R.
§ 37.3 (1998).
7. See 527 U.S. 471 (1999); see also 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
8. This central question distinguishes this Note from an earlier published work,
Argun M. Ulgen, Comment, From Household Bathrooms to the Workplace: Bringing
the Americans with Disabilities Act Back to Where It Belongs: An Analysis of Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 761 (2003). Ulgen does not
address the status of work as a major life activity under the ADA, focusing instead on
the importance of work tasks as part of the major life activity of performing manual
tasks.
9. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Im-
plications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413, 427-28 (1991). Burgdorf was the staff author for the National Council on the
Handicapped's 1986 report Toward Independence, and drafted the original Ameri-
cans with Disabilities bill introduced in Congress in 1988. Id. at 413 n.a.
1334
PLAYING WITH WORK
many of the same tactics pioneered by these oppressed groups, in-
cluding public demonstrations, civil disobedience, and lawsuits.'
Advocates for the disabled also pressed for federal legislation pro-
scribing discrimination against disabled individuals. Between 1973
and 1990, Congress passed several laws against such discrimination,
of which the most important was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
Almost all of these laws limited their coverage to activities con-
ducted by the federal government, or to those supported at least in
part by federal funds.2
Disability issues gained a higher public profile in the 1980s, as
seen most obviously in the work of a Presidential commission, the
National Council on the Handicapped (since renamed the National
Council on Disability). Two reports by the Council, issued in
198613 and 1988,14 respectively, assessed the bleak condition of dis-
abled Americans, and called for comprehensive legislation to com-
bat discrimination against the disabled.' 5 The second report, issued
in 1988, included a draft of the legislation which later became the
ADA,' 6 and bills were introduced in both houses of Congress later
that year. 7 The 100th Congress adjourned without either house
taking action on the bill,18 but a revised version was introduced in
both houses the following year.19 After separate House and Senate
versions were reconciled in conference committee,20 the Americans
with Disabilities Act passed in both houses by the lopsided margins
of 377 to 28 in the House, on July 12, 1990, and 91 to 6 in the
Senate, on July 13.21
Throughout the Congressional deliberations leading to the pas-
sage of the ADA, two themes predominated. Members of Con-
gress and the reports of the standing committees hailed the ADA
as a landmark civil rights law, a long overdue companion piece to
10. Id. at 427-28.
11. Id. at 428-29.
12. Id.
13. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN As-
SESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILI-
TIES WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986).
14. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPEN-
DENCE: PROGRESS ON LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1988) [hereinafter ON THE
THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE].
15. Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 432.
16. ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 14.
17. Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 433.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong. (1989).
20. Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 433-34.
21. Id.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 The Congress also presented the
ADA as an employment bill, declaring that discriminatory exclu-
sion from the workplace inflicted the greatest injuries suffered by
the disabled, while depriving the nation of badly needed labor, and
burdening the public treasury with billions of dollars every year in
support payments.23 The Act's greatest significance, however,
probably lay in the extent of its coverage. Almost all previous disa-
bility discrimination bills covered only activities funded by the fed-
eral government.2 4 The ADA, in contrast, covers the private
sector, as well as state and local governments.
B. The ADA's Provisions
The Americans with Disabilities Act defines a category of dis-
abled individuals, and protects them from discrimination in em-
26tosrployment, in access to services, including transportation provided
by public entities,2 7 in access to services and public accommoda-
tions provided by private entities, 28 and in access to telecommuni-
cations.29 Access to public buildings, workplaces, and services is
frequently mandated in the form of architectural and technological
standards, for example, wheelchair ramps or amplified telephone
transmission for the hearing-impaired that remove impediments to
access.30 In the workplace, a disabled individual, if otherwise qual-
ified for employment, is entitled to "reasonable accommodations"
from her employer in the job application process, in access to em-
ployee benefits, and in the actual process of work.31 For example,
an employer could allow a blind employee to bring a guide dog to
work.
The ADA's definition of "disability" originated in a 1974 amend-
ment to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,32 and reads as follows:
22. See infra Part II.F.2; see also Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 413-14.
23. See infra Part II.F.3; see generally Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking
Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 68 U. CoLo. L. REV. 107 (1997).
24. Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 432.
25. See Locke, supra note 23, at 107.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (1990).
27. Id. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
28. Id. §§ 12181-12184 (1990).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12184.
31. Id. § 1212(a)-(b).
32. Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-516 (1974).
Section 111(A) of the Amendment amended the Rehabilitation Act at section 7(6)
(definition of handicapped person), adding to the existing definition-which de-
pended only upon an individual's "employability"-the language:
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The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual -
A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual;
B) a record of such an impairment; or
C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
The Act itself does not define "major life activity." The Rehabili-
tation Act, however, authorized the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations implementing Title V
of that Act, and these regulations established what has become the
basic,34 though by no means exhaustive 35 list of major life activities
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. According to the
HEW regulations, "'Major life activities' means functions such as
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, learning, and working. "36
Substantially the same list of major life activities, in each case
including work, appears in the regulations issued by the three agen-
cies charged with the principal responsibility for implementing the
varied titles of the ADA: the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC),3 7 the Department of Justice, 38 and the De-
partment of Transportation.39 The ADA did not, however, explic-
itly grant authority to any of these agencies to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the Act, for
example the definition of disability. Instead, the ADA charges
each agency with issuing regulations to implement specific Titles of
the Act, for example, the EEOC for Title I (private-sector employ-
For the purposes of Titles IV and V of this Act, 29 U.S.C. 780, 790, [handi-
capped person] means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment.
The ADA definition differs only in unimportant ways from the Rehabilitation Act
definition by using the word "disability" rather than "handicap," a terminological
change which Congress intended to signify no change in meaning (see infra notes 170-
71, and accompanying text); grammatically, in defining "disability" rather than "per-
son with disability"; and in the word order in subsection (A).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990).
34. "Basic" in the sense of being repeated approvingly in the Congressional Com-
mittee Reports preceding the passage of the ADA, and being repeated in the regula-
tions issued by the three executive branch agencies charged with implementing the
ADA. See infra Parts II.E, II.F.4.
35. See, e.g., Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. Rep.
No. 101-485(11) (1990).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2003).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
38. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2004).
39. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2003).
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ment).4 0  Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that no
agency has been delegated authority under the ADA to define
"disability," and the Court has declined to consider "what defer-
ence [these regulations] are due, if any. "41
C. The Supreme Court's Doubts About Work as a Major
Life Activity
In Sutton, Justice O'Connor explained that because the parties
accepted that the term "major life activities" included working, the
Court did not reach the question of whether it did.42
We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty
in defining "major life activities" to include work, for it seems
"to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance,
by reason of [an impairment, from working with others] ... then
that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question
you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of
handicap."43
Here, Justice O'Connor quotes from the Solicitor General's oral
argument in School Board v. Arline (1987). 44 I will return below to
the argument that making work a "major life activity" rests on cir-
cular reasoning. 5 Readers who find it difficult to understand the
above quoted passage should not assume that the problem lies with
them. The Court's 2002 opinion in Toyota likewise alluded to this
problem in dictum: "Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent
in the argument that working could be a major life activity, we
have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this
difficult question today. 46
The Sutton court also stated that "even the EEOC has expressed
reluctance to define 'major life 'activities' to include working and
has suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity,
considered, as a last resort, 'if an individual is not substantially lim-
ited with respect to any other major life activity' only." 47
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).
41. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1999).
42. Id. at 492.
43. Id. (quoting oral argument of the Solicitor General in School Board v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
44. 480 U.S. at 273.
45. See infra Part II.A.
46. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002). The Toyota
Court did not explicitly refer to the circularity argument made in Sutton.
47. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998)) (emphasis added
by Court)).
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The Court's unanimous decision in Toyota also undermined the
status of work as a major life activity by establishing a new and
more stringent test 48 for determining what constitutes a major life
activity under the ADA. After several years of working at the
Toyota plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, Ella Williams developed
severe carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis in her hands, wrists,
and arms.49 No longer able to perform the work which had caused
her injuries, Williams sought and received a transfer to a position
at which she inspected automobiles for flaws in exterior paint and
finish.5" These new tasks did not exacerbate her injuries.51 Later,
however, Toyota reorganized the quality control unit to which she
belonged, and required her to supplement her inspection work
with the task of applying highlight oil to the cars.52 This new task
inflamed her tendonitis and produced new injuries, reflected in
pain in her neck and shoulders.53 Williams requested that her work
assignment be limited to inspection.5 4 By her account, Toyota re-
fused this accommodation.5 5 In any case, on December 6, 1996,
her treating physicians placed Williams under a no-work-of-any-
kind restriction. 6 Toyota fired Williams in January 1997.57
Williams filed suit under the ADA, lost in District Court on sum-
mary judgment, and appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.5" On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, granting Williams
partial summary judgment on the question of whether she had a
"disability" as defined by the ADA.59 The Court of Appeals held
that Williams was substantially limited in the major life activity of
48. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. The Court declared that the tasks comprising the
activity must be "of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. The specific
tasks of most individuals' jobs, on the court's reasoning, would not meet this test,
because there are so many different kinds of employment, and each person's work
differs from that of most other people. Id. at 201. Strictly speaking, the court did not
declare this to be a new test for determining which activities are "major life activi-
ties," but the logic of the Court's reasoning clearly indicates that the Court may apply
this test as such. Id. at 197, 201-02.
49. Id. at 187-88.
50. Id. at 188-89.
51. Id. at 189.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Williams claimed that Toyota forced her to continue doing the work that
was exacerbating her injuries, but by Toyota's account, Williams simply stopped going
to work. Id.
56. Id. at 189-90.
57. Id. at 190.
58. Id. at 190-91.
59. Id. at 191-92.
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performing manual tasks.6" Toyota appealed, and the Supreme
Court reversed, vacating the Sixth Circuit's grant of summary judg-
ment, and remanded for further proceedings. 61 In so doing, the
Court established a new standard for determining whether an indi-
vidual is "substantially limited" in a major life activity.62 The rea-
soning behind this new standard, if followed to its logical
conclusion, would remove work from the list of major life activities
recognized under the ADA.
In Toyota, the sole issue before the Court was the standard for
determining whether an individual is "substantially limited" in the
major life activity of performing manual tasks.63 After summariz-
ing the EEOC regulations' which explain the term "substantially
limits,"65 the Court ignored the agency's definition and proceeded
to construct its own from dictionary entries for "substantial, 66
"substantially,"67 and "major, "68 corresponding to the phrases
"substantially limits" and "major life activities" in the ADA defini-
tion of disability.69 From the dictionary definitions of "substan-
tially" and "substantial," the Court reasoned that "[t]he word
'substantial' thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in
only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from quali-
fying as disabilities."70 The Court then observed that "'[m]ajor' in
the phrase 'major life activities' means important," quoting Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary "defining 'major' as
'greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest."'7 1 "'Major life
activities,"' continued the opinion of the Court, "thus refers to
60. Williams v. Toyota, 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd. 534 U.S. 184
(2002).
61. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202-03.
62. Id. at 197-98.
63. Id. at 187.
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) reads:
The term substantially limits means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activ-
ity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the gen-
eral population can perform the same major life activity.
65. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195-96 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (2004)).
66. Id. at 196 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280
(1976)).
67. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 2280).
68. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 1363).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 197.
71. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 1363).
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those activities that are of central importance to daily life."72 Hav-
ing set out to revise the definition of "substantially limits," the
Court ended by establishing a new criterion for determining what
does or does not qualify as a major life activity under the ADA, a
criterion which Justice O'Connor reaffirmed in two sentences of
the opinion of the Court. She writes, "in order for performing
manual tasks to fit into this category [major life activities], a cate-
gory that includes such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hear-
ing, the manual tasks in question must be central to daily life."7 3
In the case of Ella Williams, the Court observed that she was
able to perform many manual tasks that were central to most peo-
ple's daily lives, including dressing herself, bathing, brushing her
teeth, and performing household chores.74 Conversely, the job
tasks which caused her injuries and inspired her lawsuit, described
as "repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above
shoulder levels for extended periods of time," were not an impor-
tant part of most people's daily lives.75
Although work, broadly defined, is surely central to most peo-
ple's daily lives, the specific jobs that most people perform are not.
Because most people never do welding, police work, or retail sales,
to take a few examples, it is difficult to see how "work" could sur-
vive the "daily lives" test to remain a major life activity under the
ADA. The Court has thus defined "work" so narrowly, equating it
with the specific tasks that an individual performs in his particular
job, that virtually no one's work can be considered central to daily
life. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court's reasoning there-
fore must remove work from the list of major life activities that
help define disability under the ADA.
The Toyota court did not acknowledge this consequence of its
reasoning, and indeed the holding did not claim to address the cri-
teria for defining "major life activity." The Court held only "that
to be substantially limited in [the major life activity of] performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives."'7 6 The Court also
stated that in order for "performing manual tasks" to qualify as a
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 201-02.
75. Id. at 201.
76. Id. at 198 (2002). The Court also added that "[t]he impairment's impact must
also be permanent or long term." Id.
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major life activity, "the manual tasks in question must be central to
daily life."77
H. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
This Part examines the explicit and implicit objections raised to
retaining work as a major life activity. A discussion will then pro-
ceed, in the following order, to the varied sources that may be used
when construing the statute: the ADA statute itself; regulations is-
sued by executive branch agencies pursuant to the statute's charge;
and the Act's preamble and legislative history as evidence of Con-
gressional intent.
A. The Problem of Circularity
In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]here may be some conceptual difficulty in defining "major
life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle
to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an im-
pairment, from working with others].., then that exclusion con-
stitutes an impairment, when the question you're asking is,
whether the exclusion itself is by reason of [a] handicap."78
The passage in internal quotation, taken from the oral argument in
School Board v. Arline,79 confuses the issue by stating that when
work is claimed as a major life activity, the claimant's exclusion
from work constitutes the impairment which excludes the claimant
from work. This passage is so baffling because it makes no sense
on its face, and because it incorrectly characterizes the experience
of being disabled. A disabled person is excluded from work be-
cause she has an impairment, for example paralysis or bad eye-
sight, that limits her ability to work. This characterization of
disability is no different than that which applies to any of the other
major life activities. If an impairment limits a major life activity of
an individual, the individual is disabled under the ADA. Whatever
may be said of this definition of disability, it certainly is not
circular.
Justice O'Connor's use of this passage from the Arline oral argu-
ment is all the more difficult to understand, given that O'Connor
pointed out the conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activi-
77. Id. at 197.
78. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (quoting oral argu-
ment of the Solicitor General in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)) (empha-
sis added).
79. 480 U.S. at 273.
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ties" because of the problem that the argument may be circular.8 0
Observing that the United States had argued that making work a
major life activity was to use circular reasoning, however, the Ar-
line Court stated, "[t]he argument is not circular, however, but
direct."'"
B. The EEOC's "Reluctance" About Work
After raising the circularity question, the Sutton court added that
"even the EEOC has expressed reluctance to define 'major life ac-
tivities' to include working and has suggested that working be
viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only
'[ilf an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any
other major life activity. ' ' 82 But, the terms "reluctance" and
"residual life activity" appear nowhere in the EEOC's discussion
cited by the Court, and the Court's procrustean editing of the rele-
vant passage implies a very different tone from that conveyed in
the original, which reads as follows:
If an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any
other major life activity, the individual's ability to perform the
major life activity of working should be considered. If an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination should be made as to whether the individual is
substantially limited in working. For example, if an individual is
blind, i.e., substantially limited in the major life activity of see-
ing, there is no need to determine whether the individual is also
substantially limited in the major life activity of working.83
Although the EEOC does not directly state its reason for mak-
ing this recommendation, the reason can be readily inferred from
the paragraphs that follow the quoted passage. It is simply more
difficult and complicated to claim a disability defined by work as
the major life activity, because "work," unlike seeing or walking,
for example, resists easy definition. Losing one's ability to pitch
major league baseball, or fly a space shuttle, obviously doesn't
make one "substantially limited" in work. On the other hand, a
manual laborer who can no longer lift heavy objects clearly seems
substantially limited in work. The EEOC has developed tests for
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the
80. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
81. 480 U.S. at 283 n.10.
82. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1998)) (emphasis added
by Court).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 16320) (1998).
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major life activity of work.84 The agency advises that such an indi-
vidual must be "substantially restricted" in the ability to perform a
"class of jobs" (jobs similar to one another) or a "broad range of
jobs in various classes. ' 85 This test is also supplemented by three
other factors pertaining to the number of jobs in the geographic
area to which the individual has access. 6
The courts have often found it difficult, if not impossible, to ap-
ply these tests with any consistency.87 For plaintiffs seeking relief
under the Act, arguing from work as the major life activity necessa-
rily imposes a more onerous evidentiary burden than is the case
with other major life activities, in which a doctor's opinion can suf-
fice to establish the disability.88 Rather than attribute to the
EEOC a "reluctance" to consider work a major life activity, it
seems more reasonable to infer that because it can be more diffi-
cult to litigate a claim based on work, and because the outcome in
the courts is more difficult to predict, the EEOC wanted only to
advise potential claimants that they should use some other major
life activity if feasible.
C. Toyota Revisited
As discussed above, in Toyota the Supreme Court established a
new standard for judging whether or not an activity qualifies as a
"major life activity" under the ADA.89 The Court first examined
dictionary definitions of "substantial" and "substantially," to inter-
pret the meaning of "substantially limits" in the ADA's definition
of disability. 90 The opinion then continued, "'[m]ajor' in the
84. Id.
85. Id. The agency gives this example of a "range of jobs":
[S]uppose an individual has an allergy to a substance found in most high rise
office buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, that makes breathing ex-
tremely difficult. Since this individual would be substantially limited in the
ability to perform the broad range of jobs in various classes that are con-
ducted in high rise office buildings within the geographical area to which he
or she has reasonable access, he or she would be substantially limited in
working.
Id.
86. Id.
87. See generally Reed L. Russell, Arguing for More Principled Decision Making
in Deciding Whether an Individual is Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity
of Working Under the ADA, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057 (1998).
88. Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the
Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 115-16 (1997).
89. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-98 (2002).
90. Id. at 196-97.
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phrase 'major life activities' means important. See Webster's...
(defining 'major' as 'greater in dignity, rank, importance, or inter-
est.')" 91 The next sentence contains the crucial logical leap: "'Ma-
jor life activities' thus refers to those activities that are of central
importance to daily life."
92
As noted above, the Court's reasoning, if followed to its logical
conclusion, might well eliminate work as a major life activity under
the ADA, because although "work" is central to most people's
daily lives, the specific jobs which most people perform, whether
exotic dancing, law enforcement, or shoe repair, to take three ex-
amples, are not "central to most people's daily lives," just as Ella
Williams's tasks at the Toyota plant did not meet this standard.
93
The Court explicitly rejected the "daily life" standard in Bragdon,94
affirming that sexual reproduction is a major life activity under the
ADA, even though it is clearly not a daily activity. In Bragdon,
respondent Abbott sought the protection of the ADA on the
grounds that she was infected with the HIV virus, and therefore
substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction, 95
which does not appear on the regulatory agencies' lists of major life
activities. Petitioner Bragdon contended that Congress wanted the
ADA to cover only those aspects of an individual's life which are
economic, public, or daily in character. 96 "[This] argument foun-
ders on the statutory language," concluded the Court.97 The Court
explained that
Nothing in the [dictionary] definition [of "major"] suggests that
activities without a public, economic, or daily dimension may
somehow be regarded as so unimportant or insignificant as to
fall outside the meaning of the word "major." The breadth of
the term confounds the attempt to limit its construction in this
manner.
98
Reproduction is obviously not central to most people's daily lives.
Nevertheless, the Court held that "[r]eproduction falls well within
91. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra note 66, at 1363).
92. Id. at 197.
93. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201-02.
94. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39.
95. Id. at 639-41. The Court held that Abbott's HIV infection "substantially lim-
ited" her ability to reproduce in two ways: unprotected sex would impose a risk of
infection on her male partner, and her child was at risk of becoming infected while in
the womb. Id.
96. Id. at 638-39.
97. Id. at 638.
98. Id.
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the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dy-
namics surrounding it are central to the life process itself."99
The Court's holding in Toyota is focused narrowly enough to
avoid a direct clash with the Bragdon precedent. 100 But, the
Court's reasoning in the two cases cannot be reconciled; the two
opinions pose the question of whether a "major life activity" must
be implicated in daily life, and reach opposing answers. The Brag-
don court could anchor its conclusion in "the breadth of the term
'major' ,,;101 the Toyota opinion, in contrast, limits the construction
of "major" in precisely the manner rejected in Bragdon, and with-
out offering any justification for doing so.10 2
D. The Letter of the Statute
The definition of disability, as stated in the ADA itself, supports
the claim that a major life activity need not implicate most or all of
the areas of an individual's life. The definition begins by stating
that "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual (A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual."' 3 The em-
phesized passages indicate that the determination of whether a per-
son has a disability under the ADA "is an individualized inquiry,"
as the Supreme Court observed in Sutton."4 One can therefore
argue that the meaning of "major" must depend, at least in part, on
an assessment of which activities are important to the individual
claiming a disability. For a great many individuals in the United
States, work is the central and defining activity of life. The Sutton
Court used the requirement of individualized inquiry for a differ-
ent purpose than that which is suggested here: to argue that a disa-
bility determination had to take into account the effect of any
mitigating measures which the individual could take.10 5 The Court
did not consider the implications of using an individualized inquiry
for deciding which activities qualify as "major life activities" under
the Act. 10 6 Removing work from the list of major life activities,
99. Id.
100. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). The holding was
limited to defining the standard for determining whether a person was "substantially
limited" in a specific major life activity, such as performing manual tasks. Id.
101. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
102. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2004) (emphasis added).
104. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
105. Id.
106. See id.
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however, would foreclose any individualized inquiry as to the disa-
bility status of many, perhaps millions, of individuals whose impair-
ments limit their access to gainful employment.
An even stronger case for retaining work as a major life activity
rests on the construction section of the ADA, which reads, in perti-
nent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal
agencies pursuant to such title.10 7
The HEW's list of major life activities, which includes "working,"
was issued pursuant to Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.108 The
HEW list has therefore been written into the statute itself, and has
the force of law. The Supreme Court said as much in Bragdon.10 9
After quoting from the ADA's construction section, the Court con-
cluded that "[this] directive requires us to construe the ADA to
grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations
implementing the Rehabilitation Act. ' 110
E. Other Agency Regulations
The ADA gives three federal agencies or departments the task
of issuing regulations to implement those of the Act's provisions
that lie within each agency's area of responsibility: employment
provisions to the EEOC,111 the public services subchapter to the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation,1 ' and the
subchapter on services provided by private entities to the Secretary
of Transportation and the Attorney General. 113  As Justice
O'Connor pointed out in the opinion of the Court in Sutton, the
ADA gives no agency the explicit authority to interpret the Act's
generally applicable terms, which include the critically important
definition of disability.1 14 In Sutton, the Court saw no need to
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
108. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004). "'Major life activities' means functions such
as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Id.
109. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998).
110. Id. at 632.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1990).
112. Id. § 12134 (1990).
113. Id. § 12186 (1990).
114. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
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"consider what deference [the regulations] are due, if any."' 15
Should the status of work as a major life activity be challenged in
the courts, however, much may depend on what measure of defer-
ence the courts will accord these regulations. All three agencies
have elaborated on the definition of "disability" in their regula-
tions to implement the Act, all have done so in nearly identical
language; all provide substantially the same list of major life activi-
ties, and all name "work" or "working" as one of these.116
There are at least two possible approaches to arguing that the
agency regulations that implement the ADA have an implied statu-
tory authority, even though explicit authority is lacking. Justice
Breyer developed the first approach in his Sutton dissent, when he
argued that the EEOC needed the authority to interpret a gener-
ally applicable term such as "disability" in order to carry out the
provisions of the employment subchapter, especially as the word
"disability" appears both in the Act's general provisions and in the
employment subchapter. 117 Justice O'Connor dismissed this inter-
pretation as "imaginative." '118 A second approach builds on the
first, and perhaps strengthens it. Congress has delegated authority
to three agencies to implement the Act, and cannot have intended
that these agencies should operate with mutually inconsistent defi-
nitions of the Act's central terms. Congress must therefore have
assumed that the agencies would define critical terms, for example,
"major life activity," by consensus, so that definitions would
emerge that proved workable in varied contexts. It can therefore
be argued that Congress delegated a form of collective statutory
authority to the three agencies.
One could also argue, at cross purposes to the arguments for im-
plied authority, that Congress saw no need to let any agency define
the Act's terms, because these terms had already been defined by
HEW under the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA's section on its
construction directly links the ADA's standards to those estab-
lished under the 1973 Act and the pursuant regulations,1 19 and
Congress may have assumed that no further interpretation was
necessary.
115. Id. at 480.
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004); see 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2004); see also 49 C.F.R.
§ 37.3 (2004).
117. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 514.
118. Id. at 479.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1990).
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F. Congressional Intent
1. Using the Term "Disability"
There is some evidence, albeit none of it conclusive, to suggest
that Congress did not intend to bring the work-disabled under the
protection of the ADA. Specifically, the Act's preamble gives
some support to the argument that work is an anomaly within the
list of recognized "major life activities," and that Congress did not
intend the Act to cover persons whose impairments only limited
them in the workplace. 120 Although a preamble to a statute's en-
acting clause is not a part of the statute, and does not control the
meaning of the substantive parts, it can be used as a source for
understanding the intent of the lawmakers. 121 In the first of nine
findings which comprise the preamble to the ADA, Congress used
the term "disability" in a way that implies a narrow construction of
the term. "[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans," begins the finding,
"have one or more physical or mental disabilities. ' 122 The phrase
"physical or mental disabilities" short-circuits the Act's definition
of disability, i.e., a physical or mental "impairment" that "substan-
tially limits" a "major life activity." This finding thus reduces "dis-
ability" to "impairment," collapsing the "limits" and "major life
activity" prongs into the "impairment" prong. This phrasing makes
no sense when work is a major life activity, because the impairment
is not the inability to work, but rather the infirmity (paralysis,
blindness, or others) that interferes with work. In contrast, this
collapsed definition is readily comprehensible when the major life
activity is seeing, hearing, walking, speaking, or learning because
the impairment can be equated with a limit on the major life activ-
ity: one has bad eyes and is thus limited in seeing; a man is para-
lyzed, and we know this because he cannot walk.
One can more plausibly argue, however, that Congress simply
used "disability" in this finding as a quotable short hand, readily
understandable by the general public. Certainly the legislative his-
tory demonstrates that Congress understood the Act's full defini-
tion of disability, as will be discussed below.
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
121. J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2A, 221-22
(6th ed. 2000, revised by Norman J. Singer)
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
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2. The ADA as a Civil Rights Act
In other findings within the preamble, Congress described the
disabled as an isolated and readily distinguishable minority that
needed the protection of civil rights legislation comparable to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.123 This picture of the disabled does not
readily encompass the work-disabled, and thus supports the argu-
ment that Congress did not intend that work be a "major life activ-
ity" under the Act. At several points, the findings invoke,
implicitly or explicitly, the canonical language of Carolene Products
footnote 4, as it defines what today is called "a suspect classifica-
tion."'1 24 The seventh finding states that "individuals with disabili-
ties are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful un-
equal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerless-
ness in our society."' 2 This finding implies that an individual's
disability is readily apparent to others, and that it interferes with
the individual's functioning in many different contexts. It is other-
wise hard to see how such an individual would belong to a "dis-
crete and insular minority." Persons whose impairments limit
them substantially only in the workplace would be disabled only in
the context of work, and neither recognizable as disabled nor iso-
lated from others outside of work. The Congressional findings in-
directly support this interpretation by listing the many "critical
areas" in which discrimination against the disabled persists: "em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, education, transporta-
tion, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services. 126
Most of the major life activities on the standard regulatory list
implicate all of the contexts in which people live their lives. For
example, a limitation in the major life activity of "seeing" can af-
fect not only work, but also caring for one's self at home, transpor-
tation, education, communication, recreation, voting, and so on.
People who encounter a woman with impaired eyesight are likely
to perceive her principally, or at least importantly, in terms defined
by her flawed vision. A man who is paralyzed from the waist
123. Id. § 12101(a)(2)-(7).
124. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judi-
cial inquiry.").
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (emphasis added).
126. Id. § 12101(3).
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down, his personality traits or other attributes notwithstanding, will
often be seen first and foremost as "a paraplegic." Limitations to
the major life activities of walking, hearing, speaking, learning, and
breathing can likewise have a global impact upon a person's life;
impairments which interfere with such activities can mark that indi-
vidual as disabled in most or all contexts. Such individuals might
belong to a "discrete and insular minority," isolated and thwarted
at every turn. Someone limited only in the major life activity of
working may be in an entirely different position.
An individual limited only in the major life activity of working
would not necessarily belong to the "minority" which Congress en-
visioned in its findings. By definition, his impairment cannot hin-
der him from doing all types of work, or even most types, for in
that case he would already be limited in some other life activity,
such as seeing or performing manual tasks. Instead, his impair-
ment need only hinder him from performing a "class" of jobs or a
"broad range of jobs" from different classes.127 To take an exam-
ple from the EEOC's interpretive guidance to the ADA, a woman
who is highly allergic to a substance found in most high rise office
buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, would be substantially lim-
ited in her ability to do the broad range of jobs found in tall office
buildings.128 If she lived in any urban area where many office jobs
were located in tall buildings, she would be substantially limited in
the major life activity of working, and would therefore qualify as
disabled under the ADA. 1
29
Disabled though she might be under the ADA, this woman could
walk, drive, or take the bus to work. 3 ° She could attend school
and university without difficulty.13 ' She could communicate with
others, and participate in recreation and public entertainment.
32
She could gain ready access to health care and public services. 33
She could vote and otherwise participate in politics. 134 The people
around her would not identify her as "disabled," she would run no
risk of being socially or otherwise isolated, and she could scarcely
be said to belong to a "discrete and insular minority." Yet the
Congressional findings, which constitute the ADA's preamble, re-
127. See 29 CFR § 1630.20) (2004).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
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inforce at every turn a picture of a well-defined, isolated group that
the Act was intended to benefit. Persons disabled solely in work
do not obviously belong to such a minority.
"[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate indi-
viduals with disabilities," begins the second subsection of the find-
ings. 135 Alluding to other globally apparent, immutable attributes,
comparable to blindness, deafness, or paralysis, Congress found
that "unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on
the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, indi-
viduals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility have often had no legal recourse to address such
discrimination. ' 136 Congress further found that "census data, na-
tional polls, and other studies have documented that people with
disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and
are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically,
and educationally.' '1 37
The legislative history provides further evidence that Congress
viewed the disabled as a "discrete and insular minority." The Sen-
ators who introduced the ADA in 1989 often invoked the memory
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, commenting that passing the ADA
would commemorate that earlier watershed, on its 25th anniver-
sary, in a most fitting manner.1 38 At many places in the record of
floor debate, legislators described the disabled as a "minority," im-
plicitly comparable to a racial minority such as African-Ameri-
cans.1 39 Senator Edward Kennedy proclaimed that the ADA
would help "end this American apartheid. ' 140 Now, on the 25th
anniversary of the 1964 Act, Kennedy claimed it was time to do for
the disabled what the earlier Act had done for African-
Americans. 41
The House Education and Labor Committee found the disabled
to be the country's "largest minority,1' 42 and declared that "indi-
viduals with disabilities are a discrete, specific minority who have
been insulated in many respects from the general public.' 43 The
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1990).
136. Id. § 12101(a)(4).
137. Id. § 12101(a)(6).
138. See, e.g., S. 4992, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
139. See, e.g., S. 4985, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Harkin); S. 4986,
101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
140. See, e.g., S. 4984, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
141. Id.
142. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 49 (1990).
143. Id. at 40.
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Committee also found that the disabled as a group were politically
weak; for this reason it had taken a full twenty-five years since the
1964 Act to pass a law protecting their civil rights.144 "In sum,"
stated the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, "the
unfortunate truth is that individuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and lim-
itations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society .... 45
Persons who are limited only in the major life activity of working
may not belong to the minority which Congress imagined. This
mismatch of categories argues for striking work from the list of
major life activities under the ADA. The repeated Congressional
references to a "discrete and insular minority," however, served a
purpose unrelated to the substantive provisions of the Act, limiting
their value as a guide to Congressional intent. To subject state and
local governments to the Act's authority,146 Congress needed to in-
voke its enforcement authority under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 One can therefore argue that
Congress deployed the term "discrete and insular minority" chiefly
(or only) to shield the Act from attacks on its constitutionality, and
not to express its intentions as to how the Act should be construed.
This argument gains strength from the recognition that the disabled
population of the United States, taken as a whole, does not consti-
tute a "suspect classification" as defined in Carolene Products and
subsequent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The disabled
are not insular, as they live scattered among all classes, races, and
ethnicities of society. They do not reside in definable geographic
enclaves. Congressional findings notwithstanding,1 48 they have not
been subject to purposeful unequal treatment, at least not to the
extent experienced by African-Americans, women, or even some
immigrant groups in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
disabled have also not been "relegated to a position of political
144. Id.
145. S. Rep. No. 101-116, pt. 1, at 15 (1989).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000); see Burgdorf, supra note 9, at 436-39. "It is the
purpose of this chapter to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the Fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabili-
ties." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). "Individuals with disabilities... have been...
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment." Id.
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powerlessness. '' 149 No government in the United States has ever
deprived the disabled of the vote, or excluded them as a group
from jury service or public office, as Franklin Delano Roosevelt
demonstrated.150
3. The ADA's Purpose: The Centrality of Work
If the members of Congress often hailed the ADA as a new civil
rights act, just as often they hailed it as a program to get the dis-
abled into the workforce.15 1 They also promised that it would save
the Federal and state governments billions of dollars each year in
support payments currently made to the unemployed disabled.152
This central purpose of the Act argues strongly for retaining work
as a major life activity under the Act. Addressing the Senate on
the day the ADA was brought to the floor, Senator Simon made
clear that work enjoyed a special importance among the benefits
from which the disabled were so often excluded: "The Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, 'in our society it is murder, psy-
chologically, to deprive a man of a job or an income. You are in
substance saying to that man that he has no right to exist."' 153 Dr.
King's comment explains why work deserved to be included in the
life activities that help define disability: it is almost as necessary to
life as are breathing, seeing, or walking. Even a seemingly minor
impairment can have grave consequences if it excludes someone
from the workplace.
The centrality of work marked federal disability legislation at its
inception. The original Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defined disabil-
ity only as an obstacle to employability.'54 The following year,
Congress decided that this definition was too narrow, and created
the definition later incorporated into the ADA. In deliberating on
the ADA, Congress referred often to recent studies which showed
that a great majority of the disabled were unemployed; as a conse-
quence, disproportionate numbers of the disabled lived in poverty.
Senator Durenberger admonished that for the disabled, without
149. Id.
150. See THE WHITE HOUSE: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/fr32.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
151. See Ulgen, supra note 8, at 765-73.
152. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 17-18 (1989); see S. 4986, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989)
(remarks of Sen. Harkin); see also S. 4995, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Simon).
153. S. 4996, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
154. H.R. Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 7(6) (1973).
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work "[t]here is no hope, there is no sense of self-worth. ' 155 Sena-
tor Riegle emphasized that the disabled needed independence and
self-sufficiency, and also advocated changing the requirements for
Social Security disability benefits, to encourage more disabled citi-
zens to return to work.156
Legislators also tended to offer work as a principal reason for
mandating disabled access to transportation. Senator Durenberger
cited a Harris poll showing that three of ten disabled persons stated
that lack of transportation was a reason why they had no employ-
ment.1 57 Transportation, he concluded, was "essential if a person is
to seek and maintain a job. ' 158 The House Public Works and
Transportation Committee, after listing benefits that the disabled
will enjoy once they can use public transportation, concluded by
adding "and most of all, taking pride in a job well done."'1 59
Finding "staggering levels of unemployment and poverty," the
House Education and Labor Committee quoted with approval
from the conclusions of a recent Louis Harris study of the disabled:
"'not working' is perhaps the truest definition of what it means to
be disabled in America.' 160 Senator Harkin, as the principal spon-
sor when the ADA was brought to the Senate floor in 1989, like-
wise quoted this passage from the Harris poll. 161 Senator Harkin
also cited a statistic from the Harris poll, one which appears at
many other points in the legislative record: that some two-thirds of
all working-aged disabled Americans were not working, although a
large majority of this group wanted to work. 162
If work was absolutely essential to the hopes of disabled Ameri-
cans, securing employment for the disabled promised enormous
benefits to American society, in the eyes of legislators and other
political leaders. Senator Harkin asserted that the Federal Gov-
ernment spent some $60 billion each year on support payments to
persons who could not work because of their disabilities. 163 By
ending discrimination, the ADA could put these people back to
work, allowing savings in these disability programs. The disabled
who returned to work would now also be able to pay income tax,
155. S. 4994, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
156. S. 4997, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
157. S. 4994.
158. Id.
159. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at 58.
160. Id. pt. 2, at 32.
161. S. 4979.
162. Id.; see also id. (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
163. S. 4986, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989); see S. 4987, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
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improving the government's fiscal condition, and could also
purchase more consumer goods, stimulating the economy.164 Sena-
tor Simon, including in his calculation the cost of state welfare pro-
grams for the disabled, asserted that discrimination against the
disabled cost the United States some $300 billion every year.
165
The significance of this particular argument may be diminished by
its obvious tactical utility: in the floor debate just cited, Harkin in-
voked these economic benefits in the context of arguing that the
ADA's regulations would not impose excessive costs on business
and government.166
Other legislators argued that the United States faced a shortage
of skilled labor in coming decades, and would sacrifice considera-
ble economic growth by failing to draw on the talents of the dis-
abled. 167 Senator Durenberger set a dramatic tone, proclaiming
that "America over the next two decades will be in a fight for eco-
nomic survival," and could not afford to waste the talents of the
disabled. 6
8
Congress clearly indicated that a central purpose of the ADA
was to make it possible for disabled Americans to secure and retain
gainful employment. It is therefore difficult to see how Congress
could have countenanced removing work, of all the major life ac-
tivities, from the Act's definition of disability. Moreover, Congress
repeatedly and explicitly stated that work was a major life activity,
as will be seen in the next section.
4. Naming the Major Life Activities
When crafting the ADA, Congress made clear that work counted
as a major life activity for the purpose of defining disability by re-
peating the standard agency list of major life activities, at several
points throughout the deliberations concerning the ADA.169 In an-
alyzing the draft legislation, the House Committee on Education
and Labor explained that "[a] 'major life activity' means functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, and participat-
ing in community activities."' 7 0  Similar or identical lists, all
containing "work" or "working," appear in the reports of the
164. S. 4986, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989); see S. 4987, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
165. S. 4995, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
166. S. 4986; see S. 4987.
167. See, e.g., S. 4995 (statement of Sen. Simon).
168. S. 4994, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
169. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
170. Id.
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House Judiciary Committee' 71 and the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee.172
The House Judiciary Committee gave a telling example of a disa-
bility rooted in the major life activity of working: if a painter were
instructed by her employer to work with a specific paint that
caused "severe allergies, such as skin rashes and seizures, the per-
son would be substantially limited in a major life activity. ' 173 This
example indicates that Congress did not just accept the idea that
work was a major life activity. Congress embraced work as part of
the disability definition, and did so emphatically, by choosing as an
example a person who clearly would not be disabled outside the
workplace.
Congress also signaled its intention to include work among the
major life activities by repeatedly invoking the pertinent regula-
tions which implemented the Rehabilitation Act 174 and the 1988
Fair Housing Act Amendments.1 75 These regulations included
work on lists of major life activities.176 In introducing the ADA, on
behalf of thirty-two sponsors of both parties, Senator Harkin re-
ferred his colleagues to these regulations for an explanation of such
terms as "impairment" and "major life activity.' 1 77 The Senate
committee that reported on the bill likewise embraced the agency
analysis of the term disability (used interchangeably with "handi-
cap" as contained in these regulations), and declared its intent that
this analysis "apply to the definition of the term 'disability' in-
cluded in this legislation.' 78 Observing that the regulations issued
under the Rehabilitation Act used the term "handicap" instead of
"disability," the Committee emphasized that the term "handicap"
was being discarded only because it offended many persons with
disabilities: "[n]o change in definition or substance is intended nor
should be attributed to this change in phraseology. ' 179 Identical
language, referencing the same regulations and explaining the
change in terminology, appears in the report of the House Educa-
tion and Labor Committee.18 0 The intent of Congress could not be
171. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990).
172. See Committee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., Legislative History of
Public Law 101-336 (1990).
173. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990).
174. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (1989).
175. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1989).
176. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1989).
177. S. 4986, 101st Cong. (May 9, 1989).
178. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 119 (1990).
179. Id.
180. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990).
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clearer: the agency regulations, and the list of major life activities
they contained, were to have the force of law.
Il. ARGUMENTS THAT WORK, AND ARGUMENTS
THAT WORK Too HARD
The Supreme Court contends that the argument for making
work a major life activity does not withstand closer examination.181
It makes no sense for the Court to cite the passage which the Court
quotes approvingly in Sutton. In the preceding sentence to the pas-
sage, the Court acknowledges the conceptual difficulty of defining
"major life activities" and the possibility of circularity.182 Addi-
tionally, the Court itself had commented in a footnote in Arline, a
prior case, that "[t]he argument is not circular, however, but di-
rect.' 1 83 The Sutton court also contended that "even the EEOC"
had expressed "reluctance" about keeping work as a major life ac-
tivity under the Act.184 The Court based this contention on a
highly selective reading of the agency's regulations, and over-
looked the most obvious explanation for the EEOC's recommen-
dation that plaintiffs and judges first ask whether a claimant is
limited in another major life activity, before conducting the analy-
sis with respect to work: work is more difficult to define, so that
claiming it as a major life activity requires a more complicated
analysis, and imposes greater evidentiary burdens upon the
plaintiff.'85
In Toyota the Court clearly implied that any "major life activity"
under the ADA would have to include those activities that are cen-
tral to most people's daily lives. 186 Followed to its logical conclu-
sion, this new standard would exclude work from the definition of
"major life activities."' 87 Yet the Court itself explicitly considered
and rejected this "daily life" standard in Bragdon, and held that
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1987).
184. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. at 471, 492 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.20) (1999)).
185. This is based chiefly on the difficulty experienced by the courts in determining
whether or not plaintiffs are substantially limited in the major life activity of work.
See generally Russell, supra note 87.
186. See supra notes 89-94.
187. This is assuming that one also adopts the Court's position that an individual's
work is "not central to daily life," on the reasoning that the specific tasks comprising
an individual's job are not part of daily life for most people, who necessarily perform
different tasks in different jobs. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, at 200-01. (2002).
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reproduction and childrearing constituted a major life activity
under the ADA, although reproduction is clearly not central to
daily life.'88 The Court's reasoning in Toyota also breaks down on
its own terms, when the Court quotes dictionary definitions of
"major" as "'greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest,"" 89
and in the next sentence declares: "'[m]ajor life activities' thus re-
fers to those activities that are of central importance to daily
life."'190 The definition stated for "major" is broad and inclusive,
and the Court has stated no reason for insisting that "daily life" is
an important, much less essential, component of this definition.19'
The Court's rigid interpretation of "major" is also inconsistent with
the individualized nature of the disability determination, which, in
the Act's language, is to be made "with respect to an individual,"
assessing the limitations an impairment imposes on "the major life
activities of such individual."'92
The three governmental agencies charged with implementing the
ADA have all stated in their regulations that work is a major life
activity. Although the Court in Sutton held that these regulations,
insofar as they address the Act's definition of disability, do not
have the force of law, the courts have traditionally accorded their
views some deference, in recognition of their specialized expertise
in the law and policy relevant to their areas of authority.193
The Act's preamble and legislative history, as evidence of Con-
gressional intent, may place the inquiry on firmer ground. At first
glance, the Act's preamble, and some of the legislative history,
seems to suggest that Congress did not have the work-disabled in
mind when drafting the statute. By stating in the preamble that
"some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities,"' 94 Congress collapsed the three components of the
disability definition ("impairment," "substantially limits," "major
life activity") into the impairment prong. Under this compressed
definition, many major life activities are still comprehensible, for
example, where the impairment is an inability to see. The major
188. See Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624, 638-41 (1998); see supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
189. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) (citing WEB-
STER'S, supra note 66, at 1363).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 198.
192. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
193. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 501-02 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990).
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life activity of work, however, makes little sense under such a defi-
nition, because any impairment that might limit work, for example
bad eyesight, is conceptually distinct from the activity itself. This
compressed definition of disability, however, is probably just that:
a quotable shorthand intended to make the ADA comprehensible
and attractive to the general public. Attaching a larger significance
to this passage in the preamble makes little sense. Other language
in the preamble raises a more troubling issue.
At several points in the preamble, Congress described disabled
Americans as "a discrete and insular minority," a category that
probably would not include persons whose disability only limited
their major life activity of work.195 When referring to "discrete and
insular minorities," however, Congress had a very specific agenda,
one that had little to do with crafting the Act's substantive provi-
sions: by repeatedly intoning the language of leading Fourteenth
Amendment cases, in a manner that seems almost ritualistic, Con-
gress sought to buttress its constitutional authority to impose the
ADA upon state and local governments. It is difficult to see why
Congress, without such a motive, would describe the disabled as a
"discrete and insular minority,... relegated to a position of politi-
cal powerlessness," because the disabled in this country are neither
insular nor powerless.
Even if one assumes that Congress actually thought of the dis-
abled as being a minority in the Carolene Products sense of the
term, this does not necessarily argue for removing the work-dis-
abled from the protection of the Act. Congress enacted the ADA
with more than one purpose in mind, and these purposes are not
mutually exclusive. Congress has stated clearly that a central pur-
pose of the Act was to remove barriers that prevented the disabled
from securing and retaining gainful employment. 196 At more than
one point, Congress adopted the statement of Lou Harris that
"'not working' is perhaps the truest definition of what it means to
be disabled in America."197 For the disabled, Congress observed,
work was essential to a decent standard of living and a basic self-
respect. For society, continued exclusion of the disabled from the
workforce meant the loss of skilled labor and the annual drain of
billions of dollars in support payments. In light of this purpose,
Congress could not have intended that work be stricken from the
195. See supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 147-64 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 160.
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ADA's definition of disability. Congress also explicitly stated that
work was part of that definition.
The legislative history makes clear that Congress relied upon the
list of major life activities developed by regulatory agencies pursu-
ant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 1988. These regulations include work on the list
of major life activities, and Congressional committees also re-
peated these lists verbatim in their reports, as did members of Con-
gress in floor debate. Congress also effectively incorporated this
regulatory list into the ADA itself, in the Act's section on construc-
tion, which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter [i.e., the ADA as a whole] shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973... or the regulations issued pursuant
to such title.198
Quoting this provision in Bragdon, in the context of determining
whether or not reproduction is a major life activity under the
ADA, the Supreme Court concluded that "[this] directive requires
us to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as
provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation
Act."' 9 9 Therefore, the major life activity of work is part of the
ADA, just as surely as if it had been named in the plain language of
the statute.
CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court has questioned whether work should con-
tinue to be treated as a major life activity under the ADA, stating
two grounds for doubt: that making work a major life activity rests
on a circular argument, and that the EEOC itself has expressed
"reluctance" to include work in the Act's definition of disability.
Neither claim withstands scrutiny. The Court's Toyota standard for
defining major life activities, that they must include activities "cen-
tral to daily life," founders on its own illogic, and cannot be recon-
ciled with precedent.
The Act's section on construction incorporates into the Act reg-
ulations that include work on a list of major life activities. The
courts are bound to follow this mandated construction of the stat-
ute. If a court does not regard this construction as authoritative,
198. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004).
199. See supra note 111.
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evidence of Congressional intent still points overwhelmingly to one
conclusion: Congress intended that work be considered a major life
activity under the ADA, and saw work as central to the Act's over-
riding objectives. Therefore, it is an impermissible construction of
the Americans with Disabilities Act to hold that work is not a ma-
jor life activity under this Act. And, even if such a construction
were permissible, it would at best be highly implausible.
WRITING ON THE WALL OF SEPARATION:
UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC POSTING OF
RELIGIOUS DUTIES AND SECTARIAN
VERSIONS OF SACRED TEXTS AS AN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION IN
TEN COMMANDMENTS CASES
David C. Pollack*
INTRODUCTION
When a moving company arrived in Montgomery last summer to
relieve the Alabama State Judicial Building of a two-and-a-half ton
granite monument entrenched in its rotunda, the movers were
greeted by shouts of "Pray the wheels crumble!" and "Lord, it's
never too late to repent."' One protester even demanded: "Cow-
ards! Open the door! Let me in there!"2 The monument was in-
scribed with a translation of the Ten Commandments3 from the
King James Bible and was often the site of prayer services attended
by government officials and other members of the public.4 Its
shape-two adjacent tablets, each rounded at the top'-recalled
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A., History, Johns
Hopkins University, 2001. I wish to express my sincere thanks to Marc Stern of the
American Jewish Congress and Professor Abraham Abramovsky for their assistance
and (especially) their patience in helping me complete this Note. I also wish to thank
my family for their encouragement and attention. Finally, I dedicate this Note to my
late grandfather, Bernard Meislin, whose love of Jewish culture, writing, and law (not
to mention athletics) earned the adoration of all that were fortunate enough to have
known him. I miss him more every day, and I only hope that I am making him proud.
1. Jeffrey Gettleman, Monument is Now Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A14.
2. Id.
3. Throughout this Note, the terms "Decalogue" and "Ten Commandments" are
used interchangeably to refer to any and all of the common renderings of the biblical
text, Exodus 20:2-14 (Jewish Publication Society) and Deuteronomy 5:6-18 (Jewish
Publication Society). As explained below, this necessary shorthand obfuscates impor-
tant differences in the way distinct religious traditions have translated, divided,
named, and enumerated the relevant text. See infra notes 27-90 and accompanying
text.
4. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
5. Id. at 1285. The two tablets were arranged side by side, corresponding to one
traditional religious view of the division between the Commandments. See id. at 1285
n.1 (quoting defendant Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore's assertion that the Com-
mandments inscribed on one tablet "represent[ ] the duties which we owe to GOD,"
whereas the Commandments inscribed on the other tablet "represent[] the duties
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that most ancient of religious documents, which in keeping with its
namesake, summons divine authority to literally command its read-
ers to obey between ten and twelve religious duties.6 Installed in
2001 by former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore,
shortly after his election and campaign as the "Ten Command-
ments Judge," 7 the monument and its removal signaled the end of
an ordeal that lasted more than a decade.8 This legal sideshow fea-
tured everything from popular protest9 and wasteful lawsuits' ° to
threats of civil disobedience by Moore" and a governor's rhetoric
recalling Alabama's notorious stand against desegregation.' 2 It
was only pursuant to multiple federal court orders,'13 the last com-
which we owe to each other"). But see Ronald Youngblood, Counting the Ten Com-
mandments, BIBLICAL REV., Dec. 1994, at 34 (noting that the "more likely explana-
tion for there being two stone tablets" is that, in accordance with "ancient covenant
practices," there were "[t]wo complete copies" of the original Decalogue, each of
which "contained all ten of the commandments," with one copy belonging to God and
the other "belong[ing] to the vassal (Israel)").
6. As explained below, what some denominations consider a formal Command-
ment, others do not; likewise, what certain sects view as two separate Command-
ments, others view as only one. See infra notes 27-90 and accompanying text.
7. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288.
8. Moore made his name as a Decalogue-brandishing bureaucrat while serving as
a state circuit court judge in Etowah County. Id. at 1284. Elected in 1992, he soon
hung behind the bench in his courtroom a wooden plaque into which he had person-
ally hand-carved a version of the Ten Commandments. Id.; Marlon Manuel, AT-
LANTA J. AND CONST., Nov. 1, 1998, at 14A. Moore regularly invited clergy members
to lead prayer at jury-organizing sessions, Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284, and when the
American Civil Liberties Union requested that he discontinue the practice and re-
move the plaque he refused and litigation ensued. See State ex rel. James v. ACLU of
Ala., 711 So. 2d 952, 967 (Ala. 1998). After a higher Alabama court judge ordered
him to remove the plaque, Moore flouted the order, winning the attention and sup-
port of then-governor Fob James. See Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to
the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 551 (1998).
9. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
10. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284 (referring to "two high-profile lawsuits in 1995 ...
one filed by a nonprofit organization seeking an injunction and the other brought by
the State of Alabama seeking a declaratory judgment that then-Judge Moore's actions
were not unconstitutional").
11. See Kim Cobb, ACLU Targets Judge Displaying Ten Commandments, Hous-
TON CHRON., May 21, 1995, at All.
12. See Baugh, supra note 8, at 511 n.3 (comparing James' vow to forcibly prevent
the removal of Moore's hand-carved Decalogue from the courtroom to the actions of
former Alabama governor George Wallace, who, in 1963, "stood in the schoolhouse
door at the University of Alabama to prevent the registration of two black students").
13. See Gettleman, supra note 1.
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ing in no uncertain terms from the Eleventh Circuit,14 that Moore's
penchant for Decalogue-posting ceased.15
The Alabama spectacle and other cases involving the posting of
the Ten Commandments on government property scream out for a
clear response to the question: On which side of Thomas Jeffer-
son's "wall of separation between church and State' 1 6 do public
displays of the Ten Commandments fall? This Note seeks to an-
swer the question by analyzing the text of the Ten Commandments
as a religious document. Because many of the Commandments ex-
plicitly purport to mandate and forbid particular theological beliefs
and worship, and because the document is vulnerable to a number
of conflicting sectarian interpretations, I will argue that the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment17 forbids its public
posting.
Part I of this Note discusses the religious obligations set forth in
apodictic fashion in the Decalogue. It also explains that three ma-
jor religions-Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism-each
maintain a disparate and conflicting version of the document, not-
withstanding the endeavors of some to elide all differences in so-
called "ecumenical" or hybrid versions of the text. Part II consid-
ers the case law in the area, discussing the relevant applications of
the Establishment Clause to Ten Commandments displays. Part III
then examines the split between courts regarding the constitutional
implications of publicly posting a version of the Ten Command-
ments inspired by Protestant translation and enumeration. Part III
also looks at the posting of the hybrid versions of the Command-
ments and the split between courts over whether the putative amal-
gamation of the versions fairs any better under constitutional
14. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1303 ('"The rule of law does require that every person
obey judicial orders .... The chief justice of a state supreme court, of all people,
should be expected to abide by that principle. We do expect that ... when the time
comes Chief Justice Moore will obey that order. If necessary, the court order will be
enforced. The rule of law will prevail.").
15. See Gettleman, supra note 1. Since refusing to obey court orders to remove
the monument, Judge Moore has been removed from office. Jeffrey Weiss, Ten Com-
mandments are back; But this courthouse display isn't stirring up as much trouble,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 2004, at 4G. In place of the old monument, the
Alabama Supreme Court created a display of "historical documents" alongside En-
glish and Hebrew versions of the Ten Commandments. The display included copies of
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights among
other documents. Id.
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting President Jeffer-
son's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association dated Jan. 1, 1802).
17. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion .... ").
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scrutiny. Finally, Part IV suggests an answer to each split, arguing
both that the choice of the recognized Protestant version impermis-
sibly endorses one denomination over all others and that the ecu-
menical version of the Commandments is no less constitutionally
infirm.
PART I. THE DECALOGUE, ITS VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS,
AND ITS POSTING IN AMERICA
Because some may be unfamiliar with the Ten Command-
ments,' 8 section A of this part of the Note briefly discusses their
place in Western religion. Section B then analyzes the text of the
Commandments themselves, focusing on both the theological na-
ture of the edicts and the substantive differences between the au-
thoritative versions of the Decalogue propagated by the major
religious denominations. 19 Finally, Section C considers the various
hybrid versions of the Ten Commandments in America and pro-
poses federal and state legislation seeking to guarantee their public
posting.
A. Background
According to the Hebrew Bible, the ancestors of the Jewish peo-
ple, referred to as the Hebrews, were enslaved in Egypt until a
deity known as "YHVH," or God, brought them out of the land
through a series of miracles.2" Amidst thunder and lightning, and
atop a cloud-covered mountain outside Egypt, the narrative states,
God gave two stone tablets to the leader of the Hebrews, Moses.2'
On the tablets, God inscribed what many refer to-not without a
18. According to studies by associates at the Graduate School of the City of New
York, just under two million Americans considered themselves to be followers of the
Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, or Taoist religions in 2001, while another approximately 1.9
million considered themselves atheists or agnostics. Largest Religious Groups in the
USA, at http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html#religions (last visited Oct. 5, 2004)
[hereinafter Adherents.com]. More than 27 million labeled themselves "secular." Id.
19. At least one other law student has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the Ten
Commandments. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as
a Historical Document in Public Schools, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1041-43 (2002). Al-
though I hope and believe that I have added a new perspective, particularly with
respect to the differing versions of the Commandments, I recognize that a law Note is
not the place for an exhaustive theological treatise on the Ten Commandments. For a
more thorough examination of the religious, moral, and historical issues surrounding
the Decalogue, see generally WALTER J. HARRELSON, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15-18 (1997) and his discussion of other secondary sources.
20. See generally Exodus 1:8-15:21.
21. Exodus 24:12, 32:15.
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controversy in its own right 22-as the Ten Commandments. 23 Al-
though most sects of the major western religions accept the basis of
this account, they are wedded to their particular interpretations of
the Hebrew text.24 This is true not only with respect to the choice
of translation of the Bible as a whole-the King James version for
Protestants, for instance25-but also with respect to the divisions,
enumeration, and translation of the Decalogue in particular.2 6
22. See Rabbi Neil Gillman, The Ten Commandments? Yitro: Portion of the Week,
N.J. JEWISH NEWS, Feb. 12, 2004, at 26 ("In regard to the so-called Ten Command-
ments, note first that they are not all commandments. The Hebrew term for com-
mand, mitzva, appears nowhere in the passage."),' available at http://
www.njjewishnews.com/njjn.com/21204/torahcommandments.html.
23. Deuteronomy 10:4; see Youngblood, supra note 5, at 30. The Bible actually
refers to the Ten Commandments as the aseret haddevarim, "the ten things," while
current Jewish sources refer to them as aseret hadibrot, or "the ten utterances." See
ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 441 (Jewish Publication Society ed., 2001)
(1985) [hereinafter ETZ HAYIM]. To further complicate the issue, scholars debate
whether these ten "things" or "utterances" were the same Ten Commandments that
we are familiar with today, as there is evidence of "another Decalogue" located in
Exodus 34:14-26. HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 27-33.
24. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1971) (detailing the conflict
between Protestants and Catholics over the use of the King James version of the Bible
in public schools).
25. See id.
26. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1032 (8th Cir.
2004) (citing one source which discusses a nineteenth-century massacre resulting from
a debate over which denomination's version of the Commandments should be posted
in public schools). Although I have found no book-length scholarly treatment of the
different versions of the Decalogue corresponding to the major religious denomina-
tions, scholars routinely refer to differences and conflicts between each denomina-
tion's version of the Ten Commandments. E.g., HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40
(displaying chart comparing versions of the Ten Commandments); Bernard Meislin,
The Role of the Ten Commandments in American Judicial Decisions, in JEWISH LAW
ASSOCIATION STUDIES III, at 190, 205-09 (A. M. Fuss, ed., 1987) (same) [hereinafter
Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments]; Youngblood, supra note 5, at 34-35 (same);
see Bill Broadway, A New Judgment Day for Decalogue Displays; As Issue Nears High
Court, Argument Develops over Differing Versions of Ten Commandments, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 2004, at B9. There are also disagreements over accounts of the Deca-
logue within religious groups. ETZ HAYIM, supra note 23, at 442. Irrespective of this
fact, however, this Note focuses on the tension between the major religions them-
selves on the issues of division, enumeration, and translation of the Decalogue. Of
course, these divergences in translation are more significant than those that inevitably
arise from differences in style and word choice. Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Jewish Congress at 6, Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-
16708-DD, 02-16949DD) (explaining that these divergences reflect a "theological dif-
ference of great moment," and are not merely "insignificant differences of style and
word choice inevitable in any translation"); HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 38.
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B. Religious Obligations Within-and Sectarian Disputes
Over-the Decalogue
1. The Duty to Worship God Alone
The first obligation enumerated in the Decalogue is a purely re-
ligious one: "I the LORD am your God who brought you out of
the land of Egypt, the house of bondage."27 These words consti-
tute a requirement to "believe in God's existence... [i.e. to believe
in] a cause and motive force behind all that exists," to "accept the
yoke of God's sovereignty [and] to recognize God as the Supreme
Authority. 28 Thus, anyone sympathetic to the notion that God
might not exist, including atheists and agnostics,2 9 are guilty of "a
sin against the virtue of religion" through their beliefs.3" Accord-
ing to one research group, 902,000 atheists and 991,000 agnostics
lived in America in 2001.31
Although Judaism and Christianity are in agreement that God
alone must be worshiped, they differ with regard to how this tenet
is expressed in the revelatory text. The prevailing Hebrew version
of the Decalogue makes the words "I am the LORD thy God, who
brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bond-
age," the First Commandment,32 while Christian denominations
often consider this verse a prologue to the rest of the text.33 In
addition, Christian versions of the Decalogue often omit the refer-
ence to redemption from Egypt. As one commentator observed,
this difference is not only "important and real," but "theologically
inspired. '34 It reflects the fact that the Exodus story is fundamen-
27. Exodus 20:2 (Jewish Publication Society); see THE TORAH: A MODERN COM-
MENTARY 539 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., Union of Am. Hebrew Congregations ed. 1981)
(1974). Some translations begin, "I the Lord am your God." See ETz HAYIM, supra
note 23, at 442.
28. See ETZ HAYIM, supra note 23, at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted). But
see id. (noting that other Jewish commentators over the years have disagreed that this
Commandment, in itself, orders readers to believe in God).
29. Cf MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 31-32 (1997) (defining the terms "atheistic" and "agnostic").
30. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 515-16 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana
ed., U.S. Catholic Conference, Inc. trans., 1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM]; see ACLU
Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1032-33 (noting that the Ten Commandments monument
excludes the "non-religious").
31. Adherents.com, supra note 18.
32. See Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 205.
33. See HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 43-45; Meislin, Role of the Ten Command-
ments, supra note 26, at 205; see also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2003) (noting that Moore's Decalogue monument began with the phrase "I am
the Lord thy God" and omits the reference to slavery in Egypt).
34. HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 38.
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tal to the Jewish faith, while it occupies a less prominent role in
Christianity.35
The Second Commandment in Judaism is thus the First Com-
mandment according to most Christian denominations. 36 It pro-
hibits polytheism and any other religious practice not centered on
the author-deity: "You shall37 have no other gods beside me. "38
While the Commandment can also refer, metaphorically, to an ob-
ligation to refrain from "rever[ing] a creature'in place of God...
[such as] power, pleasure, race ... etc,"'39 the most obvious reading
regards beliefs in other "gods or demons" and clearly forbids "false
pagan worship. ' 40 Thus, the text explicitly rejects the beliefs main-
tained by Wiccans and other arguably polytheistic and nontheistic
faiths, such as Buddhism and Hinduism.41 There were 1,082,000
Buddhists, 766,000 Hindus, and 307,000 Wiccans42 residing in the
United States in 2001;43 other non-biblical faiths such as Sikhism
and Native American religions grew at rates greater than one-hun-
dred percent between 1990 and 2000.44
35. Cf. Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 205.
36. See id. at 205-06.
37. The King James version of the Bible, used by most English-speaking Protes-
tants, renders all affected Commandments as "thou shalt" rather than "you shall."
Exodus 20:3-5, 7, 13-17 (King James). Some homilies attach religious significance to
this point:
Yes, it is true that God was speaking to Moses and at the same time to the
more than one million Israelites. But He did not speak as an individual
would be [sic] to a mass of people, as from "me" to "you all," as from "me"
singular to "you" plural. No. What we have here is more than a million
people being spoken to as to each man and woman and child, using the sec-
ond person singular "thou."
The First Commandment, at http://www.calvaryroadbaptist.org/sermon thefirst_
commandment.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
38. Exodus 20:3 (Jewish Publication Society); see HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40
(displaying traditional Catholic and Protestant division); THE TORAH: A MODERN
COMMENTARY, supra note 27, at 534 (displaying traditional Jewish division).
39. CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 515.
40. Id.
41. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1032-33 (8th Cir.
2004); cf. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing
the Wiccan faith as "an earth-based religion reconstructed from ancient Pagan be-
liefs"); ALAIN DANItLOU, THE M'rHs AND GODS OF INDIA: THE CLASSIC WORK ON
HINDU POLYTHEISM 3-4 (Alain Dani6lou trans., Inner Traditions Int'l, 2d ed. 1991)
(1964).
42. Adherents.com, supra note 18. Included in this number are those Americans
who consider themselves "Druids" or "Pagans." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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2. "Graven Images"
According to the Jewish version of the Decalogue, the following
passage is a continuation of the injunction against polytheism:
You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image, or any like-
ness of what is in the heavens above, or on the earth below, or in
the waters under the earth. You shall not bow down to them or
serve them. For I the LORD your God am an impassioned
God, visiting the guilt of the parents upon the children, upon the
third and upon the fourth generations of those who reject Me,
but showing kindness to the thousandth generation of those who
love Me and keep My commandments.45
In most Protestant sects (and in Eastern Orthodox Christianity),
however, the prohibition of polytheistic belief stands alone as the
First Commandment, while the duty to refrain from creating
"graven images, ' ' 46 comprises the Second Commandment in its en-
tirety.47 More significantly, according to Catholic sources, the in-
junction against graven images is either encompassed within the
First Commandment (the injunction against polytheism) or omitted
entirely.48 This fact not only distinguishes the numbering of the
Catholic version-each successive Catholic Commandment is one
ordinal number behind its counterpart in the Protestant and Jewish
versions-but also reflects deep divisions at the core of Protestant
and Catholic identity.49
On the one hand, the Commandment against graven images
played a crucial role in the Protestant Reformation.5" In what was
"[o]ne of the earliest, and certainly one of the most intense contro-
versies to erupt in the sixteenth century, '51 according to one histo-
rian of Christianity, Reformed Church leaders brandished their
Second Commandment to advocate the removal of paintings and
45. Exodus 20:4-6 (Jewish Publication Society) (verse numbers omitted). To com-
plicate matters, some scholars and religionists posit an "original" version of the Com-
mandments, written on the stone tablets themselves, which is more concise. See
HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 33-34.
46. Exodus 20:4-6 (King James).
47. HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40.
48. Id.
49. Cf. Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 190. Interest-
ingly, the Lutheran faith follows the Catholic tradition in this respect, omitting the
Commandment against graven images from its Decalogue and maintaining the Catho-
lic enumeration. See David C. Steinmetz, The Reformation and the Ten Command-
ments, 43 INTERPRETATION 256, 257 (1989).
50. Steinmetz, supra note 49, at 257.
51. Id.
1370
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
sculptures.52 They argued that the use of religious icons could and
did lead to veneration of inanimate objects, fettering meaningful
religious worship. 53 In fact, John Calvin and other fathers of Prot-
estantism also saw the rejection of the Eucharist-a rejection cen-
tral to the doctrine of most Reformed Churches-as inextricably
linked to the directive of the Second Commandment.5 4 "[T]he
veneration of the elements of bread and wine" was, for these lead-
ers, like "the veneration of images and icons ... substituting the
creature for the creator, robbing God of the glory that belongs to
God alone." 55
On the other hand, Catholic authorities not only gainsaid this
logic, but also held fast to the essential value of religious images to
"'admonish and remind' Christians to direct their worship" prop-
erly. 6 Like the Eucharist, which remains a fundamental practice
of Catholicism to the present day, holy images were "sensible signs
that point to transcendent realities. ' 57 Accordingly, Catholic doc-
trine today encourages "the veneration of icons-of Christ, but
also of the Mother of God, the angels, and all the saints," so long as
it is "'a respectful veneration,' not the adoration due to God
alone."58 This logical but subtle explanation has caused Catholic
authorities to deal with the Commandment in a variety of ways.
Thus, while some scholars argue that the Church has essentially
"excised the injunction against graven images, '59 others-including
Catholic authorities themselves-argue that Catholicism continues
to incorporate the essential message of the injunction within its
First Commandment.6" In either case, the prohibition of images is
less prominent in Catholic tradition than in most Protestant tradi-
tions, at the very least not accounting for an apodictic Command-
ment in and of itself.
52. Id. at 258.
53. Id. Luther's ideology, which supported the use of images in worship, was the
exception to this general trend. See id. at 259.
54. Id. at 258-65.
55. Id. at 262.
56. Id. at 263 (quoting sixteenth century Catholic theologian John Eck); see CATE-
CHIsM, supra note 30, at 516-17.
57. Steinmetz, supra note 49, at 263.
58. CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 516-17.
59. Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 190.
60. CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 516. Still other Catholic sources interpret the
proscription to bar only the "carv[ing of] idols for yourselves," not the creation of an
"image" or a "likeness" which resembles the deity. Exodus 20:4 (New American Bi-
ble) (emphasis added). But see CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 516 (using the word
"image" in discussing the Commandment).
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Predictably, the differences between Protestants and Catholics
on this point were and continue to be a major source of anti-Catho-
lic sentiment.6' In his 1923 screed, The Decalogue, an Archdeacon
of Westminster Abbey devoted more than a fifth of his argument
to the Commandment against graven images.
62
Much of this section was an attack on Catholicism. The
Anglican clergyman alleged that "the Church of Rome" feared and
shunned the Commandment, either "following it up with laboured
misrepresentations" or "omit[ting] it wholly. '63 Such renderings
were, according to the author, a "mental degradation ... unintel-
ligible outside the Church of the dark ages, and the Roman Church
which is their legitimate successor. '64 Given this error in such a
fundamental doctrine, it was no wonder that Catholicism sanc-
tioned acts akin to the worship of "the golden calves in Palestine"
and the practices of "the cultivated heathens in the first four
centuries. 65
Today, anti-Catholic websites parrot these accusations of her-
esy,66 while some Catholic websites respond in kind, attacking par-
ticular sects of Protestants for even discussing the Commandment
and its place in Catholicism. 67
3. Other Religious Obligations in the Decalogue
The Third Commandment according to Judaism and most de-
nominations of Protestantism is, for the above reasons, the Second
Commandment in Catholicism.68 This Commandment has been
61. See R.H. CHARLES, THE DECALOGUE: BEING THE WARBURTON LECTURES
DELIVERED IN LINCOLN'S INN AND WESTMINSTER ABBEY, 1919-1923, at 74-75 (T. &
T. Clark, ed. 1926) (declaring that "no Christian Church, whether Anglican, Re-
formed or Eastern, omits the second Commandment save that of Rome .... What
she has to do is to justify ... [this] omission..."); see also Catholics Take Out One of
the Ten Commandments!, at http://www.jesus-is-lord.com/tencomma.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004) (declaring that Catholics' "perverted Bibles have something that ap-
proximates the commandment to not make images, but since their leaders tell them
they are too spiritually dumb to understand the Bible, they don't read it (or read it
with muddy eyeballs)") [hereinafter Jesus-is-lord.com].
62. CHARLES, supra note 61, at 14-88.
63. Id. at 70.
64. Id. at 84.
65. Id. at 75.
66. See, e.g., Jesus-is-lord.com, supra note 61.
67. See, e.g., Mario Derksen, A Catholic Response to the SDA Misuse of "You shall
not make a graven image," at http://www.cathinsight.com/apologetics/adventism/im-
age.htm (last visted Oct. 18, 2004) (claiming that Seventh Day Adventists besmirch
Catholicism).
68. See HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40.
1372
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
described as the "vaguest"69 edict in the pericope, and its meaning
is disputed." In Jewish tradition, the duty, at least on its face, is
narrow:71 "You shall not swear falsely by the name of the LORD
your God; for the LORD will not clear one who swears falsely by
His name. ' 72 For followers of Christianity, however, the obligation
is more general, forbidding any manner of "tak[ing] the name of
the LORD thy God in vain. '73 Any attempt to criticize God is thus
forbidden by the Commandment, as an individual may not "intro-
duce [the name of God] into his own speech except to bless, praise,
and glorify it."' 4
The Fourth Commandment in Judaism and Protestantism (Third
Commandment in Catholicism) admonishes the reader to:
Remember the Sabbath day and keep it holy. Six days you shall
labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath of
the LORD your God: you shall not do any work-you, your son
or daughter, your male or female slave, or your cattle, or the
stranger who is within your settlements. For in six days the
LORD made heaven and earth and sea, and all that is in them,
and He rested on the seventh day; therefore the LORD blessed
the Sabbath day and hallowed it.75
While the text of this Commandment is not often debated, Jews
and Christians differ on the manner in which the Sabbath is com-
memorated. While Christians observe Sunday as the Sabbath, re-
ligious Jews observe the Sabbath on Saturday and adhere to a host
of complex Sabbath regulations not incorporated into Christian re-
ligious law.76
69. See Josiah Derby, The Third Commandment, 21 JEWISH BIBLE 0. 21, 24-25
(1993).
70. See id. at 25.
71. But see THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY, supra note 27, at 540 (noting
that "others render [the Hebrew verb as] 'take in vain' or 'abuse,"' suggesting a possi-
ble broader interpretation).
72. Exodus 20:7 (Jewish Publication Society).
73. Exodus 20:7 (King James); cf Exodus 20:7 (New American Bible).
74. CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 518. Catholicism also holds that the Command-
ment forbids even the "improper use" of the names of "the Virgin Mary and all
saints." Id. at 519.
75. Exodus 20:8-11 (Jewish Publication Society) (verse numbers omitted); see
Youngblood, supra note 5, at 34-35 (charting differences between the Fifth (Fourth)
Commandments in Exodus and Deuteronomy); cf Deuteronomy 5:12-15 (Jewish Pub-
lication Society) (differing from the Exodus version in its statement that the Sabbath
must be "observe[d]" rather than "remember[ed]" and explaining the rationale of the
Commandment as a commemoration of God's redeeming the Hebrews from slavery
in Egypt, rather than His creating the world).
76. Steinmetz, supra note 49, at 263.
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4. Commandments Not Regarding Worship
While the Fifth (Fourth) Commandment, which obligates respect
for one's parents, is interpreted relatively uniformly across denomi-
national lines,77 the translation of the Sixth (Fifth) Commandment
is yet another contentious issue.7 As understood in the accepted
Jewish version, the decree prohibits only "murder"; 79 for most
Christians, however, the decree is broader, declaring, "Thou shalt
not kill."80 As one Jewish commentator notes, "'[k]ill' and 'mur-
der' are words whose integrity is carefully guarded. ' 81 Whereas
the former "designates any taking of human life," the latter "is re-
served for unauthorized homicide, usually of a malicious nature.
82
Thus, the Jewish version of the Commandment does not speak to
"homicide of ... a judicial or military nature."83 For at least some
Jews, this fact epitomizes the difference between their own faith, "a
realistic, hard-headed system, committed to a law of justice," and
Christianity, which "naively and unrealistically" nurtures "a chaos
of love." 84
The Seventh (Sixth) Commandment, which forbids adultery, the
Eighth (Seventh) Commandment, which prohibits stealing,85 and
the Ninth (Eighth) Commandment, which enjoins bearing false
witness, are again translated in a relatively uniform manner, other
than differences in verse division.86
At the last verse, however, the Catholic division of the Com-
mandments again differs from the general Protestant and Jewish
versions. What the Jewish and Protestant traditions count as the
entire Tenth Commandment, "You shall not covet your neighbor's
wife, or his male or female slave, or his ox or his ass, or anything
77. See Exodus 20:12 (Jewish Publication Society); Exodus 20:12 (King James);
Exodus 20:12 (New American Bible).
78. See generally Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment-The Classic Jewish Dis-
cussion, 14 JUDAISM 159, 159-62 (1965); Rodney E. Ring, The Bible Does Not Say
"Thou Shalt Not Kill," 25 DIALOG 310, 310-11 (1986).
79. Exodus 20:13 (Jewish Publication Society).
80. See Exodus 20:13 (King James); Exodus 20:13 (New American Bible).
81. Blidstein, supra note 78, at 159.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. There is some controversy as to whether this Commandment actually prohibits
kidnapping rather than stealing. See Brief Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress
at 6, Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-16708-DD, 02-
16949DD).
86. HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40; see Exodus 20:13 (Jewish Publication Soci-
ety); Exodus 20:13-16 (King James); Exodus 20:13-16 (New American Bible).
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that is your neighbor's, '8 7 the Catholic Church divides into two. 88
It is not clear exactly where in the text this division arises, but
Catholic authorities state that "the ninth commandment forbids
carnal concupiscence, 89 while "the tenth forbids coveting an-
other's goods." 90
C. Hybrid Decalogues and the Posting of the Ten
Commandments in America
1. "Unique" Versions
Despite the difficulty inherent in defining the Ten Command-
ments, many Americans have long been fascinated by them.91
Capitalizing on this fact, Hollywood producer Cecil B. DeMille,
whose biblical extravaganza "The Ten Commandments" hit thea-
ters at the height of the Cold War, worked with an organization
called the Fraternal Order of Eagles ("FOE") to publicize his film.
Together, FOE and DeMille erected as many as 2000 graphite
monuments, each engraved with "unique" versions of the Deca-
logue, and often accompanied by elaborate dedication rituals in-
cluding clergy.92 Before embarking on the project, however, FOE
official and juvenile judge E.J. Ruegemer discussed the plan with
"representatives" of the three major religious groups in America at
the time: Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism.93 To counter
87. Exodus 20:14 (Jewish Publication Society); Exodus 20:17 (King James).
88. See HARRELSON, supra note 19, at 40; Youngblood, supra note 5, at 34-35.
89. CATECHISM, supra note 30, at 602.
90. Id.
91. As Meislin recognized, some early Americans held the Ten Commandments in
such high regard that they chose to believe, incorrectly, "that the Decalogue ... [was]
incorporated in the common law." BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN
TRIBUNALS 25 (1976) [hereinafter MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW]. This ideology "died hard,"
but did eventually give way to the "conventional Anglican viewpoint" that "Old Tes-
tament laws were consigned no 'farther than (to) that people to whom they were
given."' Id. at 25-27 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). Yet scholars and
judges still debate the degree to which the Decalogue actually infiltrated the early
American legal system. Compare Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and
Right? The Ten Commandments as a Source of American Law, 24 J. L. & RELIGION
525, 558 (2000) (concluding that "the most that could be said about the relationship of
the Ten Commandments to the law is that the former has influenced legal notions of
right and wrong ... [b]ut to insist on a closer relationship . . . lacks historical sup-
port"), with Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (as-
serting that it is "undeniable ... that the Ten Commandments have had a significant
impact on the development of secular legal codes of the Western World").
92. State v. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Colo. 1995);
Broadway, supra note 26; see Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294-95 (7th Cir.
2000).
93. Books, 235 F.3d at 294.
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the concerns of sectarian rivalry engendered by the lack of an au-
thoritative version of the Commandments, 94 the representatives at-
tempted to create a hybrid version that would satisfy all religious
bents.95
Apparently, the task was not easily accomplished. In the suc-
ceeding years, FOE created at least three distinct versions of the
Commandments in its attempt to hue closest to none of the stan-
dard Jewish, Protestant, or Catholic versions of the text.96 Thus, a
monument erected in Elkhart, Indiana and ordered removed in
200197 was engraved with an FOE-fashioned text unburdened by
the traditional restriction to ten distinct statements:
The Ten Commandments
I AM the LORD thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain.
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long
upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant,
nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy
neighbor's. 98
Another monument, located on state capitol grounds in Denver,
Colorado and ruled constitutional by the Colorado State Supreme
Court in 1995, 99 displays a different text, which enumerates ten dis-
tinct obligations:
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
I AM the LORD thy God
I. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
II. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
Vain.
94. See Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1016-17.
95. Id.
96. The first of these three versions is transcribed in Books, 235 F.3d at 296, the
second in Freedom from Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d at 1016, and the third in Indi-
ana Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2001).
97. Books, 235 F.3d at 307-08.
98. Id. at 296.
99. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1015-16.
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III. Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy.
IV. Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be
long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
V. Thou shalt not kill.
VI. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
VII. Thou shalt not steal.
VIII. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
IX. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
X. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-
servant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything
that is thy neighbor's.
0 0
The similarities as well as the differences between the monuments
are significant. While the Elkhart text apparently includes the
words, "I AM the LORD thy God," as the First Commandment, in
accordance with the traditional Jewish enumeration, the Denver
monument seems to include it only as an introduction, in the man-
ner of most Christian versions.' Neither text, however, contains
the reference to redemption from Egypt alongside these words, as
does the prevailing Jewish rendering. 0 In addition, the Elkhart
monument follows Jewish and Protestant traditions by treating the
prohibition of graven images as a distinct Commandment, whereas
the text of the Denver monolith, like the Catholic Decalogue,
omits it.1 0 3 Yet, both monuments contain two separate Command-
ments regarding coveting, as Catholicism teaches, 1° 4 and neither
monument translates the Commandment regarding homicide as a
proscription against "murder."10 5  Instead, both texts declare,
"Thou shalt not kill," choosing the prevailing Christian translation
over the standard Jewish version.' 6
2. Laws on Decalogue Displays
In recent years, legislators have sought to ensure the constant
display of the Ten Commandments in a variety of public settings.
While a smattering of laws requiring the posting of the Decalogue
were enacted before 1999, school shootings, such as that perpe-
trated in Columbine, Colorado, facilitated a burgeoning of at-
100. Id. at 1016.
101. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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tempts to enact such laws. 10 7 Most conspicuously, the House of
Representatives proposed the Ten Commandments Defense
Act,"' which purported to overrule Supreme Court precedent by
asserting the right to post the Decalogue as a power reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment.10 9 The Act, which the Senate
declined to consider, did not offer guidance on which version of the
Ten Commandments was to be posted and what restrictions, if any,
controlled its placement. 1 0 Following in the footsteps of the na-
tional body, two states passed similar legislation in 2000111 and an-
other ten states considered similar bills in 2001,112 including an
attempt by Alabama to amend the state constitution to allow for
Decalogue posting. 3 Although many of the state bills are specific
enough to include manner and appearance requirements and an
accompanying document requirement,1 4 none specify which ver-
sion of the Ten Commandments must be posted.11 5
Such laws have apparently fueled the litigious fire. Since 1999,
courts have decided a litany of cases involving the public display of
the Decalogue, a majority of which have resulted in victories for
plaintiffs seeking removal of Ten Commandments displays. 6 On
the other hand, the Third Circuit,' 17 the Fifth Circuit, 1 8 and the
Colorado Supreme Court1 19 have upheld the display of a plaque
107. See Robert G. Hensley, Jr., Written in Stone: Why Renewed Attempts to Post
the Ten Commandments in Public Schools Will Likely Fail, 81 N.C. L. REV. 801, 803
(2003).
108. H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. §§ 1201-1202 (1999); see Joel L. Thollander, Thou
Shalt Not Challenge the Court? The Ten Commandments Defense Act as a Legislative
Invitation for Judicial Reconsideration, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 205, 205-06
(2000-2001).
109. Thollander, supra note 108, at 206.
110. Hensley, supra note 107, at 814.
111. Indiana and South Dakota. Id. at 802-03.
112. Id. at 802.
113. Id. at 803.
114. Id. at 814-26.
115. Id. It should be noted, however, that the replacement display in the Alabama
Supreme Court building has apparently attempted to address this issue by displaying
the original Hebrew text of the Ten Commandments adjacent to the King James
translation. See National Public Radio (National Public Radio radio broadcast, Feb.
8, 2004 (1:00 pm)), available at LEXIS, News Library.
116. See the cases discussed at length in Part III of this Note as well as ACLU of
Ohio Foundation, Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004), McGinley v. Hous-
ton, 361 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2004), and Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon,
259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001), among others.
117. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
118. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003).
119. State v. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013, 1027 (Colo. 1995).
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and two monuments, respectively, all of which boldly pronounce
the religious duties of the Decalogue.
PART II. BUTTRESSING THE WALL: THE SUPREME COURT'S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Because the maintenance of the wall separating church and state
is a tricky business, 120 it has required a delicate balance of princi-
ples and analysis rather than the simple application of a bright-line
rule.12' This part of the Note will seek to adumbrate this balance
as it is conveyed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the con-
stitutional command: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . "..."122 Part A discusses the framework
with which to analyze Establishment Clause issues. Part B then
looks to the first of three prongs of the framework, which prohibits
governmental acts motivated by a predominantly religious pur-
pose. Part C explains the second prong, which forbids any govern-
ment from advancing or endorsing religion, while Part D describes
the last prong of the test, requiring governments to refrain from
entangling themselves in religious issues and sectarian disputes.
A. The Lemon Test
It was not until 1971, almost twenty-five years after the Court
held the Establishment Clause to apply against the states, that the
Court could articulate a test to analyze claims of Establishment
Clause violations.123 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 4 the Court con-
cluded that to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, "[f]irst,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its prin-
cipal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
120. It is a necessary business, nonetheless. Although the "wall metaphor" has
been questioned at times, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting), the Court long ago decided that it was an entirely appropriate standard
for which to strive. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Indeed, if any-
thing, the difficulties in separating church from state require more, not less, judicial
vigilance. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (recognizing
the duty of the Court to protect against the "myriad, subtle ways in which Establish-
ment Clause values can be eroded") (citations omitted).
121. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591 (finding that the values protected by the Estab-
lishment Clause are "not susceptible to a single verbal formulation").
122. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
123. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2125 (1996).
124. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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government entanglement with religion.' 1 25 Thus, the Lemon test
included a purpose prong, an effect prong, and an entanglement
prong, all of which the government had to pass in order to avoid a
violation. Although advocates of a closer relationship between
church and state-as well as some separationists-have vocifer-
ously derided Lemon,126 the Court has continued to use it, analyz-
ing both statutes and governmental actions to ensure they conform
to Lemon's strictures. 127
B. Religious Purpose Written in Stone'28
Nine years after the Lemon decision, the Court in Stone v. Gra-
ham relied on the first prong of the Lemon test to invalidate a Ken-
tucky statute compelling the display of a "permanent copy of the
Ten Commandments" on the walls of every state public school
classroom.129 Refusing to be "blind[ed]" by the legislature's
"'avowed' secular purpose," the majority demonstrated that the
"pre-eminent purpose" of the statute was "plainly religious" and
therefore unconstitutional. 30 The Court first observed that the
Decalogue is "undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian
faiths."'1 3 1 While the Commandments could be appropriately used
in a "study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion or
the like,' 32 the Court explicitly distinguished such a case from that
of mere display: "Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no
such educational function.' 33 The concomitant posting of a dis-
claimer purporting to recognize the "secular application of the Ten
Commandments" as a foundational legal text, simply could not
change the text itself.13  Although some Commandments ad-
dressed "arguably secular matters," the Court explained that "the
first part of the Commandments" did not.135 Commandments re-
quiring reverence of "the Lord God," refraining from "idolatry,"
"not using the Lord's name in vain" and "observing the Sabbath
125. Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
126. For a particularly colorful condemnation, see Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
127. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
128. See Hensley, supra note 107.
129. 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (per curiam).
130. Id. at 41.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 42.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 41.
135. See id. at 41-42.
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Day," were "religious duties," pure and simple, and they betrayed
the legislature's lack of a sufficient secular purpose. 36
While four justices dissented from the denial of plenary re-
view,137 only one, Justice Rehnquist, wrote an extensive dissent.
Without challenging the Court's analysis of the text of the Deca-
logue, Justice Rehnquist declared that the majority should have de-
ferred to the state's avowed purpose.138 It was "undeniable, ' 139 he
asserted, that the Kentucky Legislature was correct in describing
the impact of the Ten Commandments on American law as "signifi-
cant," a fact which should have validated the state's avowed secular
purpose.1 40
C. The Endorsement Test and Holiday Displays
In the 1980's, the Court decided two cases of holiday displays,
Lynch v. Donnelly1 4 1 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,1 42 which
focused on and refined the effect prong of the Lemon test. In a
143 temjnebulous opinion, the majority in Lynch upheld the display of a
nativity scene in a privately-owned park. 144 The Court focused on
the "context" of the display, which included items deemed secular,
such as "a Santa Claus house," a "teddy bear" and a large "SEA-
SONS GREETINGS" banner. 45 Purporting to apply the Lemon
framework, the Court's analysis left questions about why and how
the display conformed to its purpose and effect prongs. 146
The concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, however, was
clearer. Justice O'Connor's rationale, which clarified the second
prong of Lemon147 and which the Court later adopted in Allegheny,
136. See id. at 42.
137. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented because they would have
given the case plenary hearing. Id. at 43. Justice Stewart dissented from the reversal.
Id.
138. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
142. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
143. See id. at 594 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the Lynch majority opin-
ion for exhibiting a rationale that was "none too clear").
144. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687.
145. See id. at 671, 679.
146. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.
147. As originally put forth in her Lynch concurrence, Justice O'Connor purported
to reinterpret both the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at
691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proposing a more "proper inquiry under the purpose
prong of Lemon"). Since Allegheny, lower courts have split on how to properly inter-
pret the Supreme Court's adoption of Justice O'Connor's analysis. Some courts view
it as eliminating the purpose prong of Lemon, see Freethought Society v. Chester
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suggested that the Establishment Clause "prohibits government
from... 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community."1 48 Thus the Court
was required to decide whether a display "communicat[ed] a mes-
sage of government endorsement or disapproval of religion.' '1 49 If
the display effectively branded "nonadherents" as "outsiders, not
full members of the political community,' 150 it would violate this
endorsement test. Likewise, if the display assured "adherents" that
they were "insiders, favored members of the political community,"
this too would violate the test.'5 ' Clarifying this inquiry in her Al-
legheny concurrence, Justice O'Connor indicated that judges must
determine what the content of the message is to the "reasonable
observer.' 1 52  In another concurrence in a later case, Justice
O'Connor fleshed out this notion to some degree, suggesting that
this "hypothetical observer" should be "presumed to possess a cer-
tain level of information that all citizens might not share," includ-
ing the context and history of a religious display.'53 Such
information, then, could help the observer determine whether the
message discloses "disapproval of his or her particular religious
choices ... 154
In Allegheny itself, the Court again analyzed holiday displays,
considering both a creche and a display featuring a menorah and a
Christmas tree.155 This time, the Court found the creche to be un-
constitutional and the display featuring the menorah and Christ-
County, 334 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that Justice O'Connor's analysis re-
quires "collaps[ing] the 'purpose' and 'effect' prongs [of Lemon] into a single in-
quiry"), and others view it as informing Lemon's effect prong, keeping the original
purpose prong intact. See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000).
Thus, there is still a question of whether Justice O'Connor's inquiry is truly indepen-
dent of the Lemon inquiry from which it evolved. See Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d
247, 250 (undertaking both the original Lemon inquiry and Justice O'Connor's modi-
fied analysis "in an abundance of caution").
148. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
149. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 592 (stating that "in recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'en-
dorsing' religion, a concern that has long had a place in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence") (citations omitted).
150. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 578.
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mas tree permissible. 56 Although Allegheny did not overrule
Lynch, and indeed continued to use "context" as the controlling
standard, a57 the case was significant for two reasons relevant to
Decalogue display. First, as noted above, a majority of the court
accepted the zero-tolerance rationale of Justice O'Connor's Lynch
concurrence, promising, at least in theory, to root out all instances
of government endorsement or disapproval of the "reasonable ob-
server's" religious choices. 158 Accordingly, the court described the
creche as an outright display of government approval of Christian-
ity, unabated by secular context, while the menorah and Christmas
tree sent a decidedly secular winter holiday message. The Court
also cited Larson v. Valente159 for the proposition that "[t]he clear-
est command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious de-
nomination cannot be officially preferred over another."16 Thus,
government displays "may not demonstrate a preference for one
particular sect or creed (including a preference for Christianity
over other religions)." '161 With this holding, the Court suggested
that denominational bias is a relevant factor militating against the
government in the calculus of the constitutionality of religious
displays.
D. Entanglement and "The Clearest Command of the
Establishment Clause"
In the Larson case, a Minnesota statute imposed registration and
reporting requirements only on those religious organizations that
received more than fifty percent of their funding from outside or-
ganizations.1 62  Holding that the rule "engender[ed] a risk of
politicizing religion, ' 163 the Court purported to set aside the
Lemon test, holding that any rule "granting a denominational pref-
156. Id. at 578-79.
157. One of the Court's principal determinations was that the creche stood "alone"
as the "single element of the display on the Grand Staircase," unlike the menorah,
whose religious status was tempered by the secular Christmas tree. Id. at 598.
158. Id. at 601.
159. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
160. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244).
161. Id. (parentheses in original). Indeed, this factor proved essential in distin-
guishing Allegheny from Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where the Court
upheld the practice of legislative prayer. Id. at 795. The majority in Allegheny
stressed that the "unique history," which saved the nonsectarian legislative prayer in
Marsh, is unavailing when a practice "demonstrates the government's allegiance to a
particular sect or creed." Allegheny, 490 U.S. at 603.
162. Larson, 456 U.S. at 230.
163. Id. at 253 (internal quotations omitted).
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erence" was "suspect" and could only be valid if it passed strict
judicial scrutiny.164 Because Minnesota could not show that its law
was closely tailored to fit its stated governmental objective, the
"clearest command of the Establishment Clause" invalidated the
legislation. 165
But, the Court also implicitly recognized another rationale for its
decision. Noting that, of the three prongs of the Lemon test, the
third prong was "most directly implicated in the present case," the
Court discussed "the problems of entanglement" generally, even
when there is no direct evidence of discrimination between
groups.166 Any "state inspection and evaluation of the religious
content of a religious organization," the court concluded, "is
fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution for-
bids. ' 167 The mere fact of such a close "relationship" between
church and state was "pregnant with dangers of excessive govern-
ment direction ... of churches.' ' 6
8
1. Sectarian Aid and Kiryas Joel
In subsequent Establishment Clause decisions, the Supreme
Court as well as other state and federal courts have employed both
of the rationales discussed in Larson to strike down government
legislation respecting religion and religious groups. On the one
hand, in Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,169 the Court struck down a statute
because of its tendency to prefer one religious denomination over
other groups. 70 Finding that the statute, which created a separate
school district to include only the members of a particular Ortho-
dox Jewish sect,17 1 impermissibly aided a particular religion, the
Court concluded that it "failed the test of neutrality.' 72 Because
there was "no assurance that the next similarly situated group
seeking a school district of its own will receive one,"' 73 the Court
itself had to intervene "to foreclose religious favoritism" by invali-
dating even the first attempt to establish such a scenario. 174 "The
legislature," the Court explained, "might fail to exercise govern-
164. Id. at 246.
165. Id. at 244, 255.
166. Id. at 252.
167. Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
170. Id. at 709-10.
171. Id. at 693.
172. Id. at 709.
173. Id. at 703.
174. Id. at 710.
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mental authority in a religiously neutral way.' 1 7 5 Speaking in tones
reminiscent of its "clearest command" language in Larson, the
Court found such a possibility to be anathema to "a principle at the
heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not
prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.' 176
2. Government Involvement in Religious Affairs and Disputes:
The Kosher Cases
On the other hand, however, at least four justices in Kiryas Joel
were also troubled by their observation that the redistricting was
"substantially equivalent to defining a political subdivision... by a
religious test. ' 177 This refusal to accept such "a purposeful and for-
bidden fusion of governmental and religious functions" because of
the "fusion" itself (and regardless of neutrality concerns) was a
veiled reference to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, as
Justice Blackmun noted. 78
Indeed, courts have used Lemon's entanglement prong to invali-
date other laws in the same vein. Most notably, a state high court
and two federal appeals courts have applied the prong to strike
down "kosher fraud" statutes, which seek to codify Jewish dietary
restrictions in secular law by penalizing food vendors that improp-
erly claim to follow such restrictions.179 Thus, in Ran-Dav's County
Kosher, Inc. v. State, 8 ' the Supreme Court of New Jersey recog-
nized that kosher fraud statutes were invalid because they allowed
"enforcement by religious personnel of a sectarian or religious
law." ' 1 Not only had the state created an Advisory Committee
"consist[ing] entirely of rabbis, 1 82 but it also charged the commit-
tee with a purely religious job: "polic[ing] the ... religious pu-
175. Id. at 703.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 702. Though Justice Kennedy did not formally join the plurality on this
point, his concurrence seemed to speak to the same issue. Id. at 728 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that one such fundamental limitation imposed by the Establish-
ment Clause is that government may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or
electoral lines).
178. See id. at 710 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also argued that
the Court's neutrality test was essentially an application of Lemon's second prong. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. See Aharon R. Junkins, The Establishment Clause's Effect on Kosher Food
Laws: Will the Jewish Meal Soon Become Harder to Swallow in Georgia?, 38 Ga. L.
Rev. 1067 passim (2004).
180. 129 N.J. 141 (1992).
181. Id. at 159.
182. Id. at 158.
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rity"' 18 3 of kosher food. This arrangement allowed the resolution of
disputations that were "ineluctably religious in tenor and con-
tent,"1"4 and created an impermissible "interrelationship between
government and religion," which the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test forbade.185 For comparable reasons, the Fourth Circuit
and the Second Circuit struck down similar legislation. 86
PART HI. CIRcurr SPLITS: To POST OR NOT TO POST
While all courts agree that the Decalogue is, at least primarily, a
religious document,187 there is disagreement as to whether, or to
what extent, other factors somehow mitigate the affront to the Es-
tablishment Clause represented by the public display of theological
obligations.1 88 This part of the Note will detail the competing argu-
ments on this question. Because, however, there are two discrete
versions of the Ten Commandments that generally lead to litigation
when posted-the Protestant version (or approximations thereof)
and the amalgamation texts created by FOE-this Note deals with
each separately. Section A of this Part outlines the split in cases of
displays closely resembling the Protestant Decalogue, paying close
attention to how courts come out on the question of whether the
sectarian bent of the text is constitutionally significant. Section B
describes the split in FOE-monument cases, focusing especially on
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id. at 159.
185. See id. at 158 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See Commack Self Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.
2002); Junkins, supra note 179, at 1087-91 (discussing Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher
Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995)).
187. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
that "the case has yet to be made that the Ten Commandments themselves have lost
their primary religious significance or that they have taken on a primarily secular
purpose"). The terms "religious" and "secular" themselves are difficult to define in
the abstract. See George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional
Definition of "Religion," 71 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1553 (1983) (quoting William James for
the proposition that religion likely has "no one essence") (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court has said relatively little on the matter, Id. at 1524-28.
188. Of course, there are other issues disputed between and within circuits, as ex-
hibited by the dissent in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d
1020, 1043-50 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bowman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(disputing the majority's conclusions on: 1) the definition or at least the parameters of
the "reasonable observer" in religious display cases; 2) whether the symbols on the
FOE monument enhances or mutes religious significance; 3) how to, and whether to,
weigh historical value of a monument; 4) whether the purpose prong of the Lemon
test constitutes an inquiry independent of Justice O'Connor's endorsement/disap-
proval analysis).
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
whether the purported hybrid of Christian and Jewish versions in
any way answers the concerns of the Establishment Clause.
A. New Testament "Summaries" and The King James Version
of the Decalogue
Of the Circuit Courts that have decided cases involving a Protes-
tant version of the Ten Commandments, at least two, the Eleventh
Circuit and the Third Circuit, have given consideration to the ques-
tion of whether the sectarian bent of the text should inform the
constitutional inquiry.189 Although the cases involved different
facts relevant to the context of the monument, both opinions re-
ferred to testimony and briefing on the fact that the posted text
derived from Protestantism. In addition, two district courts, one
weighing in on either side of the debate, help flesh out both sides
of the argument.
1. The Eleventh Circuit Approach
In deciding Glassroth v. Moore,190 the case of the "Ten Com-
mandments Judge" discussed above, 191 a unanimous panel of the
Eleventh Circuit recognized the importance of the various versions
of the Decalogue in ordering the removal of the display. First, in
its rendition of the facts, the court recounted Roy Moore's sancti-
monious rise to chief justice of the state supreme court, 92 and then
considered the details of the monument that he installed upon arri-
val.193 In this context, the panel noted that Moore's display fea-
tured "[e]xcerpts from Exodus 20:2-17 of the King James Version
of the Holy Bible, the Ten Commandments."' 94 The opinion then
described the text of the monument:
The left [tablet] reads:
I AM THE LORD THY GOD
THOU SHALT HAVE NO OTHER GODS BEFORE ME
THOU SHALT NOT MAKE UNTO THEE ANY GRAVEN
IMAGE
189. The Sixth Circuit also dealt with the issue of a Protestant version of the Deca-
logue. See ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 443 n.2 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting the posted version of the Commandments, which concluded with the words
"King James Version").
190. 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
191. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
192. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285 n.1, 1299 n.3.
193. Id. at 1285.
194. Id.
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THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE LORD
THY GOD IN VAIN
REMEMBER THE SABBATH DAY, TO KEEP IT HOLY
The right [tablet] reads:
HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER
THOU SHALT NOT KILL
THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY
THOU SHALT NOT STEAL
THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS
THOU SHALT NOT COVET
195
Calling attention to the fact that the monument contained eleven
statements and not ten, 196 the court found that the question of how
to divide the relevant text had caused "[d]ifferent faiths [to] dis-
pute" the issue.1 97 "For example, many Jews and some Christians
consider the 'First Commandment' to be 'I am the Lord thy
God,"198 while most Christians understand the First Command-
ment as an injunction against worship of "all other gods before
me," the Second Commandment for Jews. 199 The court also recog-
nized that there is disagreement as to whether the beginning of the
edict is properly rendered, "Thou shalt" or "You shall. '120 The tes-
timony on the issue of conflicting interpretations of the Decalogue,
therefore, disclosed a "significance" to which the court would re-
turn in its analysis.20 '
In its application of the Lemon framework, the court took due
note of both Moore's testimony admitting his religious purposes 20 2
and the lack of sufficient secular content around the large monu-
ment, failing to mute the monument's religious message. 203 The
court did not, however, stop at this cursory level of analysis. Quot-
ing Larson v. Valente,2 °4 it explained that "[tihe clearest command
of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another. 20 5 By posting one
particular version of the Exodus pericope, the defendant was tak-
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1285 n.1.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
200. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285 (rendering the proscription against idolatry as
"[t]hou shalt [or You shall] have no other gods before me") (second alteration in
original); see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
201. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285.
202. Id. at 1296.
203. Id. at 1297.
204. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
205. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1299 n.3.
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ing a side in the "deep theological disputes ' 20 6 that "lurk[ ] behind
the disparate accounts. '20 7 While recognizing that some of the dif-
ferences between the versions "might seem trivial or semantic, ' 2°8
the court found that even the general decision to take excerpts
from "the King James Version of the Bible, which is a Protestant
version," was problematic.20 9 This was true because "Jewish, Cath-
olic, Lutheran, and Eastern Orthodox faiths use different parts of
their holy texts" to compose their versions of the Command-
ments,210 and because of "the conflict between Catholics and Prot-
estants '211 resulting from the use of the Protestant Bible in public
schools in the nineteenth century. 212 This centuries-old conflict
was anathema to a court that observed the strictures of the separa-
tion of church and state.213
Finally, the court considered "but one example" of the myriad
conflicts in the interpretation of the Commandments.214 Having
mentioned the dispute over the First Commandment,215 the panel
now focused on "the Hebrew translation of the Sixth [Fifth for
Catholics] Commandment. '216 Because it prohibited "only mur-
der ' 217 it directly contradicted the King James version, which en-
joined "all killings. '218 Demonstrating that this dispute was not a
mere divergence in linguistic style but a serious theological row,
the court cited the testimony of a rabbi in a previous Ten Com-
mandments display case.219 The rabbi testified to his belief that
"this ['Thou shalt not kill'] version of the Sixth Commandment,"22°
far from being an acceptable variant of the injunction against mur-
206. Id. (quoting Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 Const.
Comment. 471, 474-76 & n.18 (1998)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1971)).
212. Id.
213. Id. (noting that the Catholic version, like the Lutheran version but unlike the
mainstream Protestant version displayed by Moore, treats the proscription against
killing or murder as "the Fifth Commandment, not the Sixth").
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
216. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1299 n.3.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
219. Id. (citing Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669, 677 (N.D. Ga. 1993)).
220. Id. (alteration in original).
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der, was rather a "mistranslation of the original Hebrew, 222
which "frequently appear[ed] in Christian versions. 223
To elaborate, the court might have also considered, as did a dis-
trict court in Georgia examining another Decalogue-display case,
the practical implications of a governmental decision to choose the
Christian translation of this Commandment over the standard Jew-
ish version.224 The difference between "kill" and "murder," the
district court pointed out, is "extraordinarily important. ' 225 Not
only was there a vast theoretical chasm in the relative breadth of
the two verbs, but the distinction also had real world consequences.
Posting a biblical tenet prohibiting all killing "implicates some of
the most controversial social issues of the day, including war, abor-
tion and capital punishment. 2 6
2. The Third Circuit Approach
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, in
Freethought Society v. Chester County,2 2 7 chose not to give serious
consideration to the words of the Decalogue itself.228 Deciding
that a plaque, which contained "a Protestant version"2 9 of the
Commandments, could remain affixed to the wall of a county
courthouse, 3 ° the unanimous panel made only brief reference to
the text of the plaque in the facts section of the opinion. 3'
In that section, the court quoted the more elaborate version of
the biblical text displayed on the courthouse wall:
THE COMMANDMENTS
THOU SHALT HAVE NO OTHER GODS BEFORE ME.
THOU SHALT NOT MAKE UNTO THEE ANY GRAVEN
IMAGE, OR ANY LIKENESS OF ANY THING THAT IS IN
HEAVEN ABOVE, OR THAT IS IN THE EARTH BE-
NEATH, OR THAT IS IN THE WATER UNDER THE
EARTH:
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
228. Id. at 247. The two cases were filed at roughly the same time. Freethought
Society was filed on June 26, 2003. Glassroth was filed five days later. 335 F.3d at
1282.
229. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 249.
230. Id. at 270.
231. Id. at 252-53.
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THOU SHALT NOT BOW DOWN THYSELF TO THEM,
NOR SERVE THEM:
For I the Lord Thy God am a Jealous God, Visiting the Iniquity
of the Fathers upon the Children unto the Third and Fourth
Generation of Them that Hate me. And Shewing Mercy unto
Thousands of Them that Love Me and Keep My
Commandments.
THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE LORD
THY GOD IN VAIN:
For the Lord will not Hold him Guiltless that Taketh His Name
in Vain.
REMEMBER THE SABBATH DAY, TO KEEP IT HOLY.
SIX DAYS SHALT THOU LABOR AND DO ALL THY
WORK:
BUT THE SEVENTH DAY IS THE SABBATH OF THE
LORD THY GOD: IN IT THOU SHALT NOT DO ANY
WORK, THOU, NOR THY SON, NOR THY DAUGHTER,
THY MANSERVANT, NOR THY MAIDSERVANT, NOR
THY CATTLE, NOR THY STRANGER THAT IS WITHIN
THY GATES:
For in Six Days the Lord Made Heaven and Earth, the Sea, and
All That in Them is, and Rested the Seventh Day, Wherefore
the Lord Blessed the Sabbath Day, and Hallowed it.
HONOR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER:
That Thy Days May be Long upon the Land which the Lord Thy
God Giveth Thee.
THOU SHALT NOT KILL.
THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY.
THOU SHALT NOT STEAL.
THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS AGAINST
THY NEIGHBOUR.
THOU SHALT NOT COVET THY NEIGHBOUR'S HOUSE.
THOU SHALT NOT COVET THY NEIGHBOUR'S WIFE,
NOR HIS MANSERVANT, NOR HIS MAIDSERVANT,
NOR HIS OX, NOR HIS ASS, NOR ANY THING THAT IS
THY NEIGHBOUR'S.
SUMMARY
THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL
THINE HEART, AND WITH ALL THY SOUL AND WITH
ALL THY MIND.
THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS THYSELF.
232
The court noted that the text came from three parts of the Protes-
tant Bible. Unlike the posted text in Glassroth, which only con-
232. Id.
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tained the well-known pericope from Exodus 20:2-17 and
Deuteronomy 5:6-21, the instant text also included a so-called
"summary" from the New Testament book of Matthew. 33 This ad-
dition, the court acknowledged, was "not part of the Jewish Bi-
ble."'2 34 As a rabbi named Leonard Gordon testified, this fact
alone made the text objectionable to adherents of Judaism.235 The
very inclusion of a "summary" portion of the plaque "implie[d]
that certain commandments are more important than others," an
idea at odds with the Jewish understanding of the Decalogue.236 In
addition, like the experts in Glassroth, Rabbi Gordon recognized
the distinction between "kill" and "murder" to be a contentious
issue between Jewish and Christian interpretations of the Sixth
(Fifth) Commandment.2 37 Finally, Rabbi Gordon testified that the
plaque's omission of "the First Commandment in Jewish tradition:
'I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of
Egypt'" sent a decidedly Christian message. 38
Despite these denominational conflicts, however, the court did
not consider the Protestant focus of the text to cut against the de-
fendant's case. 239 After summarizing Rabbi Gordon's assertions in
a footnote, the court pointed to contrary testimony from one of the
defendants, a county commissioner. The commissioner, whose de-
nial of the plaintiff's request to remove the plaque led to the litiga-
tion,240 described himself as "a practicing Reform Jew ' 241 and
opined that his coreligionists would not care about or even notice
the distinctions noted by Rabbi Gordon.242
Concomitantly, in the main text of its opinion, the court de-
scribed at length the testimony of a Father Francis X. Meehan, who
declared that the posted version of the text would not be offensive
to Catholics. The priest also testified, however, that there was "at
least one critical difference in the Catholic interpretation of the
Ten Commandments. '24 3 Whereas the posted version contained
the standard Protestant and Jewish injunction against the creation
of any likeness or image, the standard Catholic version, as set out
233. Id. at 253.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 253 & n.1.
236. Id. at 253 n.1.
237. Id.
238. Cf id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 255.
241. Id. at 253 n.1.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 253.
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in the New American Bible, "uses the word 'idols' in place of
'graven images.' ,,244
In its analysis of the message sent by the plaque, the court
looked almost exclusively to the physical and historical context of
the display, without considering its text. Discounting the fact that a
religious organization had donated the plaque amid a religious cer-
emony,245 the court emphasized both the fact that a famous archi-
tect had designed the building in 1920246 and the fact that the
plaque was adjacent to an entrance no longer used.247 While the
court did briefly distinguish "the language of the Ten Command-
ments 12 4 8 from phrases like "In God We Trust," it did not fully
elaborate on this distinction.2 49 The court therefore never made
explicit its reasons for failing to consider the decidedly Protestant
bent of the display.
While the court might have simply discounted the rabbi's testi-
mony, which declared that posting the Christian version of the
Commandments on the plaque sends a message of disapproval to
Jews, the panel might also have implicitly accepted other reason-
ing. A Kentucky district court judge, for instance, based his deci-
sion to rule a Decalogue display constitutional on an aversion to
even discussing which version of the Decalogue was posted.2 5 0 The
chief judge offered two alternative rationales to explain his deci-
sion not to consider the source of the display on which he was rul-
ing. First, he posited that a court was not in the position to
determine which denomination's version of the Decalogue is
posted, because judges ought not become involved in "theological
distinctions that are not the proper business of the Court." ' Sec-
ond, he asserted that conflicting versions of the Decalogue were
irrelevant, given the "reasonable observer" standard posited by
Justice O'Connor. While the hypothetical reasonable observer has
244. Id.
245. Id. at 251 ("Judge J. Frank E. Hause, the keynote speaker at the dedication
ceremony, admonished those in attendance: Have you remembered the Sabbath Day
to keep it holy? If you disobey the commandments here and escape punishment,
there is yet the punishment which will surely be meted out on the day of judgment.").
246. Id. at 266 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), for the proposition
that "history can transform the effect of a religious practice").
247. E.g., id. at 266-67.
248. Id. at 264.
249. Id. at 264-65. The court noted that the national motto, "In God We Trust,"
unlike the Ten Commandments, was "not taken directly from the Bible" and is "non-
sectarian." Id. at 264.
250. ACLU of Ky. v. Mercer County, 219 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
251. Id. at 797.
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been presumed to have the capacity to scrutinize the context of a
display on the level of an interior decorator,252 Forester ruled that
such an observer would not grasp the "subtle distinction[s]" be-
tween the various versions of the Commandments. 3
B. FOE's Attempt at Ecumenism
As noted above,254 many Ten Commandments cases involve
monuments donated to local governments by FOE.255 Like the dis-
plays of the Protestant version of the Commandments, different
FOE monument cases vary with regard to the physical setting of
the monument,2 56 though some facts are fairly uniform. The monu-
ments are between three and six feet high, are usually positioned
on public land and are inscribed with purported amalgamations of
the standard Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant versions of the Deca-
logue.2 57 In addition, the face of each monument contains a combi-
nation of symbols including "two small tablets engraved with the
Ten Commandments written in a Semitic script, an eye within a
triangle, and an eagle gripping an American flag.., two six-point
stars [and] the intertwined [Greek] symbols 'chi' and 'rho. ' ' 258
Each monument is also inscribed with a dedication to the city in
which it was donated.259
While some courts simply presume the text of the monument to
be religious, asking whether the external context of the monument
mutes the religious message,26 ° other courts have gone into more
depth in discussing the essential nature of the text of the Ten Com-
mandments. These latter courts, which have given due attention to
252. Am. Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that current Establishment Clause strictures require "scrutiny
more commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary").
253. Mercer, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
254. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
255. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1.025 (8th Cir.
2004) (noting that the monument donated to Plattsmouth bore a "very close resem-
blance to scores of other Ten Commandments monuments given by the Fraternal Or-
der of the Eagles to towns and cities in the 1950s and 1960s").
256. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing
a monument on Texas capitol grounds), with ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1025
(describing the monument as being in a park ten blocks from city hall).
257. E.g., ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1025; Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176; State v.
Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Colo. 1995).
258. ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1025 (footnotes omitted); cf. Van Orden, 351
F.3d at 176.
259. ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1025 (footnotes omitted); cf Van Orden, 351
F.3d at 176.
260. See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2002).
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external context but also have considered the Decalogue as a self-
contained document, are themselves split. On the one hand, the
Eighth Circuit, discussing particular Commandments in its analysis,
found that a government's display of a list of religious injunctions,
as put forth in the FOE version of the Decalogue, is more constitu-
tionally infirm than mere "acknowledgment" of a generic
"God."2 6 ' On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme
Court of Colorado, speaking only generally of the comprehensive
Decalogue and not paying particular attention to the words
therein, have taken the view that the message conveyed by the Ten
Commandments can be secular.262 The following subsection of the
Note focuses on this split.
1. The Eighth Circuit Approach
In ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth,263 the
Eighth Circuit decided that a five-foot monument inscribed with a
hybrid version of the Ten Commandments identical to that in-
scribed in the Elkhart, Indiana monument, 264 in a public park near
city hall violated the Establishment Clause.265 In considering how
to apply the Supreme Court's holding in Larson v. Valente,26 6 the
court explored two distinct concepts related to the factious nature
of the Ten Commandments as a religious document. First, echoing
the Glassroth court, the panel noted that the "choice of Command-
ments," in terms of which denomination's version the government
chose to post, did "indeed express religious preference. '267 The
"deep and divisive disagreement" between adherents of Protes-
tantism, Catholicism, and Judaism over the content of the text was
real,268 and it existed irrespective of FOE's purported "amalgam"
of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish interpretations.269 Second, the
court found that, far from simply displaying a list of universally
applicable moral axioms, the monument's text exhibited a series of
261. See ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1042 ("The monument does much more
than acknowledge God; it is an instruction from the Judeo-Christian God on how He
requires His followers to live.").
262. See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 182; Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at
1027.
263. 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004).
264. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
265. 358 F.3d at 1025.
266. 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1032-33.
267. ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1032.
268. See id. (quoting several sources that discuss the contentious and violent nature
of religious disagreement).
269. See id. at 1026.
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sectarian "religious beliefs," every one of which was "a rejection of
contrary views. '27  Thus, even on its face, the monument
"snub[bed] polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as well as non-the-
istic sects, such as Buddhism, and the non-religious. "271
Although the court declined to apply the strict scrutiny analysis
of Larson,272 it considered the capacity of the Ten Commandments
to be divisive in its discussion of the Lemon framework.273 Apply-
ing the purpose prong of Lemon, the court looked primarily to the
text of the monument274 to show that it not only "possesse[d] a
religious nature," as other courts had pointed out,275 but that it also
patently advanced an argument in support of a contentious relig-
ious view. The monument's declaration of the "existence and
supremacy of God, 2 76 for instance, as well as the prescription of
"exclusively religious" behavior 277 made it more likely that the
government was motivated by a desire to promote particular relig-
ious beliefs.278
Furthermore, even the arguably secular Commandments, such as
the prohibition against stealing, were not unproblematic. "It is one
thing for Plattsmouth to say one should not steal," the court
stated.279 "[I]t is quite another for Plattsmouth to say there is a
God who said, 'Thou shalt not steal.' '' 280 Thus, the "religious
tenor" of even the "secular" Commandments gave credence to the
plaintiff's argument that the government's motivation in displaying
them was to promote their "putative source"-"the LORD thy
God"-rather than to discourage the admittedly wrongful act.2 81
The court used the same evidence to both apply the effect prong
of Lemon and to distinguish Marsh v. Chambers, a case that side-
stepped the Lemon framework.282 After explaining that the exter-
nal context of the monument did not heal its constitutional defect,
the court concluded that Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer
would "perceive this monument as an attempt by Plattsmouth to
270. Id. at 1033.
271. Id. at 1032-33.
272. Id. at 1033-34.
273. Id. at 1034-36.
274. Id. at 1036 ("We begin with the words and symbols on the monument.").
275. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 302 (7th Cir. 2000).
276. ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1036.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1042.
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steer its citizens in the direction of mainstream Judeo-Christian re-
ligion. "283 Likewise, the court found "fatal fault" in the defen-
dant's attempt to describe the monument as "merely an
acknowledgment of God. ' 284 Seeking to show that the monument
was no different than the nonsectarian benediction upheld in
Marsh, the defendants failed to realize that the monument's text
"is an instruction from the Judeo-Christian God on how He re-
quires His followers to live."'285 To reduce the Ten Commandments
to a bland recognition of faith would "diminish[ ] their sanctity to
believers and bel[ie] the words themselves. "286 While a dissenting
opinion disagreed on most of these points,287 a concurring opinion
emphatically "join[ed] and applaud[ed] most of the Court's excel-
lent opinion, "288 urging that the court should also have applied
Larson strict scrutiny. 289 Quoting the majority's rejection of the
"mere acknowledgment" argument, the concurrence underscored
the court's finding that "[t]he words on the monument clearly pre-
fer Christianity and Judaism.
290
2. The Approach of the Fifth Circuit and the Colorado
Supreme Court
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Colorado took
a different tack than the Eighth Circuit in deciding on the validity
of FOE monuments on government property.2 91 Although each
court gave its own theory on the essential nature of the Ten Com-
mandments, both spent little or no time considering the text of the
Commandments as had the Eighth Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit,
in Van Orden v. Perry,292 did not even transcribe the text of the
monument it was analyzing, the Colorado Supreme Court did so in
State v. Freedom from Religion Foundation:293
I AM the LORD thy God
I. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
283. ACLU Neb. Found., 358 F.3d at 1042.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 1043-50 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 1042 (Arnold, J., concurring).
289. See id. at 1043 (Arnold, J., concurring).
290. Id. (Arnold, J., concurring).
291. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003); State v. Freedom from
Religion Found., 898 P.2d 1013, 1027 (Colo. 1995).
292. 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003).
293. 898 P.2d at 1016.
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II. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
Vain.
III. Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy.
IV. Honor thy father and thy mother that thy days may be
long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
V. Thou shalt not kill.
VI. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
VII. Thou shalt not steal.
VIII. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
IX. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house.
X. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-
servant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything
that is thy neighbor's. 294
Asserting that this "unique version ' '295 of the Decalogue did "not
reproduce exactly the Ten Commandments as accepted by any par-
ticular sect," the court failed to discuss the monument's striking
resemblance to the Catholic version of the Decalogue. Though the
text of the monolith excluded the prohibition of "graven images"-
the Second Commandment according to the Jewish and Protestant
versions of the text296-for instance, the court summarily con-
cluded that it reflected "reconciliation and diversity more than any
sentiment of intolerance. '"2 97 Rather than taking note of the monu-
ment's two separate Commandments against coveting-also at
odds with the Jewish and Protestant versions of the biblical pas-
sage 9S-the Court looked to the monument's Jewish and Christian
icons 299 as more evidence of harmony.
Aside from the ecumenism issue, however, there was another ar-
gument regarding the nature of the Ten Commandments as a
whole which could be found in both the Colorado Supreme Court's
opinion and the Fifth Circuit opinion. The Colorado court sug-
gested that the Commandments were essentially "expressions of
universal standards of behavior common to all western socie-
ties. ' 300  Without acknowledging the injunctions against other
forms of religious worship found throughout the Decalogue, the
court held that it could not concede to disestablishmentarian argu-
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1023.
296. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
297. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1023.
298. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
299. Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1023 (describing "the juxtaposition
of the Christian Chi and Rho [symbolizing Jesus Christ] with the Jewish Star of
David").
300. Id. at 1024.
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ments that would only be "exaggerat[ing] the effect of benign relig-
ious messages .... 301
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that "the Command-
ments have a secular dimension as well as a religious meaning. "302
Seemingly taking the position that the only "religious" aspect of
the Commandments was their purported source, the panel, like the
Colorado Supreme Court, failed to discuss the patently religious
duties noted by the Supreme Court in Stone.303 The Fifth Circuit
did, however, harken back to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Stone,
asserting that the Decalogue's "influence upon the civil and crimi-
nal laws of this country" was axiomatic.3 °4 The court further sug-
gested that "even those" that did not accept the biblical narrative
"cannot deny" this;30 5 to do so would be to seek a "constitutional
right to be free of government endorsement of its own laws. 306
PART IV. TAKING TEXT SERIOUSLY: RECOGNIZING THE
DISPLAY OF THEOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS AND PARTICULARIST
RENDERINGS OF BIBLICAL PASSAGES ON GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION
AND A VIOLATION OF THE "CLEAREST COMMAND" OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Because raw emotion pervades the atmosphere in the debate
over the legal ramifications of displaying the Ten Commandments
in public, it is crucial that judges and commentators focus on the
text of the Decalogue itself in analyzing this issue. Thus, this part
of the Note reaches its conclusion-that the Ten Commandments
cannot be publicly displayed-through an analysis of the words of
the biblical pericope. Section A concentrates on the theological
nature of the Commandments and argues that their public posting
conveys a sense of government endorsement of religion to a rea-
sonable observer, violating the second prong of the Lemon test.
Returning to the first prong of Lemon, section B contends that in
most cases, the act of posting the Decalogue on government prop-
erty betrays an impermissible religious purpose. Section C then
concludes that because there is no standard version of the Deca-
301. Id. at 1026.
302, Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2003).
303. See id. at 181 ("Even those who would see the decalogue as wise counsel born
of man's experience rather than as divinely inspired religious teaching cannot deny its
influence upon the civil and criminal laws of this country.").
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 182.
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logue to which all religions conform, the government violates
Lemon's third prong by entangling itself in religious affairs when-
ever it chooses to post one of the many extant versions of the
document.
A. Religious Duties in Black and White: Impermissible
Government Endorsement of Religion
In ACLU v. McCreary County,3 °7 one of the cases for which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Sixth Circuit correctly noted
that the Decalogue, unlike a creche or other "passive symbol[s]" of
religion, is an "active symbol" containing "blatantly religious con-
tent. ' 3°8 Quoting the Supreme Court in Stone, the McCreary court
explained that the Commandments from God were "religious du-
ties of believers. '30 9 Nothing could be clearer from reading the
text itself.
The most striking religious identifier of the Ten Commandments
is that the first several obligations are express requirements en-
joining religious worship and belief in the most fundamental theo-
logical issues. For instance, "I am the LORD your God," the First
Commandment in the Jewish text and the introduction included in
most Christian versions, requires the belief in a particular God.310
Likewise, the next verse in the pericope included in each version,
"You shall have no other gods beside me," prohibits, perhaps even
more directly, all polytheistic belief.31' If reasonable observers of a
monument bearing these words would attribute them to the gov-
ernment,312 they would naturally assume a governmental instruc-
tion, or at the very least a suggestion by the government, to obey
these precepts.
As Allegheny and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch
teach, such an overture violates the Establishment Clause. By en-
couraging monotheistic worship, the government "communicat[es]
a message of government endorsement... of religion," setting the
government's imprimatur on the theological principle at the core of
307. 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
308. Id. at 455.
309. Id. (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 42).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
312. A reasonable person could easily assume this, considering the fact that the
words are enshrined on government property and that there is often much pomp and
circumstance associated with Ten Commandment dedication ceremonies. See supra
note 91 and accompanying text; see also Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 295
(7th Cir. 2000).
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Western religion.313 The nearly two million Americans who con-
sider themselves atheists and agnostics are thus effectively dubbed
"outsiders, not full members of the political community," unless
they abandon their own ideologies regarding the question of a de-
ity.314 Another subset of Americans greater than two million in
number likewise have their beliefs marginalized as a result of the
nontheistic and polytheistic theological religions to which they sub-
scribe, making "adherence to [theirJ religion relevant .'. . [to their]
standing in the political community." '315 The "accompanying mes-
sage" of the text to adherents of these theological duties, treating
them as "insiders, favored members of the political community," is
equally impermissible and seals the fate of the posting as a viola-
tion of the modified effect prong of the Lemon test.316
Other Commandments, of course, enjoin behavior also pro-
scribed by civilizations other than those dominated by monotheis-
tic religion. While some argue that even these Commandments are
not entirely secular in nature,317 this notion misses the point. The
public veneration of a document which plainly compares the desire
to practice dissenting religious beliefs with the failure to observe
basic moral imperatives is, to say the least, religious discrimination
against all citizens practicing such dissenting beliefs. Whatever the
value of the Decalogue within a religious tradition, a government
in the United States may not officially compare murder or killing
(Sixth Commandment according to Protestant tradition), stealing
(Eighth Commandment according to Protestant tradition), and ly-
ing under oath (Ninth Commandment according to Protestant tra-
dition) with the practice of religious worship that differs from that
practiced by the majority. Indeed, even to compare those that fol-
low their own religious ideologies with those who dishonor their
parents (Fifth Commandment according to Protestant tradition)
and commit adultery (Seventh Commandment according to Protes-
tant tradition)-two nearly universal ethical transgressions-
"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
313. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
314. See id.; Adherents.com, supra note 18.
315. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1999) (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687) (internal quotation marks omitted).
316. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
317. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (stating that "honoring
one's parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and covetousness"
are "arguably secular matters") (emphasis added).
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members of the political community. '318 As Allegheny tells us, this
the government may not do.3 19
B. Seeking to Post the Commandments: An Impermissibly
Religious Purpose
The above reasoning should hold irrespective of the font size
used for each Commandment. Even if a government chose to post
a text of the Decalogue that enlarged the Commandments that do
not regard worship, such as those against stealing and lying, a rea-
sonable observer would still read government endorsement of a re-
ligion into the text. So long as the Commandments requiring
monotheistic worship, the sanctification of God's name and the ob-
servance of the Sabbath are legible, their literal message-an in-
struction to the reader to follow the imperatives-is religious. If,
however, a government were to follow the lead of the Alabama
Supreme Court and surround the document with other lawgiving
texts, such as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights,32 ° the result
would not be so clear according to the reasonable person test.
There would be a substantial likelihood, however, that such an
action would be invalidated based on an impermissibly religious
governmental purpose, the first prong of the Lemon test.3 21 For
instance, in the case of the display created in the Alabama Su-
preme Court six months after the deposed Chief Justice's display
was removed,322 a religious motivation is particularly likely. Al-
though acting Chief Justice Gorman Houston claimed at the time
that the Alabama justices ordered the construction of the display
to educate citizens on the foundations of Alabama and United
States law,323 such an "avowed secular purposei32 4 s unlikely. It is
doubtful that the Alabama justices would be so motivated by a sud-
den interest in legal history that they would construct a display in-
cluding the Ten Commandments so soon after Moore's Decalogue
was removed. The more likely explanation for this governmental
action is that the Court wished to maintain some semblance of the
Decalogue monument built by former Chief Justice Moore, "The
Ten Commandments Judge," an act of unambiguously religious
318. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).
319. Id.
320. See supra note 15.
321. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
323. See National Public Radio, supra note 115.
324. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
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motivation. 325 Despite the justices' desire to moderate the raw of-
fensiveness of Moore's display by placing other documents around
the Decalogue, their actions belie a desire to replicate Moore's
work out of a similarly religious-albeit tempered-motivation or
a desire to appeal to Moore's religious constituency.326 While the
United States Supreme Court has not often parsed the meaning of
the phrase "religious purpose, '327 it would seem that even the lat-
ter motivation should be deemed improper. After all, a govern-
ment official acting as a surrogate of a religious organization
determined to execute an act with a decidedly religious motivation
would be no different than a government actor expressing and act-
ing on that motivation itself.
C. Not Just Any Ten: "The Clearest Command" and
The Decalogue
1. Background
In light of the strictures of Lemon's purpose prong, it seems dif-
ficult to believe that any amount of "context," short of an in-depth
critical study of the text, could save a government display which
was clearly designed to showcase the Decalogue. Yet some who
urge judicial recognition of "the foundational role of the Ten Com-
mandments in secular, legal matters, '"32" remain unconvinced.
While the debate over the historical role of the Commandments in
the development of American law is alive and well, 329 it should be
noted that at least one admirer of the Decalogue agreed that the
lack of an agreed-upon version of the document was a "sensible
325. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Chief Justice
Moore testified candidly that his purpose in placing the monument in the Judicial
Building was to acknowledge the law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scrip-
tures, and that it was intended to acknowledge 'God's overruling power over the af-
fairs of men.'").
326. Id. at 1286 (noting that Moore was supported by groups like the "Coral Ridge
Ministries, an evangelical Christian media outreach organization ... [which] used its
exclusive footage of the installation [of the monument] to raise funds for its own pur-
pose and for Chief Justice Moore's legal defense, which it [underwrote]").
327. Indeed, the court has eschewed descending any deeper than necessary into the
term "religious" in any context. See Freeman, supra note 187, at 1524-25.
328. City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1062 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari). Other courts have focused on what they view as the
Commandments' "wise counsel urging a regiment of just governance among free peo-
ple." Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003).
329. See generally Green, supra note 91, at 531 (examining "the historical basis for
claims that the Ten Commandments is the fundamental legal code of Western Civili-
zation and the Common Law of the United States.").
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enough" reason to prohibit its public posting. 330 Bernard Meislin,
who wrote a still-authoritative book on the influence of Jewish law
on its American counterpart, 331 also wrote extensively on the par-
ticular influence of the Ten Commandments.332 In an article on the
latter subject, he noted that differences between the distinct ver-
sions of the text "have grown with the passage of time. ' 333 Indeed,
because "the trend of major religions has been away from Deca-
logue harmony," all efforts to create a truly ecumenical version of
the text in the modern period were necessarily flawed.334
Any attempt at Decalogue reconciliation prescribed by state of-
ficials would be anathema to church and constitutionally abhor-
rent to the state. It has been tried and rejected. Display of a
version of the Ten Commandments drawn by state officials from
the three major faiths but conforming to the authorized version
of none was forbidden by the New York State Education Com-
missioner. As early as 1803, the Chief Justice of New Hamp-
shire's highest court wrote, "It has not pleased God to enlighten
by his grace any government with the gift of understanding the
scriptures., 3
35
Such vaticinations proved prescient. Efforts of governments to
post particular version of the Ten Commandments are almost al-
ways constitutionally infirm. Public Decalogue displays fail "the
test of neutrality, 336 as set out by the Court in Kiryas Joel, because
the different versions of the text are in irresolvable conflict; regard-
less of which version the polity chooses, it necessarily accepts the
view of one denomination while rejecting that of another. Moreo-
ver, even if it were possible to find a perfectly neutral version of
the Commandments, a government would have to violate "the en-
tanglement test, ' 337 as applied in the kosher fraud law cases, to cre-
ate it. Polities would have to establish committees of rabbis,
priests, and ministers to sort out the complicated distinctions be-
tween the Commandments of each sect and to decide which should
be displayed, an anathema to the third prong of Lemon.
330. See Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 190.
331. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW, supra note 91.
332. See generally Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26 passim.
He was in the process of writing a book on the subject before his death in 1988.
333. Meislin, Role of the Ten Commandments, supra note 26, at 190.
334. Id.
335. Id. (citations omitted).
336. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 709 (1994).
337. Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 129 N.J. 141, 158 (1992).
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2. The Use of Icons in Religious Observance: Catholics
vs. Protestants
The most apparent illustration of this twin-prong argument re-
gards the Commandment against "graven images," which is in-
cluded prominently in the Jewish and Protestant versions as the
Second Commandment, but is either excised or embedded in the
Catholic version.338 Whether the government posts a Decalogue
which prominently displays this Commandment, as the city of Elk-
hart did, or it displays a monument that omits this Commandment,
as the city of Denver did, the polity entangles itself in a theological
debate that is centuries old.339 For instance, if the government in-
cludes the Commandment in the display, it implicitly demonstrates
a hostility to religious icons. 340 This position is at odds with Cathol-
icism and favors the Protestant view, a blatant failure to maintain
neutrality between religious denominations as Larson and Kiryas
Joel command. Likewise, a posting that does not include the Com-
mandment takes the Catholic view on the issue-that religious
icons may and should be venerated-and is equally damning.341
Additionally, even if a government were to attempt to resolve this
dispute amicably, it would likely have to create an advisory board
made up of clergy from each side of the debate to sort through the
history and theology underpinning the conflict. Because a secular
commission composed largely of clergy would have to apply Chris-
tian and Protestant theology to decide the issue, the board would
constitute the application "by religious personnel of a sectarian or
religious law," an impermissible entanglement akin to the advisory
board of rabbis in the kosher fraud cases.342
3. Deliverance from Exile and the Commandment Regarding
Homicide: Judaism vs. Christianity
Just as Catholics and Protestants have incentives to insist on a
particular version of the Decalogue, should one be publicly dis-
played, so too does the Jewish community. As the Eleventh Circuit
noted in Glassroth, Judge Moore's Commandments included the
phrase "I AM the LORD thy God," but did not include the contin-
uation of the biblical verse acknowledging the Exodus story ("who
338. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
342. See Ran-Day's, 129 N.J. at 158.
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brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage"). 343
This is a story cherished by the Jewish people, as it is what inexora-
bly links the Commandments themselves to the people's mythic de-
liverance by God, the very fact that suffuses the document with its
essential meaning in Jewish tradition.
Likewise, the Commandment regarding homicide is an issue that
at least some Jews regard as a staunch difference between their
faith and Christianity. 344 A literal translation of the Hebrew text
yields a Commandment forbidding only "murder" and not all kill-
ing, as most Christian versions of the text would have it. Again, a
government that publicly displays a Decalogue that flouts Jewish
versions of these Commandments effectively prefers the Christian
view of the text and Christian thought on these matters to the Jew-
ish view. To even get involved in such matters, like the attempts by
several governments to regulate the definition of Jewish dietary
laws, is a violation of the entanglement prong of Lemon.345 This is
true not only because it will lead to official preference of Judaism
or Christianity over the other, but because these are the types of
"varying doctrinal interpretations" which the entanglement test
simply forbids the government to resolve.346
CONCLUSION
One of the strangest features of judicial opinions and legal com-
mentary regarding the public displays of the Ten Commandments
is how little time is spent reading the very text inscribed on the
monument, the fate of which is being commented on or decided.
Peculiar Establishment Clause arguments to the contrary notwith-
standing,347 it seems odd that a judge would not discuss the text of
a document the fate of which he or she will decide. As I have ar-
gued, a close reading of the document shows that it contains what
clearly may not be posted on government property-unequivocal
endorsement of particular religious duties. That there are also un-
deniable universal truths within the Ten Commandments makes
the document not less abhorrent, but more, when displayed in the
343. Exodus 20:2; see THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY, supra note 27, at
534 (enumerating Commandments according to the "prevailing Jewish division" and
noting that this division of the Commandments differs from "the Greek Church Fa-
thers, and most Protestant churches" as well as some Jewish sources). Some transla-
tions begin, "I, the Lord, am your God." See ETZ HAYIM, supra note 23, at 442.
344. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 177-86.
346. Ran-Dav's, 129 N.J. at 159.
347. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
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public square. In equating the practices of religious and nonreli-
gious minorities-who worship other deities or no god at all, create
graven images in their worship, and observe the Sabbath differ-
ently or not at all-with those that lie, steal, and murder, the gov-
ernment explicitly disapproves of those minorities. A reasonable
person viewing this would rightly feel that the government has es-
tablished a de facto religious ideology that discriminates against all
nonadherents. Additionally, courts should not remain blissfully ig-
norant of the fact that different versions of the Decalogue exist and
that they conflict with one another in ways that are not meaning-
less and often contentious. The politicization of religion in
America is already regretfully apparent. To add fuel to the fire by
allowing Catholics, Jews, and Protestants to fight amongst them-
selves as to whose version of the Decalogue should be publicly dis-
played in a particular polity is, to borrow a phrase, "as senseless in
policy as it is unsupported in law." '348
348. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ARE TALEBEARERS REALLY AS BAD AS
TALEMAKERS?: RETHINKING
REPUBLISHER LIABILITY IN AN
INFORMATION AGE
Jennifer L. Del Medico*
INTRODUCTION
It was a spectacle that "produced without question some of the
most bizarre testimony," a district court judge commented in hind-
sight.' The 1982 Pulitzer divorce trial featured tales of sex, drugs,
and s6ances that were splashed throughout magazines and newspa-
pers across the country.2 Many of the scandalous details involved
Janice Nelson, the woman who served as Mrs. Pulitzer's marriage
counselor and psychic.3 Nelson testified on behalf of Mr. Pulitzer
because she felt that Mrs. Pulitzer should not have custody of the
couple's children.4
While the high-profile Pulitzer divorce produced juicy fodder for
news reports, the media's real gain from the case came five years
after the divorce trial when Nelson sued several media organiza-
tions for defamation. During the divorce trial, the Associated
Press erroneously reported that Nelson conducted s6ances in the
Pulitzer home where ten to fifteen people surrounded Roxanne
Pulitzer, who was in bed with a trumpet and a black cape.6 Both
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.S.J., Northwestern
University, 1999. Thanks to Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea and my former em-
ployer, The Star-Ledger, for inspiration. I would also like to thank James D. Hyre his
help in preparing this piece for publication. This Comment is the winner of the first
annual Fordham Urban Law Journal Alumni Association Student Author Award.
1. The statement of Judge J. Spellman, author of the opinion in Nelson v. Associ-
ated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Later in the opinion, Judge
Spellman writes that the Pulitzer trial "elicited some of the most preposterous testi-
mony imaginable during the 18 days it lasted." Id. at 1482.
2. Id. at 1471. Trial testimony was filled with stories of adultery, lesbian trysts,
incest, and drug use. Id. at 1473. Testimony indicated that Roxanne Pulitzer slept
with a Palm Beach real estate salesman, a French baker, a Belgian race-car driver, and
the wife of Kleenex heir James Kimberly. Paradise Lost, TIME, Jan. 10, 1983, at 24.
3. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1471. Nelson, who operated an astrology business,
voluntarily left Palm Beach to avoid attention because of her association with Rox-
anne Pulitzer. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1471.
6. Id. at 1473-74.
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The Miami Herald 7 and The New York Post republished this erro-
neous dispatch.8 Knight-Ridder wire service sent out a similar
story over its news wire that The Washington Post republished.9
Newsweek reported the same story based on information from va-
rious newspaper and wire service reports. 10 After the publications
of these statements, the Associated Press issued a retraction which
stated that "[i]n a Pulitzer deposition made available Thursday,
[Mr. Pulitzer] describes sdances-unrelated to Ms. Nelson-that
Mrs. Pulitzer conducted in their home."'"
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the republish-
ers1 2 based on a "powerful, but often neglected libel defense"
called the "wire service defense. '"13 This defense allows the media
to republish news without liability for defamation if the informa-
tion passed over a news wire and the subsequent publisher did not
know or have reason to know that the material was defamatory.1
4
In certain circumstances, this privilege exempts the media from the
strict common law rule that imputes independent liability to third
parties who republish libelous statements. 15 Whether the defamed
individual is a public or private figure is not a factor in determining
whether the wire service defense is applicable.1 6 Therefore, the
7. Id. at 1478-79.
8. Id. at 1482-84.
9. Id. at 1481.
10. Id. at 1475-78.
11. Id. at 1473.
12. Id. The court granted summary judgment to the Associated Press because
Nelson failed to provide notice of the suit as required under Florida law. See infra
note 53 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Kyu Ho Youm, The "Wire Service" Libel Defense, 70 JOURNAL-
ISM Q. 682 (1993) (tracing the history and use of the wire service defense from its 1933
inception to the date of the article's publication).
14. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1474 (holding that the wire service defense is law in
Florida); see also infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
the wire service).
15. See Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1480; see generally, James E. Boasberg, With Malice
Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13
HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 455, 457-64 (1991) (tracing the history of the wire ser-
vice defense).
16. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964), the Court held
that in order for a public figure to recover for defamation, the publisher must have
acted with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that [the statement] was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." See also Harte-Hanks Com-
munications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). But see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri-
vate individual").
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media can potentially get the case dismissed on summary judgment
without engaging in litigation concerning whether the defamed is a
public or private figure.
Over time, spreading the news has become more of a coopera-
tive endeavor. In 1848, the Associated Press was founded as a
news cooperative for six New York papers." Today, the Associ-
ated Press serves 1700 newspapers and 5000 radio and television
stations around the country.' 8 More than thirty other news wires,
from institutions like United Press International to the two-year-
old Women's Enews, relay news to media outlets around the coun-
try.19 Journalists frequently rely on these services for facts or
quotes to incorporate into original stories and publications often
use entire wire service stories as a replacement for self-generated
copy.20
The very existence-and recent proliferation and expansion-of
the wire service privilege illustrates that traditional republication
liability does not allow news organizations to function effectively in
a society that demands rapid news dissemination.21 Today, twenty-
one jurisdictions currently recognize the seventy-year-old defense,
the majority of them electing to do so within the last twenty
years.2 2 In the past decade, eight jurisdictions have approved the
wire service privilege.23
17. OLIVER GRAMLING, AP: THE STORY OF NEWS 19-27 (1940) (telling the story
of the founding of the Associated Press); see also Associated Press, Facts & Figures, at
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
18. See Associated Press, supra note 17.
19. Am. Journalism Review, News/Wire Services (2003), at
http://ajr.org/News-WireServices.asp?MediaType=9 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) (list-
ing current wire service).
20. See Howe v. Detroit Free Press, 555 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996). "Such a defense is consistent with the custom and practice of the newspaper
industry, in which reliance on the accuracy of wire-service articles is commonplace."
Id. at 741.
21. See infra notes 84-116 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of the
wire service defense).
22. See Youm, supra note 13, at 688 (citing thirteen jurisdictions that rely on the
wire service defense as of 1993).
23. They include Arizona (Med. Labor Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 931
F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996)); California (Peper v. Gannett Co., No.
2002061753, 2003 WL 22457121, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2003)); Illinois (Kapeta-
novic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prod., 97-C2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27,
2002)); Michigan (Howe, 555 N.W.2d at 738)); Minnesota (Cole v. Star Tribune, 581
N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)); Texas (Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman,
923 F. Supp. 924, 927 (W.D. Tex. 1996)); and Virginia (Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938
F. Supp. 39, 44 (D.D.C. 1996) (federal court applying Virginia law)). Some of these
jurisdictions have applied the defense when the medium relied on was a television
network. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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The acceptance of the defense suggests that the strict common
law rule burdening republishers with potential liability should be
abolished if there is no showing of actual knowledge that the mate-
rial was defamatory. Thus, the "actual malice" standard articulated
in New York Times v. Sullivan, which applies to public figures,
should apply to all individuals in cases involving republishers.24
The Sullivan Court defined acting with "actual malice" as publish-
ing material "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not."25 This Comment argues that
the standard established by Sullivan is the proper standard to im-
pose on republishers who publish material noting that it originates
from another source, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public
or private figure.
Whether republishers can escape liability for defamation should
not turn on the technology involved. In its traditional form, the
defense is only applicable when a wire service is involved in the
news distribution.26 Without the wire service privilege, a news or-
ganization can face liability for defamation if it reports verbatim
what has appeared in another publication, even if the item is attrib-
uted.27 It is time to re-evaluate the old adage in libel law that
"[t]alebearers are as bad as talemakers. 21
Part I of this comment chronicles the history and expansion of
the wire service defense since it first appeared in a 1933 decision.29
Additionally, Part I posits that the early development of the wire
service defense was likely a tool to protect technological develop-
ments that improved news distribution over the wire.30 Part I also
discusses the reverse wire service defense, which developed more
than sixty years after the first articulation of the defense.31
Part II will examine New York's broader approach to evaluating
whether a republisher should be held liable, which displaces the
24. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
25. Id. at 280.
26. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933) (holding that papers that
act as a "local screen" and reprint news dispatches from wire service are protected
from libel claims via the wire service defense).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578(b) (1977).
28. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915) (holding that a newspaper can be held liable for defamation when it reported
with attribution that another newspaper published a story accusing the local police
chief of illegally putting his son on the city payroll).
29. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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need for a privilege like the wire service defense.32 Under New
York law, in matters involving public figures and matters of public
concern involving private figures, republishers must act in a grossly
irresponsible manner in order to be held liable. 33 Under this stan-
dard, the court must determine whether the initial publisher was a
reliable source and whether the republisher acted as would a pru-
dent journalist.34
Finally, Part III concludes that the common law rule holding re-
publishers liable for defamation should be replaced with a pre-
sumption in favor of republication.35 This presumption would
allow republication of news without liability when a republisher
meets certain criteria, regardless of the type of medium involved,
unless the republisher acted with actual malice.36 This Part also
points out problems with both the traditional wire service defense
and New York's broader approach.37 Part III also discusses how
Congress has limited traditional republication liability for Internet
service providers, which illustrates that republisher liability is un-
suitable in modern times. 38 This change supports the important
goal of ensuring that speech is not chilled, a core First Amendment
value, and that news is not kept from the public.39 In addition, this
Part will suggest that the traditional rule barring the original pub-
lisher from being held liable for third party publication of the origi-
nal publisher's statements should be altered to account for truly
harmed plaintiffs.40
32. See infra notes 147-75 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
36. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). The qualified privilege is granted to republishers in New York who have no
reason to question the accuracy of the article or the good faith of the reporter. An-
other factor to be considered when evaluating the republisher's behavior is whether
the republisher followed "sound journalistic practices" in republishing the material
and whether it adhered to "normal procedures, including editorial review of the
copy." Id.
37. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market .... ).
40. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WIRE SERVICE DEFENSE
Part I examines Layne v. Tribune Co., the first case to articulate
the wire service defense, and the policy reasons for departing from
the strict common law rule that republishers are liable for defama-
tion regardless of whether they attributed the source of the mate-
rial.41 This Part also hypothesizes that the court's holding was
partly in response to changing technology that made wire services
more efficient.42 In addition, this Part discusses how courts have
expanded the defense, applying it to news organizations that go
beyond acting like Layne's "local screen. ' 43 For an understanding
of why the media would benefit from the defense, it is necessary to
examine the elements of defamation and republisher liability. 4
A. The Elements of Defamation
The elements of the defamation tort vary from case to case de-
pending on several factors: the identities of the parties, the charac-
ter of the alleged defamatory statement, and the law of the
jurisdiction applied to the action.4 5 The general elements are, how-
ever: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting
to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication. '46
The wire service privilege is a powerful tool for the media in
battling some defamation lawsuits because of the continued exis-
tence of the rule that secondary publishers are subject to the same
liability as the original publisher.47 The common law of libel has
long held that a publisher adopts the defamatory comment as its
own through republication. 48 This rule, which aims to protect repu-
41. See infra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-53.
45. ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 63 (2nd ed.
1994).
46. Id. at 63-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977)).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); see also Short v. News-Jour-
nal Co., 212 A.2d 718, 719 (Del. 1965). In Short, the court stated in dictum that the
traditional republisher liability applied and "neither good faith nor honest mistake
constitutes a defense, serving only to mitigate damages." Id. at 719.
48. SACK, supra note 45, at 361 (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,
838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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tations,49 excludes those who are involved solely in the delivery or
transmission of the defamatory material, such as a telegraph com-
pany putting through a call.5 0 Thus, absent a privilege, a newspa-
per is subject to liability if it republishes a defamatory statement,
"although it names the author and another newspaper in which the
statement first appeared."51 Under the wire service privilege, how-
ever, the media defendant has the potential to prevail at the early
summary judgment phase,52 thereby destroying the plaintiff's cause
of action.53
B. A Privilege for Republishers: Layne v. Tribune Co.
Layne v. Tribune Co. 54 first articulated the "wire service de-
fense" and its rationale, although the terminology was not coined
until years later.55 Layne, a Congressman's secretary, sued The
49. See, e.g., Times Publ'g Co. v. Carlisle Journal Co., 94 F. 762, 766 (8th Cir.
1899).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977).
51. Id. at § 578, comment b; see also Times Publ'g Co., 94 F. at 767 ("[Ilt is no
justification for the publication of such a libel that another had spoken or written the
false charge, and that the libeler simply repeated his statement, and that he gave the
name of his informant.").
52. The wire service defense does not apply differently to public or private figures,
making it a tool that allows media defendants to get an early motion for summary
judgment since the private/public question, which is often heavily litigated, is not an
issue. See Youm, supra note 13, at 688 (reminding media defendants not to overlook
a summary judgment motion based on the wire service defense if appropriate).
53. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1484-85 (S.D. Fla.
1987). Nelson could not sue the original publisher, the Associated Press, because she
did not give proper notice under Florida statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 770.01 (West 1986)
required plaintiffs in a civil action brought against the media for libel or slander to
notify the defendant specifying the article and the statements that are allegedly de-
famatory. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1473. Nelson notified the Associated Press that she
was filing a defamation suit, but failed to point to the specific defamatory statements
in specific press dispatches. Id. The court said that Nelson had that information avail-
able, since she sued two other newspapers the following day that reproduced copies of
the offending Associated Press story. Id. The Florida statute requires the best notice
possible. Id. at 1474. In addition, the wire service defense barred Nelson from recov-
ering from Newsweek, The Miami Herald, and The New York Post. Id. at 1484-85.
The court noted that this outcome is "ironic" and recognized that "[t]here is no ques-
tion but that Plaintiff feels victimized by the nature of these proceedings and this
result." Id. at 1485. "The irony does not 'smack' of injustice in the federal courts ....
The First Amendment, unfortunately [sic] as it may be, does not otherwise protect
Plaintiff's subjective feelings." Id. "Regardless, the court is adamant that First
Amendment protection justifies-and demands-this result." Id. The decision "must
be understood as a price we pay for upholding a Bill of Rights which believes that the
truth is best arrived at from 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' comment." Id.
54. 146 So. 234, 237-38 (Fla. 1933).
55. Id. at 238. But see Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62, 63 (10th Cir. 1933)
(affirming a jury award for a woman libeled by an article stating that she was jailed on
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Tampa Morning Tribune after the paper published two wire stories
that said he was indicted for possession of alcohol.56 The court
held that when a newspaper republishes a wire story from a "gen-
erally recognized reliable source of daily news," there is no cause
of action for defamation unless there is evidence that the publisher
"acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in reproducing
it."' 57 The court likened the republisher to a "local 'screen"' lack-
ing authorship.5 s Later courts ruled that republishers do not have
to use the wire service byline, nor are they confined to acting as a
local screen, to be afforded the privilege. 9
While the Layne court recognized that the wire service defense
was at odds with the majority common law view of republisher lia-
bility,60 the court justified its decision by relying on policy reasons
and the ancient common law "to the effect that one who hears a
slander has a legal right to repeat it," in the same words and with
attribution.61 It appears, however, that the Layne court errone-
ously interpreted the ancient common law.62 The court extended
forgery charges; the court rejected defendant's defense that they should not be liable
because they based their article on an Associated Press dispatch).
56. Layne, 146 So. at 235-36. Both stories had a Washington dateline. Id.
57. Id. at 238.
58. Id. at 239.
59. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(stating that a newspaper does not lose the wire service defense if the article in ques-
tion does not explicitly carry the wire service byline). In addition, headlines the re-
publisher created that are based on the wire story are only actionable if information is
added or subtracted, which would make the headline itself libelous. MacGregor v.
Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
60. Layne, 146 So. at 237 (approving of the modern rule that in cases of libel and
slander, one who republishes the statement "must be held liable for the publication of
a libel or defamatory words in regard to another, even though he is but repeating
what he has heard, and names his authority, and although the repetition is made with-
out any design to extend circulation..." (citing World Publ'g Co. v. Mullen, 61 N.W.
108, 109 (Neb. 1894)), because one "who repeats a slander or libel is presumed by his
reiteration of it, to indorse it and make it his own" (citing Evans v. Smith, 21 Ky. 363,
363 (1827))).
61. Id. at 237-39 (citing Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. 442 (Ala. 1836); Johnson v. St.
Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539 (1877)). Johnson suggested, without holding, that one
who repeated a slander was not liable for slander for repeating the statement if he
said it in the same words and attributed the source. 65 Mo. at 541 ("That one heard
another make the charge which he repeats, will not screen him unless at the time of
repeating the words, he affords the plaintiff a cause of action against the original
author."); see also Nelson, 667 F. Supp at 1476 (discussing the ancient common law
and allowing slander to be repeated without liability, and concluding that "modern
newspapers could not exist without a similar privilege").
62. What Layne refers to as the ancient common law rule allowing one to repeat a
slander without liability if the source was attributed is actually inaccurate; the origin
of this inaccuracy is dicta in the Earl of Northampton case, 12 Coke. Rep. 132 (1613).
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this erroneous rationale to news organizations, recognizing that
"[t]he modern daily newspaper is an institution of news dissemina-
tion that was unknown to the early common law," and that judicial
notice allowed the court to adjust common law principles to better
serve society.63
The Layne court reasoned that adopting a wire service defense
would give papers access to news from around the country and the
world that would be of interest to their readers.64 Without such a
privilege, a newspaper would be forced to verify every news item it
published, while "at the same time keep up the prompt daily ser-
vice expected of present day newspapers. ' 65 Later courts recogniz-
ing the defense explained that an obligation of independent
verification "would leave only large, wealthy newspapers capable
of covering multiple stories and regions. 6
6
Since Layne, courts have added several requirements which a
news organization must fulfill to raise the defense:67 the repub-
lisher must read the release to make sure there are no inconsisten-
cies; 68 the article must not be republished if there are unexplained
inconsistencies or if the news organization republishing the article
knows the article is false; 69 and if a reasonable jury could disagree
as to whether something in the article should put the newspaper on
notice of a possible inaccuracy, the defense is not available and
summary judgment is not appropriate.70
See JOHN TOWNSHEND, TOWNSHEND ON SLANDER AND LIBEL 300-03 (4th ed. 1890)
(discussing the impetus for the erroneous belief that a repetition could be justified by
declaring the name of the previous publisher).
63. Layne, 146 So. at 238. Courts are not "wholly powerless to remold and reap-
ply the ancient rules so as to fit them to modern conditions, where there has arisen
and become involved, new factors of life and business arising from the complexities of
a mechanized era of human progress." Id. at 237.
64. See Layne, 146 So. at 237.
65. Id. at 239; see also Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1480 ("The wire service defense is
fully consistent with the First Amendment-an amendment which tolerates occa-
sional, non-negligent mistakes for the sake of getting out the news people want.").
66. Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing
the wire service defense in Minnesota and granting summary judgment for papers that
relied on a story from The Associated Press "because there is no question that the AP
is a reputable news service that provides accurate information").
67. See Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 738, 740-42 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996).
68. Id. at 740-41.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 742. The decisions, however, lack guidance on what type of information
that would be so outrageous as to put the defendant republisher on notice that the
story was potentially defamatory. Examples of information that would not put the
republisher on notice can be found in Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp.
1468, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1987) and in O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp.
141720041
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While using the term wire service defense for consistency, some
modern courts have recognized that the defense is actually a defini-
tion of the duty a newspaper has when republishing information
from a wire service.71 Requiring verification of facts, these courts
reason, would impose a standard of extraordinary care, not ordi-
nary care, on the media.72 These courts focus their analysis on the
standard of care, not on whether the medium involved can some-
how be classified as or identified with a wire service. Whether the
information came from a wire can be an element used to evaluate
whether a republisher demonstrated ordinary care.
C. Defending the Media, Protecting Technology
Significantly, the Layne court's decision recognizing the wire ser-
vice defense appeared shortly after technological advances made
news dispatches via the wire quicker and more efficient.73 The in-
vention and widespread use of the teletype system changed news-
gathering. 4 Prior to the teletype system, the telegraph system
transmitted news in the form of dots and dashes, which had to be
converted into words. 75 Telegraph technology improved margin-
ally since its invention in 1844, and the human element plagued the
218, 225 (E.D. Ky. 1990). The Nelson court said that while the statement "drugs were
used and sex was had" is false and arguably defamatory, it was not enough to put The
New York Post on notice. Nelson, 661 F. Supp. at 1482. "This is because, admittedly,
the Pulitzer trial elicited some of the most preposterous testimony imaginable during
the eighteen days it lasted." Id. In O'Brien, the court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the paper should have been on notice as to the defamatory nature of the
statements because the article contained accusations that teachers were involved in
sexual misconduct. 735 F. Supp. at 225.
Allegations of wrongdoing are published nearly every day and involve peo-
ple world-wide. The plaintiff has offered no authority which holds that the
mention of sexual misconduct should automatically require an independent
investigation by every newspaper which wishes to publish such a story as
transmitted via the AP. The burden would clearly be onerous ....
Id.
71. See Howe, 555 N.W.2d at 740-41; see also O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 218, 220
(stating that "the so-called 'defense' is actually a definition of ordinary care in regard
to the use of wire service stories").
72. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 537 (S.D. Ga.
1988). Here, the federal district court, sitting in diversity, decided that the Georgia
Supreme Court would have applied the wire service defense, pointing to the logic
behind the defense and the fact that neighboring states had adopted it. Id.
73. Five years before the Layne court approved the wire service defense, the As-
sociated Press replaced the telegraph with the teletype printer. See Libby Quaid,
Morse Was The Source: Telegraph Served AP for Eight Decades, at http://www.ap.org/
anniversary/welcome4.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
74. Id.
75. See RICHARD SCHWARZLOSE, THE AMERICAN WIRE SERVICES 80-81 (1979).
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system's efficiency.76 Although the more efficient teletype system
was introduced in 1914,'7 it was not until the mid-1930's, around
the time of the Layne decision, that this new technology was in
widespread use for news transmission. 8
The teletype took the human element out of wire service trans-
mission, thereby increasing its efficiency.79 Transmitting news via
the wire service was "ingressed deeply into the social fabric" 80 by
the development of the teletype. Even prior to the advanced tech-
nology, the news wires were already an accepted part of society.,,
Increased efficiency and widespread use turned the work of the
wire service into a social institution, whose international stories
American newspaper readers came to expect.82 It follows that
courts would want to protect a valuable social institution like the
wire services and promote their use and growth. In fact, a contrary
decision in Layne could have potentially destroyed the wire service
industry. Papers fearing traditional republisher liability may have
forgone the use of wire news. While it is unknown if papers would
have reacted this way, this potential scenario was exactly what the
Layne court sought to avoid.83 This rationale, however, does not
76. Id. Although the system could transmit thirty-five words-per-minute, the
words were transmitted as dots and dashes which needed to be translated by opera-
tors. Id. Errors in translation were frequent. In addition, wire service telegraphers,
following the lead of Western Union telegraphers, unionized. Id. During the first
fifteen years of the century, the wire service telegraphers fought with management,
sometimes striking, in order to secure privileges similar to other telegraphers. Id.
This movement impacted transmission efficiency. Id.
77. Id. (stating that the early models of the teletype were not reliable). The tele-
type "was simply a consolidation of a typewriter mechanism (in both sending and
receiving stations) with a device for transmitting electrical impulses along connecting
telegraph or telephone wires (or even through the atmosphere by radio)." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. "The innovation raised transmission rates to sixty words per minute, re-
duced operator manpower to a single sender for each trunk or regional wire, and
permitted reception of a greater volume of cleaner, more uniform, and more immedi-
ately usable news copy in the newspaper office." Id.
80. Id. at 88.
81. See generally MENAHEM BLONDHEiM, NEWS OVER THE WIRES: THE TELE-
GRAPH AND THE FLOW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN AMERICA, 1844-1897, at 6 (1994)
("For by the early 1850's at least two columns of Associated Press news appeared
daily in nearly every major American newspaper.").
82. See SCHWARZLOSE, supra note 75, at 202-05, 339 (arguing that the wire ser-
vices attained "the position of a social institution in the United States"). "In fact, this
status increasingly appears also to accrue to them abroad by virtue of their increasing
ingression into the communication processes of foreign societies." Id. at 203.
83. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933) ("To hold otherwise
would mean that newspapers at their peril published purported items of news, against
the falsity of which no ordinary human foresight could effectually guard and at the
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explain why the defense became popular in recent years, with
courts opting to apply the defense more liberally.
D. Broadening the Scope of the Defense
The Layne court provided the justification for the wire service
defense, but left many questions open for subsequent courts, in-
cluding when the defense should apply and what the relevant stan-
dard of care should be. Courts since Layne have continued to
recognize that the defense facilitates the quick dissemination of
news,84 but many courts have rejected applying the defense only to
breaking news. While the Layne court referred to the republish-
ing newspaper as a "local" media outlet, the court did not define
the term "local." 86 Later courts expanded the notion of the repub-
lisher to include national media organizations.87 In addition, sub-
sequent courts have further clarified the threshold the media has to
meet in order to invoke the defense.' 8
Courts since Layne have been clear that the application of the
wire service defense does not turn on whether the republished re-
port is breaking news," or if the republisher theoretically could
have covered the story on its own without hardship.90 Almost fifty
years after Layne, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Appleby v.
Daily Hampshire Gazette9' ruled that the wire service defense ap-
plied even when the news reported was breaking and did not take
place in a remote location.92 In Appleby, a convicted felon sued
various newspapers in ninety-four actions, claiming that they de-
famed him in reporting information related to a criminal investiga-
tion of which he was the subject.93 Thirty-three of the papers filed
same time keep up the prompt daily service expected of present day newspapers.");
see also Nelson v. Associated Press, 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
84. See generally Ripps v. Gannett Co., CV 91-B-1954-S, 1993 WL 209617 (N.D.
Ala. Mar. 3, 1993). "The [wire service defense] recognizes the importance of publica-
tion before news becomes stale." Id. at n.4.
85. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
86. 146 So. at 234.
87. See, e.g., Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1471.
88. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Ky.
1990).
89. Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 726 (Mass. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 723.
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for summary judgment were based on the wire service defense. 94
The Appleby court ruled in favor of summary judgment using the
same rationales as the Layne court, even though the papers in Ap-
pleby were Massachusetts-based and were published not far from
Appleby's Massachusetts home, the setting of the stories.95 The
Appelby court reasoned that making a distinction between local
stories and remote stories "would impose the same risks of 'appre-
hensive self-censorship,' as would the requirement that newspapers
corroborate all wire service stories before publication. ' 96 In addi-
tion, the court rejected the "local screen" rationale from Layne and
extended the defense to include stories that were not republished
verbatim, but which instead accurately restated the substance of
the wire service stories. 97
While the Layne court did not expressly limit the defense to
newspapers, it did not specifically authorize its application to other
news sources. Subsequent courts, however, have extended the de-
fense to television networks98 and magazines. 99 One court even
suggested that the defense could be extended to radio broad-
casts.100 The Nelson court allowed Newsweek, a national news-
94. Id. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of four papers that
were representative of the others and delayed ruling on the rest to save time and
money until appeals were exhausted in the four test cases. Id.
95. Id. at 726. The four papers were The Medford Daily Mercury, The Boston
Globe, The Daily Hampshire Gazette, and The Holyoke Transcript-Telegram. The
Medford Daily Mercury republished stories verbatim from the United Press Interna-
tional, while the rest of the papers republished stories verbatim from The Associated
Press. Id. at 723.
96. Id. at 726 (quoting Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161,
169 (Mass. 1975)).
97. Id. (stating that there is no difference between reprinting verbatim and accu-
rately restating a wire story's contents).
98. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Ariz. 1996) (the wire service defense applies to a network affiliate that acted as a
mere conduit for ABC's Prime Time Live); see also Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell
Prods., Inc., No. 97-C2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (stating,
without concluding, that the wire service defense may extend to nonaffiliated net-
works); Bryks v. Canadian Broad. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 927 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (noting
that "the wire service defense and the liability of broadcaster defense are correlative
enough to be used interchangeably"); Peper v. Gannett Co., No. 061753, 2003 WL
22457121, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2003) (holding that CNN's reliance on a repu-
table wire service story allowed them to successfully use the wire service defense).
99. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(holding that the wire service applies to Newsweek magazine).
100. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 n.2 (S.D. Ga.
1988) (stating that the court suspected that the radio station defendant would be
granted summary judgment based on the defense should he decide to submit a motion
to the Court).
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weekly, to successfully assert the defense because periodicals
"obviously must rely for their sources of information upon other
reliable periodicals, newspapers and wire service reports." 10 1 The
court further justified the extension, adding that "[t]hese periodi-
cals are an integral part of today's news information services." 1°2 It
should be noted, however, that there is still a question as to
whether Layne should be extended to other media. While some
courts have applied the wire service defense to other mediums,
none have discussed whether there are limits as to what type of
medium the defense could be extended to cover. Some courts have
taken the reasoning of the wire service defense and applied it to
protect the wire service when it disseminates member-created
work, rather than that of the wire service reporters.10 3
E. Protecting the Wire: The Reverse Wire Service Defense
The same reasoning behind protecting republishers who rely on
news wires has been used to protect "reputable news services" like
The Associated Press under a "reverse wire service defense."' 04 A
reverse wire service defense allows a wire service to escape liability
for defamation if the story it distributed was the work of a reputa-
ble news source instead of the wire service's own reporter. 0 5 In
this situation, the wire service would not have the duty to indepen-
dently verify the facts of the story, and could raise the defense as
long as it did not know or have reason to know that the material
was defamatory.0 6
Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in Reilly v. Associ-
ated Press,' upheld summary judgment in favor of The Associated
Press, holding that the wire service had no independent duty to
verify the facts of a story before disseminating it when the story
came from a reputable source and had nothing on its face to indi-
cate that it was defamatory.' In Reilly, the wire service distrib-
uted an allegedly defamatory story from The Boston Herald about
101. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1477.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
104. Reilly v. Associated Press, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003);
see Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 322 (Haw. 1983); see also Winn v.
United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (D.D.C. 1996); Winn v. Associated Press,
903 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
105. Reilly, 797 N.E.2d at 1217.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1217-18.
108. Id. at 1218. But see Mehau, 658 P.2d at 322 (holding that defendant UPI could
not rely on the reverse wire service defense when picking up a story from a new
1422
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a veterinarian under disciplinary investigation for negligent prac-
tice and the paper disseminated a condensed version of the story to
Associated Press members. 10 9 The court ruled that the reasoning
behind the wire service defense applied to the situation here pro-
vided that the elements needed to raise the privilege were met. 110
The Reilly court recognized that newspapers and wire services
have a "symbiotic" relationship and must be able to trust each
other to disseminate news effectively. 1 ' While one of the ratio-
nales underlying Layne v. Tribune Co. was to allow smaller, re-
source-poor publications to publish news outside their
communities without the fear of liability,112 the court in Reilly de-
cided that the ability to disseminate the news, rather than the re-
sources available to a particular news organization, justifies the
reverse defense. 13 It would be difficult to rely solely on Layne's
justifications to defend applying the defense to large, well-funded
news cooperatives like The Associated Press." 4
In addition, the Reilly court, like many courts examining the
standard wire service defense, refused to draw a distinction that
would allow the defense to be raised in regard to "fast-breaking"
national and international news, but not "local, human interest or
news features, arguably concerning 'lesser' events. 1" 5 The court
justified this rejection, saying that it would be an "impermissible
burden" on the media and the courts to identify these "subtle dis-
tinctions.""' 6 Further, like media asserting the traditional privilege,
"tabloid without a 'track record' for reliability" that was known to sensationalize the
news).
109. Reilly, 797 N.E.2d at 1209. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of
The Boston Herald, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Reilly negligently treated the animal in question. Id. at 1218.
110. See id. at 1217 (quoting Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721,
725 (Mass. 1985)).
111. See id.
112. 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933); see also Mehau, 658 P.2d at 323 (pointing out that
should the court not apply the wire service defense, the paper "may be reduced to an
organ reporting news of Hilo and the Big Island").
113. 797 N.E.2d at 1217 (concluding that "[w]hile the AP's resources may be
greater than a small local newspaper's, it cannot afford to verify every news item
originating from every one of its member publications and still disseminate news
promptly"); see also Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476-77 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (holding that Newsweek was entitled to a wire service defense regardless of
the fact that it was a large, national, weekly publication.)
114. The Associated Press has 242 bureaus and a budgeted revenue of more than
$500 million. See Associated Press, Facts & Figures, at http://www.ap.org/pages/
aptoday/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
115. 797 N.E.2d at 1217.
116. Id.
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wire services looking for protection under a reverse wire service
defense must show that they relied on a trustworthy source.
F. Determining Who Is a Reliable Source
Papers can raise the wire service defense even if they did not rely
on a wire service itself, but instead relied on other local papers that
republished wire copy.117 In McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc.,118
the defendant newspaper editor relied on information from at least
five area newspapers when writing a story. 119 The papers upon
which the editor relied were state papers that were arguably local
papers since none of them had a national circulation, and some did
not even circulate throughout the state.12 0 In McKinney, however,
the court found that "[t]he sources relied upon ... are known for
their accuracy and are regularly relied upon by local newspapers
without independent verification." 1 21 Thus, smaller papers have
the privilege of relying upon their larger counterparts.
Arguably, the court in McKinney created a hierarchy that de-
fined "local" in relation to the size of the party that wrote the origi-
nal story and the party that relied upon it. For example, the North
Carolina Press Association classifies the Avery Journal as a com-
munity newspaper, while the papers it relied upon are all classified
as daily newspapers. 22 Although the court did not mention this
distinction, it seems that the local requirement articulated in Layne
is not uniform, but instead is evaluated based on how the repub-
lishing paper relates in size and scope to the medium upon which it
relied.
Expanding the definition of a reliable source is also illustrated in
Gay v. Williams,23 where the Alaska district court applied the
principles of the wire service defense without explicitly mentioning
117. See McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
Arguably, media organizations that raise the defense do not have to be subscribers of
the news wire. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The papers included The Charlotte Observer, The Winston-Salem Journal,
The Asheville Citizen, The Greensboro Daily News, and The News and Observer. Id.
The Charlotte Observer article was a reprinted Associated Press story. Id.
120. See N. Carolina Press Ass'n, NCPA Member Newspapers, at http://www.nc
press.com/membersbytown.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
121. McKinney, 393 S.E.2d at 297.
122. See N. Carolina Press Ass'n, supra note 120.
123. 486 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979). While the Alaska court did not invoke the
wire service defense by name, it ruled that neither the wire service nor the local news-
paper could be held liable for reasonably relying on IRE's published report. Id. at 16-
17.
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it by name. 124 There, the court granted summary judgment based
on the logic of the wire service defense in favor of a local newspa-
per that relied upon an Associated Press story.125 The court also
dismissed the Associated Press from the action because its story
was a summary of a report from Investigative Reporters and Edi-
tors, Inc. ("IRE"). 26 The IRE story reported allegations that Gay
was involved with drug smuggling.1 27 The Associated Press re-
porter assigned to write stories about the IRE reports chose not to
feature the story written about Gay.128 At the request of one of the
Alaska member papers, however, the Associated Press wrote and
disseminated a story that included the allegations against Gay. 29
The court granted summary judgment in favor of The Associated
Press, despite the plaintiff's claim that IRE was not a reputable
news source on which the wire should reasonably rely.1 30 IRE was
only formed two years before the articles in question were pub-
lished, which suggests that longevity is not a major factor in deter-
124. Id.
125. Id. The court accepted the newspaper's argument that if they did not have the
ability to rely on The Associated Press as a reliable source of news, then they would
only be able to publish local news. Id.
126. Id. at 13. According to IRE's website, the group, founded two years before
the stories in Gay were written, is a grassroots nonprofit organization dedicated to
improving the quality of investigative reporting. See IRE, History of IRE, at http://
www.ire.org/history (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). The AP did not conduct its own inves-
tigation about the facts in the IRE stories. Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 17.
127. Gay, 486 F. Supp. at 13. Journalists from around the country participated in
IRE's Arizona Project to investigate organized crime in Arizona after the death of
Don Bolles, an investigative reporter for the Arizona Republic, who was killed by a
bomb in 1976 on his way to meet an informant. Id. "The stories stated that 'pub-
lished accounts of a series by a team of investigative reporters' say that Gay, 'a
wealthy Alaskan bush pilot and owner of a small Arizona boarder town,' was a 'mys-
tery man of the Arizona drug corridor,' and that the town owned by Gay is a 'major
crossing point for drug smugglers."' Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id. The Ketchikan Daily News and Southeast Alaska Empire both published
the Associated Press story in question. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 17. The court said that the fact that many newspapers around the coun-
try refused to cover the IRE stories, especially the one about Gay, did not mean that
the stories were unreliable. Id. The court also said that Gay failed to show that The
AP should have questioned the IRE's reliability. Id. In addition, the court dismissed
stories from The Chicago Tribune and The Los Angeles Times that were critical of
IRE's methods, reasoning that the stories were published after the Gay story was
published, and that they did not pertain to The Associated Press's "knowledge at the
time of publication." Id.
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mining reliability.131 Other courts, however, have suggested that
longevity is indeed a factor in evaluating reliability. 3 2
G. Limits to the Wire Service Defense
In addition to the nature of the source relied upon, other factors
limit the applicability of the wire service defense. While it is not
necessary for republished text to mirror the wire service text verba-
tim, 13 3 adding further substantial material may bar the defense.134
In O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 35 the wire service defense
protected all but one of the newspaper defendants that republished
an Associated Press story about a school meeting. Parents of high
school students called the meeting in response to the expulsion of a
student who fought with a teacher.136 The media organizations re-
ported that during the meeting, parents also requested that the ad-
ministration investigate allegations of teachers having affairs with
students. 37 The Associated Press story reported that while none of
the speakers linked the fight between the expelled student and the
teacher to the allegations of sexual misconduct, "most [of the par-
ents] referred to 'allegations' and 'charges' surrounding the [fight]
that could prove harmful to a teacher's career."'' 38 The teacher in-
volved in the fight sued for defamation because of the implication
that the reason the male student attacked him was because he was
having an affair with a female student. 39
The O'Brien court ruled that the wire service defense was not
applicable to the Williamson Daily News because the reporter ad-
ded a paragraph at the end of The Associated Press report that
raised a negligence issue.14 The lesson from cases subsequent to
O'Brien is that strict adherence to the factual essence of the wire
131. See IRE, supra note 126.
132. See Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 317 (Haw. 1983) (referring to
one of the media defendants as a tabloid without a "track record" for reliability).
133. See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Mass. 1985).
134. See O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 224 (E.D. Ky. 1990).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 221-22, 225.
137. Id. at 221-22.
138. Id. at 224.
139. Id. at 225.
140. Id. at 224. The additional paragraph stated, "[Phelps High School principal]
O'Brien said last week that if 'something was going on, I want to stop it.'... O'Brien
confirmed that he had received a complaint against [the teacher involved in the fight]
from a 17-year-old female who is a senior at the school, but that she was not accompa-
nied by a parent." Id. (alteration in orginal).
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service story is necessary to benefit from the defense's liability
shield.14'
In addition, to successfully assert the defense, journalists must be
able to point to the exact article upon which they relied.1 42 The
Jewell court stated that the wire service defense was not applicable
to reporters who, in their affidavits, said they relied on wire service
and televised reports but who could not point to the precise reports
that they used.143 The court rejected the defendant's argument that
the reason the reporters could not identify the precise wire report
was because more than a year had passed between the time they
relied on the reports and when their affidavits were taken. 144 The
result of this candid admission was a denial of a summary judgment
motion based on New York's broader republication privilege.145
The court reasoned that since the defendants could not point pre-
cisely to the articles upon which they relied, they could not estab-
141. Medure v. Vindicator Printing Co. provides an example of when the defense
cannot be used because there is a material issue of fact as to whether or not the
reporter "substantially altered the words in materials that preceded her article .... "
273 F. Supp. 2d 588, 618 (W.D. Pa. 2002). The magistrate who initially handled the
case noted that there was no showing that the wire service defense was available in
Pennsylvania. Id. The second magistrate, however, arguably recognized the defense
here because, although the court noted that the defendants have cited no authority
that shows the wire service defense is available in Pennsylvania, the court goes on to
apply the defense to the facts and concludes that it is not applicable here. Id. at 618-
19. In the end, the court ruled in favor of the defendants based on grounds other than
the wire service defense. Id. at 619. Here, the reporter was writing about alleged
improprieties in the Indian casino industry. She reported in November 1997 that
Gaming World, the company that ran the Indian casinos, was under an FBI investiga-
tion and allegedly stole $22 million from the casino. See id. at 589. The 1996 Associ-
ated Press story she allegedly relied on, however, quoted a legal advisor to the tribe
saying that the FBI expected to begin an investigation in early September 1996. See
id. at 618-19. Also, there was more than a year between that Associated Press state-
ment and the allegedly defamatory Vindicator article. See id. Should the court find
that there is a material fact as to whether the words of wire service story were altered,
summary judgment based on the wire service defense is not appropriate. See id.
142. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 371-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Jewell, a former Olympic security guard, sued several media defendants after they
linked him in stories to the July 27, 1996 bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in
Atlanta during the centennial Olympics. Id. at 356. Here, the court comments that
"curiously," the New York courts have never cited Layne v. Tribune, nor have they
discussed the wire service defense. Id. at 370. Instead, New York law regarding re-
publication is even broader than the wire service defense, recognizing "a general re-
publication defense applicable to anyone who republishes material from any source,
provided that there was no substantial reason to question the accuracy of the material
or the reputation of the reporter." Id. at 371. But, the judge went on to discuss the
wire service defense in this opinion. Id. at 370-74.
143. Id. at 371-74.
144. See id. at 372.
145. See id.
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lish that they did not have substantial reason to question the
accuracy of the Associated Press reports. 146
I. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO REPUBLISHER LIABILITY
This Part discusses New York's qualified privilege for republish-
ers as an alternative to the wire service defense.147 While the New
York privilege is similar in many ways to the wire service defense,
the New York privilege substantially broadens the shield for repub-
lishers.148 This approach is broader because its protection is not
limited to media organizations; instead, it also allows non-tradi-
tional media entities like public relations companies to successfully
invoke the privilege when they rely on clients as reliable sources
when preparing press releases. 49
A. New York's Approach to Republisher Liability
New York offers a qualified privilege to all republishers, regard-
less of whether a wire service is involved. Republisher liability in
New York does not hinge on whether or not news passes over a
wire. 5° Instead, in cases involving private figures and matters of
public concern,1 51 New York plaintiffs must show that the repub-
lisher acted "in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consid-
eration for the standards of information gathering and
dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.' 1 52 This
qualified privilege is granted to republishers in New York who
have no reason to question the accuracy of the article or the good
faith of the reporter. 153 When evaluating the republisher's behav-
ior, New York courts also consider whether the publication fol-
146. See id.
147. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
148. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
149. See id.
150. See Zetes v. Richman, 447 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (App. Div. 1982); see also
Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
151. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), defined the ac-
tual malice standard when dealing with public figures. To act with actual malice
means one must have knowledge that a story is false or act with reckless disregard as
to whether it was false or not. Id.
152. Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (noting that while the grossly negligent
standard was initially used for media defendants, it has been applied to non-media
defendants); see also Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569,
571-72 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that getting information from two authoritative sources
and having two editors check the reporter's work did not illustrate grossly negligent
behavior).
153. See Zetes, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 779; see also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that a book publisher could rely on
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lowed "sound journalistic practices" in republishing the material,
and whether it adhered to "'normal procedures,' including edito-
rial review of the copy. 154
Zetes v. Richman was the first New York case to apply this quali-
fied privilege to a situation involving republication from a wire ser-
vice story.'55 There, the defendant, Tonawanda Publishing Corp.,
appealed from a denial of summary judgment. Tonawanda claimed
it could not be held liable for defamation for republishing a United
Press International story reporting that the plaintiff was selling de-
fective souvenir pennies commemorating the 1980 Winter Olym-
pics in Lake Placid.1 56 The court granted summary judgment in
Tonawanda's favor because the plaintiff failed to show that Tona-
wanda had reason to question either the accuracy of United Press
International, or the "bona fides" of the sports editor who wrote
the story.157 Zetes did not mention the possibility of the wire ser-
vice defense, even though courts in other jurisdictions had already
adopted the defense.158 The strict common law standard of repub-
lisher liability is only valid in cases where the elements of New
York's qualified privilege are not met.
B. The Privilege Is Not Limited to Traditional
Media Organizations
Over time, New York's qualified privilege to republish devel-
oped into a more inclusive privilege than the wire service defense.
In Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., the plaintiff, the owner of an
online designer retail site, www.offtherunway.com, sued Cyveil-
lance, the magazine Inter@ctive, and PR Newswire after it included
her business in a story about websites that sell counterfeit designer
goods.161 The article was based on a press release that defendant
PR Newswire transmitted to Inter@ctive 161 from Cyveillance, a
the work of a reporter based on the reporter's credentials and there having been no
reason to question the accuracy of the stories).
154. See Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (quoting Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp.,
119 F.3d 1018, 1031 (2d Cir. 1997)).
155. See 447 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting
that the defense had never before been mentioned in a New York opinion). The
defense, however, had been recognized sixty-five years earlier in Florida. See Layne
v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933).
159. 145 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
160. Id.
161. Ziff Davis, Inc., who was named in the lawsuit, owned Inter@ctive. Id.
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company that conducts investigations of internet sites that sell
counterfeit goods or real products sold without the permission of
the designer. 162 The court granted summary judgment for PR
Newswire, reasoning that the plaintiff could not establish that PR
Newswire was grossly irresponsible. 163 The court held that PR
Newswire could reasonably rely on information that its client,
Cyveillance, provided. 164 PR Newswire knew the nature of Cyveil-
lance's business, and the press release that it received was related
to that subject.' 65 In addition, "the source of the [press release]
had previously provided accurate information and there were no
facts which should have aroused the suspicions of Newswire or that
would give cause for further inquiry."'16 6 While Cyveillance was
not a traditional media outlet, PR Newswire still had the privilege
to rely on the company's information.
In Tzougrakis, the court erred on the side of calling a source
reputable until it proved otherwise, establishing a presumption of
reliability. PR Newswire had only received two other press re-
leases from Cyveillance prior to the one in question. 167 Appar-
ently, a minimum showing-two prior press releases that did not
prompt any allegations of libel-was enough for a republisher to
consider a source reliable. 68 This standard allows republishers
much more protection than the wire service defense, where repub-
lishers can only rely on publications with a substantial track record
establishing credibility.
The Cyveillance court also granted summary judgment in favor
of Inter@ctive because the plaintiff could not prove that the maga-
zine acted grossly irresponsible.169 The reasoning here was based
heavily on the credentials and actions of the reporter involved. 70
162. Tzougrakis, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
163. Id. at 332. Defendant PR Newswire claimed that it could not be held liable for
republication because it was more like a distributor, such as a telegraph company or a
printer, which would require a showing of actual knowledge of the statement's defam-
atory nature in order for PR Newswire to be liable. Id. But, the court pointed out
that PR Newswire had editorial control over the press release and formatted it before
distribution, which would make them more than a distributor. Id. The court did not
rule on whether PR Newswire was a distributor or a publisher because neither would
affect the outcome with regard to PR Newswire. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 328.
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The court noted that the reporter had fifteen years experience 171
and that she conducted "an adequate investigation of the facts re-
ceived" 17 2 in the press release.
If New York adopted the strict interpretation of the wire service
defense instead of its broader republisher qualified privilege, it is
likely that neither Inter@ctive nor PR Newswire would have been
able to take advantage of the defense. The issue would be whether
the original publishers qualified as a traditional, reputable source
of daily news. Arguably, a company sending out press releases or
its client would fail to meet that standard because their primary
goal is to sell a product, not disseminate news.
The elements of the wire service defense and New York's quali-
fied privilege for republication are similar, except for the former's
requirement that the information relied upon come from a wire or
similar source of daily news. But, even that requirement of the
wire service defense has been relaxed over the years. Many cases
illustrate that the trend is to make the wire service defense more
inclusive, with courts applying it to magazines, television sta-
tions,"' and possibly radio.'74 This suggests that there may not be
any justification for restricting the privilege to republish to certain
types of media. All of these modifications imply that the tradi-
tional justifications should be replaced in favor of a rule that allows
republication without liability for libel in the absence of actual
malice. 175
171. Id.
172. Id. at 332.
Although [the reporter] did not actually speak with offtherunway.com, the
site had no direct contact information posted. [The reporter] also was una-
ble to discover any contact information after performing a sufficiently dili-
gent search. It is undisputed that [the reporter] attempted to use the email
link provided by offtherunway.com but that the link did not work. Further-
more, absent obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the article, Ziff-Davis
was entitled to rely on . . . a trusted reporter's representations without
rechecking her assertions or retracing her sources.
Id.
173. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cas., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Ariz. 1996) (explaining that the wire service defense applies to a network affiliate
that acted as a mere conduit for ABC's Prime Time Live); see also Bryks v. Canadian
Broad. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
174. See Brown v. Courier Herald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D. Ga.
1988). In footnote 2, the court "suspects" that the radio station defendant would be
granted summary judgment based on the defense should he decide to submit a motion
to the Court. Id. at 538 n.2.
175. See infra notes 178-232.
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Il. REWORKING REPUBLISHER LIABILITY FOR LIBEL
Before arguing that libel law should immunize republication in
the absence of actual malice, Part III examines problems which
make both the traditional wire service defense 176 and New York's
approach inadequate.1 77 This Part concludes that while the New
York qualified privilege starts to address the shortcomings of the
wire service defense, the New York approach does not go far
enough. Part III also discusses how Congress has limited tradi-
tional republication liability for Internet service providers, which
illustrates that republisher liability is unsuitable in modern times.
178
This Part then argues that there should be a presumption against
holding republishers liable, which can be overcome only if the
plaintiff shows actual malice. First, Part III.A discusses and dis-
misses a general critique of the negative impact republication could
have on the marketplace of ideas.1
79
A. General Critique of Immunizing Republication
Critics may argue that allowing media organizations to rely on
each other could have the effect of stifling the marketplace of
ideas.1 80 The court in United States v. Associated Press pointed out
just how important the marketplace of ideas is to First Amendment
jurisprudence.181 There, the court noted that the newspaper indus-
try "serves one of the most vital of all general interests: The dis-
semination of news from as many different facets and colors as is
possible."' 8 z If a media outlet knows that it will be shielded from
liability if it acts as a mere conduit of news, there is less of an in-
centive to find the facts on its own and construct its own story.
Theoretically, one less voice on a subject creates less of a chance
that the truth is reported. 18 3
The stronger argument, however, is that rather than adversely
affecting the market place of ideas, changing the traditional repub-
176. See infra notes 191-208.
177. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
180. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-52 (Hackett Publ'g ed., 1978) (1859).
Mill argued that citizens must be free to espouse false speech in order for the truth to
be discovered. Id.
181. 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that the
bylaws of The Associated Press violated anti-trust laws).
182. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
183. See MILL, supra note 180.
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lication rule will actually increase the flow of news. 184 First, it
strains credulity to believe that a substantial number of journalists
will forego opportunities to report and write stories on their own
and instead rely increasingly on another published report.
185
Scooping the competition is often what personally drives journal-
ists to produce their own stories.'86 In addition, pressure from edi-
tors to beat the competition, or at least produce the same quality
story as the competition, makes it highly unlikely that the quality
of journalism would suffer should the republication rule be re-
pealed. 87 Using attributed work would likely only happen when
resources impede a media organization's attempt to report its own
story.
In addition, seventy-five percent of entry-level daily newspaper
journalists in the 1990s graduated from a college program in media
or mass communications, 88 despite the fact that, unlike doctors or
lawyers, there is no professional degree required to become a jour-
nalist.'8 9 The high rate of journalists educated specifically in com-
munications severely undermines an argument that many
journalists would rely on published work rather than reporting a
story on their own. Students of journalism who have paid
thousands of dollars for their degrees1 90 and are serious about en-
tering the profession are unlikely to envision themselves as
stenographers.
B. Problems with the Wire Service Defense
Media ownership, like the degree of journalists' education, has
changed tremendously in recent years. Thus, a limited republica-
tion defense like the wire service privilege makes less sense in to-
day's society as compared with the time when the common law
184. See generally David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The
Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1207 (1995).
185. See DAVID H. WEAVER & G. CLEVELAND WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN JOUR-
NALIST IN THE 1990S: U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AT THE END OF AN ERA 217-29 (1996) (dis-
cussing factors that journalists interviewed identified as being part of their best work).
186. Id. at 225 (quoting a journalist who indicated that breaking news was a factor
for evaluating a journalist's best work).
187. See generally DAVID J. KRAJICEK, SCOOPED! (1988). Krajicek recounts the
pressure of having to chase a story after it appeared in a rival New York City newspa-
per. Id. at 1-5.
188. See WEAVER & WILHOIT, supra note 185, at 32-33.
189. Id. The number of journalism departments and schools has doubled from 200
in 1972 to 413 in 1992. Id. at 30-31.
190. See June Kronholz, College Costs Play on Stump: Candidates Offer Promises
to Needy Students, But No Solutions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2004 at A4. In 2004, the
average cost for tuition and room and board at a public university was $10,636. Id.
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republication rule was first articulated.191 The number of family
newspapers has severely declined, as they have been absorbed into
media conglomerates. 192 For example, in 2002 Gannett Corp.
owned ninety-four daily community newspapers around the coun-
try with a paid circulation of 7.6 million.193 Gannett also owns a
wire service that allows its papers around the country to share
news.194 Many other media conglomerates also own a wire ser-
vice.195 Therefore, small newspapers do not enjoy the same benefit
of the wire service defense.
A major problem with the wire service defense in this context is
that, in terms of defamation liability, it treats the reporting of me-
dia conglomerates as a single publication, giving them a benefit
similar to the single publication rule. The single publication rule
states that "[any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one
radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or sim-
ilar aggregate communication is a single publication," and a pub-
lisher can only be held liable once.'9 6 Thus, a media defendant
could not be sued twice for defamation if a statement appeared in
its morning and afternoon editions. 197 In situations where the re-
publishing newspaper is part of a large chain with a wire service,
191. James V. Risser, State of the American Newspaper: Endangered Species, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., June 1998, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3276.
Shortly after World War II, three-fourths of all newspapers were independently
owned. Id. In the late 1990's about 300 out of 1504 dailies in the United States were
independent, most of them small. Id. Only fifteen independents have circulations
exceeding 100,000. Id. Twenty-five have 50,000 to 100,000 subscribers. Id. More
than half have fewer than 10,000. Id.
192. See Rob Dean, The Tenacity to Take on a Corporate Giant, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, July 11, 1999, at S-69. As of April 1999, 269 newspapers out of 1477 na-
tionwide were independent. Id. In 1997-98, thirty family-owned newspapers were
sold to chains, according to information compiled by Dirks, Van Essen & Associates,
a Santa Fe-based company that arranges the sale of newspaper companies and tracks
ownership trends. Id.
193. Gannett Co., 2002 Annual Report (2003), available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media-files/IROL/84/84662/reports/2002ar.pdf. Gannett recorded $6.4 billion
in operating revenue in 2002. Id.
194. Id.
195. For example, Advance owns thirty-one papers and two wire services, The
Newhouse News Service and The Religion News Service; Dow Jones owns twenty-five
papers and The Dow Jones News Service; Knight-Ridder owns fifty-five papers, Trib-
une Co. owns fifteen, and together the two companies own KRT Direct; Cox News
owns seventeen newspapers and The Cox News Service; and The New York Times
Co. owns The N.Y. Times News Service, which has forty-four newspaper sources. Co-
lumbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What?, at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (1977).
197. Id. at comment 3.
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the work of a single entity in the company is treated similarly to a
single publication across the company when the wire service de-
fense is applied. Smaller media companies and family-owned oper-
ations that lack a wire service do not receive a similar benefit.
There is no reason to believe that news that passes over a wire is
more reliable and more worthy of dissemination and protection
than news that is republished without going out over a wire.
Courts, however, have ignored this changing landscape and have
often relied on seventy-year-old justifications of the defense."' 8
In addition, courts have not hinted at why the wire service, as a
conduit of news, warrants protection. Their decisions give little
guidance on this point, only stating that it is important to allow the
free dissemination of news so local media are not forced to report
only on the events in their geographical area.1 99 None of the wire
service decisions discuss why news transmitted over the wire de-
serves preferential treatment with regard to republisher liability.
While protectionism may have been an impetus for creating the
wire service defense, 0 0 it does not answer the question of why
more modern courts continue to apply it. Interestingly, the major-
ity of states that recognize the defense first did so in the past
twenty years,20' when the wire services were already an established
social institution that arguably no longer needed protection.20 2 The
proliferation of the defense illustrates the importance that the abil-
ity to republish information has in our society.
There is no justification for limiting republisher liability to in-
stances where the original material passes through a news wire.
While the imagery of the wire lends itself well to analogizing re-
publishers to mere conduits20 3 of information, the wire is not the
only credible way to relay news without taking ownership of its
creation. Instead of limiting republisher liability with the wire ser-
198. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Mehau v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 658 P.2d 312, 323 (Haw. 1983).
200. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
201. Fourteen jurisdictions recognized the defense in the past twenty years. See
supra at note 23 for jurisdictions and cases since 1996. The following jurisdictions
recognized the wire service defense from 1983-1996: Georgia (Brown v. Courier Her-
ald Publ'g Co., 700 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D. Ga. 1988)); Hawaii (Mehau, 658 P.2d at
323); Kentucky (O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Ky.
1990)); Massachusetts (Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 726
(Mass. 1985)); North Carolina (McKinney v. Avery Journal, 393 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1990)); and Wisconsin (Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Pub-
lisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
202. See supra note 82.
203. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 931 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Ariz. 1996).
2004] 1435
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
vice defense, courts should eliminate the old common law liability
for republication. The power of a privilege like the wire service
defense is no match for the traditional republication rule when it
comes to chilling speech.2 4 Although media defendants over-
whelmingly win defamation lawsuits, the threat of litigation often
significantly impacts publication decisions, thereby chilling
speech.205
In addition, the recent move of courts to recognize the reverse
wire service defense illustrates the expansion of limited liability.
This, absolves republishers from liability for republishing material
that first appeared in a newspaper, as long as that material passed
through the wire.20 6 If the reverse defense were not created, the
traditional common law standard of liability would apply. Courts
justify the reverse wire service defense saying, "[tihe responsibility
for accurate, nondefamatory reporting lies with the newspaper that
published the original story, not the wire service that 'demon-
strated ordinary care in preparing and transmitting the article.'
20 7
A showing of ordinary care should also absolve from liability any
publication that takes material from another publication and re-
publishes it with attribution. 8
C. Why the New York Approach Is Not the Right Answer
While the New York privilege is broader in scope than the ap-
proach taken by jurisdictions using the wire service defense, New
York's qualified privilege also fails to go far enough. First, the
privilege effectively allows courts to create a hierarchy of what
types of publications are reliable sources.20 9 While the court in
Tzougrakis was quite liberal in deciding what constituted a reliable
204. See generally Boies, supra note 184, at 1297 (discussing the great impact of
possible litigation on the media's publication decisions, and concluding that the chil-
ling effect is "significant"). "[Litigation] is also expensive for the defamation defen-
dant, and that discourages some in the media from undertaking stories (or
undertaking approaches to stories) they know may engender litigation, whether they
believe they can actually win that litigation." Id. Boise argues that to counter the
chilling effect, courts should consider applying the English fee-shifting rule to defama-
tion cases. Id. at 1212.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
207. Reilly v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (quot-
ing Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
208. Winn, 903 F. Supp. at 579. "[T]he wire service defense is available where, as
here, a news organization reproduces an apparently accurate article by a reputable
publisher, without substantial change and without actual knowledge of its falsity." Id.
209. Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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source,210 there is uncertainty as to how other judges would define
the concept of reliability.
This Comment argues that it is irrelevant whether or not the
court believes the initial publisher was reliable. The real question
is whether or not the republisher published the work with the ac-
tual malice-knowledge that there were factual errors or acting
with reckless disregard of the truth of falsity of the facts alleged.
Instead of looking to courts to determine which publications are
reliable, media organizations should make this determination for
themselves. If a media organization is going to republish with attri-
bution something appearing in another publication, they are subtly
aligning their credibility with that of the other publication. There-
fore, should the initial publisher be an unreliable source, it is un-
likely that the republisher will rely on that source since the
republisher will not want to tarnish its own reputation. The focus
must be on the behavior of the republisher.
Another problematic issue in regard to the New York approach
is the court's inquiry into whether or not sound journalistic prac-
tices were followed. 211 There are no objective criteria that help a
court make that determination. It is true that courts routinely
make similar determinations with the help of expert witnesses. It is
troublesome, however, to have courts involved in fashioning
proper journalistic standards when one of the main functions of
journalists are to keep the branches of government, including the
judiciary, accountable for their actions.212
D. Congressional Action Illustrates that Republisher Liability Is
Incompatible with Society's Information Needs
Congressional action with respect to republishers on the Internet
illustrates the fact that neither the wire service defense nor New
York's "grossly negligent" standard is adequate. 3 While courts
had ruled that Internet service providers had First Amendment
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Constitution protects press so it can "bare the secrets of
government and inform the people").
213. The legislature apparently did not feel that the courts were doing enough to
protect Internet speech. After Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), the legislature overruled the decision by passing the Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2004). The act says that "[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." The
act states that
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protection, 14 they had also found that these publishers were sub-
ject to the traditional rules of republisher liability when they exhib-
ited editorial control.215 In response to cases like Stratton
it is the policy of the United States: (1) to promote the continued develop-
ment of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other inter-
active media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, un-
fettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received
by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interac-
tive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online mate-
rial; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to de-
ter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking and harassment by means of
computer.
Id.
214. In Stern v. Delphi Internet Services, 26 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1995), radio personality
Howard Stern sued the electronic bulletin board owner after it advertised its service,
which included a bulletin board to discuss Stern's candidacy for governor, using
Stern's picture. Delphi had been in business for eleven years and had more than
100,000 subscribers. The computer network offered three types of information: hard
information, such as news and stock quotes, computer games, and interactive features
like bulletin boards and e-mail. Id. at 696. Here, the court was faced with the novel
issue of whether an Internet service provider should be given First Amendment pro-
tection and be afforded the incidental use exception. Id. at 697. The incidental use
exception was established in Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing, 189 App.
Div. 467, 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). Stern, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 697. In Humiston, the
court "held that a news disseminator was entitled to display the name and photograph
of a woman who was the subject of the defendant's newsreel for the purposes of
attracting and selling the film." Id. at 697-98 (quoting Humiston, 189 App. Div. at
476). "Affording protection to on-line computer services when they are engaged in
traditional news dissemination, such as in this case, is the desirable and required re-
sult." Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698; see also Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (analogizing plaintiff's role as an online bulletin board
host to that of a news distributor, not publisher). The court held that Delphi was an
online distributor comparable to a news vender, bookstore or library, thereby al-
lowing it to benefit from First Amendment protection. Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
When faced with new technology the courts applied traditional defamation principles
to both the wire service and the Internet in order to allow the free flow of news and
avoid a chilling effect. Id.; see also Nelson v. Associated Press, 667 F. Supp. 1468,
1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
215. In Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, the court held that Prodigy was liable for defam-
atory messages posted on its bulletin board because the service held itself out as a
family-oriented online service that edited content. In addition, Prodigy sometimes
edited inappropriate content, and substantially changed posted messages. Id. at *6.
The court stated that it agreed with holdings in Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 144, and Auvil
v. CBS, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that a television affiliate is
not liable for defamation if the program came from the network because it is consis-
tent with the general rule that there is no "conduit liability" in the absence of fault).
What distinguished Prodigy from these cases is "Prodigy's own policies, technology
and staffing decision which have altered the scenario and mandated the finding that it
is a publisher." Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
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Oakmont v. Prodigy,16 Congress passed the Communications De-
cency Act of 1996, giving Internet service providers virtual immu-
nity from republication liability 17 regardless of the credibility of
their source .2 1 History has shown that when traditional republica-
tion rules threaten the expansion of technology with a potential for
increasing news dissemination, either progressive judges219 or Con-
gress will become involved. 20
E. Talebearers Should Not be Treated as Talemakers
This Comment argues that the proliferation of the wire service
defense and Congressional action to protect Internet republishers
demonstrates that the traditional rule holding republishers liable
for defamation should be replaced with a new approach. Under
this new approach, republishers would be entitled to republish ma-
terial so long as they did not act with actual malice, knowing the
material was defamatory, or acting with a reckless disregard for the
truth.22' In addition, the republisher could not materially change
the meaning of the information,222 and must identify the source of
the material, so there is no question of the material's origin. The
reliability of the origin, however, must not be a factor when evalu-
ating whether a republisher acted impermissibly.223 One of the jus-
tifications for imposing republisher liability was that the repetition
216. 1995 WL 823710.
217. It is not surprising that Congress got involved with protecting the Internet
since the U.S. government had funded the Internet's development beginning in the
early 1970s. See Robert E. Kahn, The Role of Government in the Evolution of the
Internet, REVOLUTION IN THE US INFORMATION INFRASTRUCrURE (1994), available
at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/newpath. The same kind of government
backing, however, was not present when Samuel Morse invented the telegraph in the
early 1800s.
Before the press took an interest in telegraphic technology, Morse exper-
ienced immense difficulty in diffusing the invention. Only after years of lec-
turing, lobbying, and negotiating was a bill to appropriate funds for an
experimental telegraph line brought before Congress, in 1843. In the course
of debate, the bill was encumbered by a proposed rider, appropriating funds
for experiments in mesmerism. This was perhaps less surprising than the fact
that the legislators were discriminating enough to vote down the rider and
uphold the original bill.
BLONDHEIM, supra note 81, at 32.
218. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that
American Online, as a service provider under the Communications Decency Act,
could not be liable for providing a gossip report to AOL subscribers).
219. See Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 239 (Fla. 1933).
220. See supra note 213.
221. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
222. See Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
223. See Tzougrakis v. Cyveillance Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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lends credibility to statement, and confirms it if there is no state-
ment of disbelief.224 This is simply untrue. This comment argues
that it is paternalistic and unrealistic to conclude that people are
not intelligent enough to digest information and for themselves de-
cide if it is worthy of belief. If American Online can republish the
Drudge Report under the Communications Decency Act without
liability,225 there is no good reason why USA Today should be
barred from republishing with attribution material from a tabloid,
should USA Today deem that information newsworthy.
F. Heightening Initial Publishers' Potential Liability
Should a presumption immunizing republication exist, there still
must be a chance for a worthy plaintiff to recover for damages to
his reputation. Thus, the original publisher is rightly held liable for
actual damages for third party publication. The traditional rule is
that original publishers are not liable for republication, either as a
separate cause of action or to enhance damages, unless the subse-
quent publication was a natural and probable consequence.226 The
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the original
publication, not the subsequent publication. 27 This rule would re-
quire adaptation to allow plaintiffs to fully recover for their dam-
ages should republisher liability be abolished in the absence of
actual malice.
A bright-line rule that third parties are privileged to republish
would put original publishers on notice that they may be held liable
for more than just their own publication. This would give injured
plaintiffs the opportunity to fully recover for their actual damages.
It is likely that the heightened liability potential will induce original
publishers to carefully source their stories before publication.
224. See MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 351 (2nd ed. 1898).
225. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that Ameri-
can Online, as a service provider under the Communications Decency Act, could not
be liable for providing a gossip report to AOL subscribers). "Section 230 [of the
Communications Decency Act] was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the me-
dium to a minimum." Id. at 50 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31
(4th Cir. 1997)).
226. See Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill. App. 570, 577 (App. Ct. 1882) (holding that
the original newspaper publisher was not liable for publication in subsequent
newspapers).
227. See Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F. Supp. 955, 960 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[Sltatute of
limitations runs from the date on which a publication was first made available to the
general public.").
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It is unlikely that saddling the original publisher with increased
potential for liability will chill speech. In the case of private indi-
viduals, 228 it will often be difficult to prove actual damage to repu-
tation outside of the plaintiff's community.2 29 Further, it is likely
that the original publisher will be a publication based in the same
community. The original publisher, however, is not likely to be lia-
ble for papers outside of the community because the defamed
plaintiff will not have suffered actual damage to his reputation as a
result of an out-of-town publication of the offending story. In the
rare case that it does actually harm the plaintiff, the injured party
will have recourse for all damages suffered from the original
publisher.
CONCLUSION
While the wire service defense is an important tool to protect
republishers from defamation suits, it does not go far enough to
serve society's need for news.2 30 Third parties should be free to
republish material so long as they specifically state their source, do
not deviate from the facts of the original source, and do not act
with actual malice.231 The courts and the legislature have already
taken steps that have weakened republisher liability.232 Courts
across the country have affirmed the use of the wire service de-
233fense, and Congress has passed the Communication Decency
Act of 1996, which virtually immunizes Internet service providers
from republisher liability. 234
The next logical step is to extend this privilege to all publica-
tions, rather than limiting it only to wire services and Internet ser-
vice providers. Thus, a presumption in favor of republication
would be created that could be defeated by a showing of actual
malice. Under this proposed approach, the prevailing plaintiffs
228. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that public
figures must prove actual malice to recover for libel). Because public figures already
have the high burden of proving the original publisher acted with actual malice, it is
therefore unlikely that they could successfully sue republishers unless a republisher
knew or should have known that the original material was libelous. See id.
229. See generally ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS,
RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES (1978) (stating that "chances are slim" that a local police
chief would sue an out-of-town paper for libel rather than a local publication). Id. at
312.
230. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 54-72, 84-132, 147-75, and 213-20 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 54-132 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
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would be able to hold the original publisher liable for subsequent
publications if the plaintiff could prove damages resulting from the
third party publication. In a technologically advanced society that
demands current news instantly, this approach best balances a
plaintiff's right to recover for defamation with the media's ability
to inform the public.
SHOULD PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERTS EVER
BE PRIVILEGED PERSONS?1
Deniza Gertsberg*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the media fixation with pursuing crime
stories has made it increasingly difficult for persons accused of a
crime to enjoy a fair judicial process.2 The media's concentration
on trials to increase ratings and profits delivers what the voyeuris-
tic public wants to see: raw human emotion discharged through
greed, sex, and murder.3 It is no longer true that any publicity is
good publicity.' Witness the trials of O.J. Simpson and Martha
Stewart.' Their celebrity status granted them the misfortune of
having to face two trials-the legal trial and the trial by the court
of public opinion.6 Even defendants with no prior celebrity status
often become infamous overnight when accused of a crime.7 Me-
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A. Fordham
University, 2002. I am especially greatful to my husband, mother, and father for their
love, understanding, support, and tolerance. I wish to dedicate this Comment to my
mother, Svetlana, who as always been an inspiration to me.
1. In this Comment, public relations firms, public relations consultants, and
public relations experts are used interchangeablely without implying any doctrinal
difference.
2. Elisabeth Semel & Charles M. Sevilla, Talk to the Media About Your Client?
Think Again, 21 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1997).
3. Id. at 10; see Carol Ann Kell, Putting Your Client Out Front, N.J. L.J., June 16,
1997, at 31 ("[T]he reality is that what is communicated in the media is often per-
ceived by the public as gospel.").
4. See, e.g., Vanessa Blum, Waging War in the Court of Public Opinion, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at 15.
5. See Robert W. Tracinski, Martha and the Tall Poppies, CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 12,
2004, at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCommentary.asp?Page=\Commentary\archive\
200401\COM20040112a.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004) ("As the Martha Stewart case
finally goes to trial, it is clear that Ms. Stewart has already been convicted in the court
of public opinion.").
6. See George Brewer, The Trial of O.J. Lipstadt, REVIsIONIST, 2001, available at
http://www.vho.org/tr/2001/2/tr06ojlipstadt.html; Peter Henderson & Lauren Weber,
Kobe's Sponsors Await Trial of Public Opinion, REUTERS, July 19, 2003, available at
http://www.uktoplOO.reuters.comlatest/mcdonalds/topl0/20030719-bryant-marketing.
asp ("In the court of law, he is innocent until proven guilty. When a district attorney
presses charges, he is guilty until proven innocent in the court of public opinion.").
7. See Mawiyah Hooker & Elizabeth Lange, Limiting Extrajudicial Speech in
High-Profile Cases: The Duty of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Their Pre-
Trial Communications with the Media, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 655, 666-67 (2003)
("The characterization [of Steven J. Hatfill, the suspected anthrax mailer] as a 'person
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dia has "enormous power" to influence the course of legal pro-
ceedings.8 The result for clients whose lawyers are not trained in
public relations could be devastating.9
This phenomenon' ° broadens an attorney's role." Not only is a
lawyer obligated to pursue lawful strategies in the court of law, but
a lawyer must also ensure that the client's right to a fair trial is not
undermined by negative media campaigns that ignite public out-
rage, induces prosecutors to bring more severe charges, and possi-
bly influence the jury pool.12 Yet, lawyers are taught how to
litigate, negotiate, and practice law according to precedent. They
are not taught how to "spin."13 Untrained and unskilled in ad-
of interest' must have had some negative effect on the public because this once promi-
nent professional has lost one job and has been suspended from another.").
8. See JAMES F. HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING YOUR
CASE WITH PUBLIC RELATIONS 5 (2003).
9. See Tracinski, supra note 5.
10. The media feeding frenzy is a "phenomenon" only in the sense that the availa-
bility of sources that deliver the "news" has increased exponentially. See Christine
Brennan, Hubbub Surrounding Bryant Case Hits Ridiculous Heights, USA TODAY,
Aug. 7, 2003, at C9; available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/brennan/
2003-08-06-brennanx.htm ("There are hundreds of cable outlets, thousands of radio
shows, hundreds of thousands of Web sites and chat rooms-and they all have oodles
of airtime and space to fill."); see generally David Harris, The Appearance of Justice:
Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice
System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1993) (arguing that although most people get their
information about the criminal justice system through the media, the information is
often misleading and frequently wrong).
11. The negative influence of publicity on the outcome of litigation is not a new
phenomenon in American history. See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an
Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1991)
("'Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had
in States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial
has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts"') (quoting Irwin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Jonathan M. Moses,
Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1811, 1816 (1995) (discussing Aaron Burr's highly publicized trial and his
ability to get a fair trial where newspapers had published affidavits of two prosecution
witnesses). Minow and Cate also discuss the increased number of cable channels
dedicated to dissecting high-profile cases. Minow & Cate, supra, at 635.
12. Joseph W. Martini & Charles F. Wilson, These Days Spin Is In: Defending
Your Client in the Court of Public Opinion, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 1, 2003, at 5; see Erin
McClam, Stewart Judge Begins Questioning Jurors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004,
at http://www.rednova.com/news/stories/6/2004/01/22/story147.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2004) (discussing the difficulty the judge faced in the Martha Stewart trial when
selecting an impartial jury who could be "fair despite the heavy pretrial publicity").
13. The term "spin control" originated in the halls of politics to describe how poli-
ticians and their spokespeople coordinate and manipulate commentary for purposes
of controlling public opinion. See JOHN A. MALTESE, SPIN CONTROL: THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL
NEWS 23 (2d ed. rev. 1994); see also David Levy et al., Have a Media Plan Before
2004] PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PRIVILEGE 1445
dressing the media, many lawyers require "outside help ' 14 from
public relations firms when representing clients who endure highly
publicized trials. A public relations consultant or firm can help at-
torneys understand the effects of publicity on the judicial proceed-
ing.15 The attorney can thus respond with an appropriate legal
strategy that attempts to minimize the negative effects of
publicity. 6
Lawyers cannot be sure that confidential information and com-
munications exchanged with a public relations firm will be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.'" This uncertainty injures
clients because they are less likely to be frank with attorneys if
attorney-client privilege applies only some of the time.'" A lawyer
who does not know the full facts cannot represent her client using
her fullest efforts.' 9
Traditionally, disclosure of confidential information to a third
party was viewed as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.2"
Crisis Strikes, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 2002, at C13 ("There are only two guys in every
media saga--a good guy and a bad guy.... Without the proper insight and training,
the lawyer loses control.").
14. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64 (stating that "because attorneys are
trained for the courtroom, not the press conference, mistakes are likely even if one is
prepared"); see also Harris, supra note 10, at 785 (describing that while "[tielevision
ensures that jurors are empanelled with ridiculous expectations," the lawyers are
"blind to anything but the intricacies of procedure"). The term "outside help" is from
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. See HAGGERTY, supra note 8, at 6-7.
16. Id.
17. Cases described in this Comment with similar facts addressing privilege being
extended to public releations firms, result in diverse holdings. Compare Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to extend the
privilege to information sought from a public relations firm), and Haugh v. Schroder,
Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2003) (holding that the privilege does not protect communications with a public rela-
tions consultant), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp.
2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending the attorney-client privildge to some, but not all,
communications between the client, the lawyers, and the public relations firm).
18. See infra Part I.A.3.
19. See id.
20. See Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859) (finding that when a third
party is present at communication between attorney and client, the communication is
not covered by the privilege); Springer v. Byram, 36 N.E. 361, 363 (Ind. 1894) ("It is
settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their
conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily
present as officers, or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited
from testifying to what they heard."); Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 401 (1880) ("It
may be that if a client chooses to speak his mind to his counsel, in the presence and
hearing of persons unrelated to him in the matter, that what is said is not
privileged.").
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There is an exception, however, for third parties who have a neces-
sary role in assisting the lawyer as a consulting expert or an agent.2'
This Comment addresses the issue of whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a lawyer's communications with a public relations ex-
pert, whose advice and assistance is only valuable to the extent that
it is communicated fully and freely with the attorney, will be pro-
tected by privilege. This Comment focuses on the role of public
relations firms in the criminal law context, where constitutional
concerns often arise.
Part I of the Comment explores the boundaries of the attorney-
client privilege and explores how the privilege developed through
the years.22 Part II examines the traditionally limited view of a
lawyer's role and indicates how the advent of mass media has
forced the defense lawyer to do more than litigate in the court of
law.23 Part III examines cases involving public relations firms and
the attorney-client privilege. 24 The section explores such issues as
whether a public relations firm may be considered a privileged per-
son because it plays a significant enough role in assisting the attor-
ney in representing her client. Resolving these issues involves
determining (1) what courts consider legitimate legal services, as
opposed to business services, and (2) whether the public relations
expert, as a third party, gives sufficiently important assistance to
the lawyer in rendering legal services, as opposed to (a) not giving
assistance that is really needed; (b) assisting the lawyer in non-legal
services; or (c) giving assistance to the client and not the lawyer.26
Part IV scrutinizes the cases discussed in Part III and suggests that
the decision reached by the Stewart court is more rational and con-
sistent with modern legal practice.27 The Comment also argues
that in cases where the public relations firm acts as a consulting
expert to an attorney representing a highly publicized criminal de-
fendant, the firm should be considered a privileged person for the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege.28 Finally, this Comment
21. In re Hill, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegal); United States v. Pipkins,
528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (handwriting analyst)); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J.
853, 874-75 (1998) (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (inves-
tigator) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding Concept].
22. See infra notes 30-113 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 114-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 170-94 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
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concludes that in order to maintain fairness in the judicial process
for those accused of a crime, our system of adjudication must rec-
ognize that, in certain circumstances, the assistance of public rela-
tions firms will be required, and the attorney-client privilege must
not be denied.2 9
I. BACKGROUND
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorney-client privilege is the oldest rule of privilege known to
common law.3° It evolved from a tradition of the English courts
where the privilege belonged to the lawyer and was grounded on
humanistic considerations, enabling the attorney to "comply with
his code of honor and professional ethics. '' 31 The code of a gen-
tleman thus shielded attorneys from being compelled to testify in
court what they had been told by their clients.32 Today the privi-
lege rests with the client, and it is the client who determines
whether to assert or waive it.33
Whether embodied in the common law, state law, or federal
law34 the broad outlines of the attorney-client privilege attaches:
"(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
29. See infra notes 231-51 and accompanying text.
30. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing JACK B.
WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §§ 503(2)-
503(d)(5)(1) (1987) and EDITH L. FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 517 (2d ed.
1977)); see Marjorie Cohn, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: The Eviscera-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1233, 1234-39 (2003) (explaining the historical roots of the attorney-client
privilege); Rice, supra note 21, at 868-69.
31. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d. 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDEN-
TIARY PRIVILEGES 108 (2002)); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
33. Id. In circumstances where the client is unable to personally assert the privi-
lege, the attorney can assert it on the client's behalf. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that the defendant
need not be present to assert the privilege).
34. FED. R. EVID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
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sional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived. ' 35 "The privilege must also be invoked before any disclo-
sure of the communication sought to be protected has occurred.
36
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines
the attorney-client privilege broader than did Judge Kearse in the
above definition.37 It expands the privilege to "privileged per-
sons," not just clients and their attorneys. 31 While it is the commu-
nication that is privileged, and not the underlying facts,39 the
privilege extends to writings as well. For example, the production
of a privileged paper in possession of a person within privileged
relations cannot be compelled.40 Furthermore, there is a rebutta-
ble presumption that all communications between an attorney and
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
35. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032,
1036 (2d Cir. 1984). Another frequently quoted definition of the attorney-client privi-
lege is from Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950), which uses a more comprehensive test:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing prima-
rily either (i) an opinion of the law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client ....
36. Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REV. 419, 422
(1998).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
38. The Restatement states that the attorney-client privilege may be invoked with
respect to "(1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confi-
dence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client." Id.
It further defines communications in section 69 as "any expression through which a
privileged person, as defined in § 70, undertakes to convey information to another
privileged person and any document or other record revealing such an expression."
Id. § 69. Section 70 defines "privileged person" as "the client (including a prospective
client), the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between
them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation." Id. § 70.
39. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d at 1037 (stating that the
"attorney-client privilege protects communications rather than information").
40. J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Persons Other Than Client or Attorney Affected
By, or Included Within, Attorney-Client Privilege, 96 A.L.R. 2D 125, 127 (2004).
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client are privileged, with the burden of showing that an attorney-
client relationship exists, as well as the confidential character of
communication, resting on the party objecting to the introduction
of the evidence. 4'
1. General Constraints on the Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is a limited doctrine42 that only be-
comes "absolute" after the privilege attaches.43 First, as already
mentioned, the privilege only applies to communications not the
underlying facts.44 In addition, a conversation is not privileged au-
tomatically just because it is between a client and her attorney.45
Second, most courts agree that when an attorney functions as a
business or economic advisor, the attorney-client privilege does not
41. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "the party claiming the privilege carries the burden of demonstrating that: (1) the
attorney-client privilege applies; (2) the communications were protected by the privi-
lege; and (3) the privilege was not waived"); accord United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d
1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[i]n order to establish the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege to a given communication, the party asserting the privilege
must affirmatively demonstrate a non-waiver"), affd in part and vacated in part on
other grounds, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding that "the proponent must establish not only that an attorney-client
relationship existed, but also that the particular communications at issue are privi-
leged and that the privilege was not waived").
42. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 861 n.19 (stating that "[mjost
courts have accepted Professor Wigmore's pronouncement that because the 'benefits
[of the privilege] are all indirect and speculative [and] its obstruction is plain and
concrete... [the privilege] ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.'").
43. See id. at 856 n.6 ("Under federal law and the law of most states, once the
attorney-client privilege has attached to confidential communications between the at-
torney and client, the privilege is absolute.").
44. See Alliance Constr. Solutions, Inc., v. Dep't of Corrs., 54 P.3d 861, 865 (Colo.
2002) ("[I]t is important to note that the privilege only protects against disclosure of
communications and does not protect the underlying facts on which the communica-
tion is based. In other words, 'the client may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact
within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his
communication to his attorney."') (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Dist. Court of Denver, 718 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Colo. 1986)).
45. See United States v. Tel. & Data Sys., Inc., No. 02-C-0030-C, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15510, at *6 (W.D. Wis. July 16, 2002) (stating that "simply transmitting infor-
mation to an attorney does not cloak it in the privilege: 'a communication is not privi-
leged simply because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer"')
(quoting United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1463 (7th Cir. 1997)); Energy Capital
Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (2000) ("Thus, information does not be-
come privileged simply because it came from counsel, and when documents or con-
versations are created pursuant to business matters, they must be disclosed.") (citing
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
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attach. 6 Third, the presence of third parties not privileged to the
communications that occurs between a lawyer and a client waives
the attorney-client privilege.47 Lastly, confidentiality is regarded as
a fundamental aspect of the attorney-client privilege.',
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and "Privileged Parties"
The Restatement's broader definition more accurately captures
the scope of the modern day attorney-client privilege when it de-
fines it as communications made between "privileged persons," in
confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assis-
tance for the client.49 A "client" also includes individuals who had
preliminary communications with regard to retention of counsel
but eventually decided to hire a different attorney.50 It is "univer-
sally accepted that agents of both of the attorney and the client,
who were vital to the legal assistance sought, could be brought
within the circle of confidentiality."'51 The privilege thus covers
secretaries, paralegals, and law clerks.52 It also extends to experts
46. See Energy Capital Corp., 45 Fed. Cl. at 485 (holding that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect either factual information or business advice); see also In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (1984) ("the privilege is
triggered only by a client's request for legal, as contrasted with business, advice." )
(citing In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982)); Dep't of Econ. Dev. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.R.D. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "when a
lawyer acts as a business or economic advisor, there is no special relationship to give
rise to a privilege to protect his advice from disclosure") (citing Standard Chartered
Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.) Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
47. Evans, 113 F.3d at 1462.
48. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 859 n.12. Rice mentions that
Professor Wigmore believes that confidentiality is one of four fundamental conditions
necessary to the establishment of a privilege. Id.
The four fundamental conditions delineated by Wigmore are:
1) The communications must originate in confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
50. See Irvin v. Mason, 59 Pa. D. & C.4th 129, 132-33 (C.P. Ct. of Allegany County
2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997 (Pa. 1995)).
51. See Rice, supra note 21, at 874.
52. See United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (stating that "[gliven the complexities of modern existence few, if any, lawyers
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hired to assist with the investigation, 3 or provide scientific or tech-
nical assistance in preparation for trial.54
Despite the misgivings of some courts,55 the circle of privileged
persons has widened.5 6 The attorney-client privilege includes a cli-
ent's outside consultants hired to perform business and later re-
tained by the attorneys to assist in litigation because of their
knowledge and experience.57 It also covers consultants who are es-
sential to lawyers in performing tasks that go beyond advising a
client to the law. 58 This includes non-testifying expert witnesses,
psychiatrists, 9 accident reconstruction experts, 60 consultants that
gauge the state of public opinion for venue change purposes, and
jury consultants.6 a
could as a practical matter represent the interests of their clients without the assis-
tance of a variety of trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar, clerks, typists,
messengers and similar aides").
53. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1965) ("Circumstances may
exist where a lawyer finds it necessary to employ a detective to enable him adequately
to furnish legal services to his client. In such a situation the client's communication,
including those relating to the hiring of the detective, would be privileged because the
legal services are indistinguishable from the non-legal.").
54. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123 (Pa. 1995) (holding that where a
third party (accident reconstruction expert) is retained by an attorney to assist the
attorney in giving legal advice to the client, information which the attorney or the
client furnishes this third party is protected by the attorney-client privilege); Rice,
supra note 21, at 875 (describing how attorney-client privilege came to include those
"investigating or providing scientific or technical assistance in preparation for
litigation").
55. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 323 (1950)) ("The pri-
mary assumption [is] that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable
of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule."); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that the privilege is neither "lightly created nor expan-
sively construed"); Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir.
1991) ("This court has consistently stated that the privilege must be strictly
construed.").
56. See In re Hill, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegal); United States v.
Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (handwriting analyst).
57. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 875 n.61 (noting cases in the early
1990s where communications between outside consultants and attorneys were held
protected by the attorney-client privilege).
58. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that jury consultants can be covered by the privilege).
59. United States ex. rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-46 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
60. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. 1995).
61. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
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3. Justification for the Attorney-Client Privilege
The growing body of regulatory law which adds to the complex-
ity and specificity of legal obligations often requires that persons
untrained in the law seek professional legal assistance.62 In order
for attorneys to represent their clients competently they need to
know all the information. 63 Attorney-client privilege encourages
"full and frank communication" between attorneys and clients.'
Clients will not fear that statements made in confidence to their
attorneys will be subsequently65 subject to disclosure by an adver-
sary.66 Such full disclosure by the client allows attorneys to render
the best possible legal advice.67 Only when a client has informed
the lawyer of all the facts can a lawyer encourage "compliance with
the ever growing and increasingly complex body of public law,"
68
thus "facilitat[ing] the administration of justice. '69 Additionally,
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATTORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 cmt. c (2002).
63. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Without the
attorney-client privilege, that right and many other rights belonging to those accused
of crime would in large part be rendered meaningless.").
64. UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The purpose of the
privilege [is to] 'encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys."') (quot-
ing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see Hunt v. Blackmun, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege is "founded upon the necessity, in the inter-
est and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law
and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.").
65. Davenport Group v. Strategic Inv., No. 14426-NC, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 109,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1995) ("If the attorney-client privilege becomes vulnerable,
the truthfulness and extent of disclosure will decrease correspondingly.").
66. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 ("It also recognizes that a lawyer's 'assistance can
only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the appre-
hension of disclosure."') (quoting Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470); see Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("These privileges are rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust... The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate
and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representa-
tion if the professional mission is to be carried out.").
67. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see Alliance Constr. Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 864 (Colo. 2002) ("In order to provide effec-
tive legal advice, an attorney must have a full understanding of the facts underlying
the representation.") (citing Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo. 2000) and
Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Colo.
1986)).
68. Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: An
Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1995); see Schwimmer,
892 F.2d at 243 (noting that the "rule of confidentiality recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer being fully informed by the client") (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
69. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1968) (quoting Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1963)).
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some commentators believe the attorney-client privilege may also
discourage frivolous lawsuits in cases where the attorney finds, af-
ter full disclosure, that his client's case is too weak to pursue.v
Attorney-client privilege serves an important societal interest of
effective representation to clients who disclose all the relevant in-
formation.71 The privilege also encourages an attorney to use her
fullest efforts to develop her client's case when she knows all the
facts and is confident that she will not be subsequently compelled
by her adversary to disclose her communications. 72 Thus, the privi-
lege is central to our adversarial system of justice since it assures a
client's right to a fair judicial process.7 3 The Supreme Court, for
example, has held that "[a] lawyer should be fully informed of all
the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to ob-
tain the full advantage of our legal system. 7 4
In criminal cases particularly, the privilege protects a defendant
who faces the broad power of government. 75 "[T]he right of par-
ties within our justice system to consult professional legal experts is
rendered meaningless unless communications between attorney
and client are ordinarily protected from later disclosure without cli-
ent consent. ,76 If candid communications between an attorney and
70. Michael Sweeney, Lecture at Fordham Law School (Oct. 23, 2003); see also
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91 ("The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is
ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the
legally relevant.").
71. People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1204-05 (Cal. 1995).
The attorney-client privilege is based on grounds of public policy and is in
furtherance of the proper and orderly functioning of our judicial system,
which necessarily depends on the confidential relationship between the at-
torney and the client. Without the ability to make full disclosure of the facts
to the attorney, the client risks inadequate representation ... by encouraging
complete disclosures, the attorney-client privilege enables the attorney to
provide suitable legal representation.
Id.
72. See Davenport Group v. Strategic Inv., No. 14426-NC, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
109, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1995).
73. Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv.
469, 587 (2003).
74. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
75. In re Grand Jury Proceeding Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Target, like any investigatory target or criminal defendant, is con-
fronted with the broad power of the government."); see Cole, supra note 73, at 471
(arguing that "it is fair to question some of the tactics that law enforcement officials
have been employing as they combat crime").
76. Alliance Constr. Solutions v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 865 (Colo. 2002)
(citing Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 196 (Colo. 2001)); see also Cole, supra note 73,
at 587 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege "may well be the pivotal element of
the modern American lawyer's professional functions").
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her client are not protected, then the two parties to a controversy
are on unequal footing.77 In criminal cases, if clients are discour-
aged or unwilling to frankly confide in their attorney because of
uncertainty over whether their communications are protected, then
our legal system moves away from its goal of administrating
justice.78
4. Countervailing Principles
Despite being recognized as the oldest privilege in the common
law tradition and serving a useful purpose in maintaining the integ-
rity of our legal system, the attorney-client privilege has to be bal-
anced against other important societal interests.79 Judges often
have to weigh a client's right to effective, competent representation
and the public's right to evidence, the interests of society in solving
crime, and the vindication of victims' rights.80 The balancing be-
comes even more difficult in a criminal proceeding because of the
defendant's constitutional rights.81 The Second Circuit, for exam-
ple, has "severely restricted" the scope of discovery in criminal
proceedings. 82
Nevertheless, many courts adhere strongly to the "fundamental
maxim ... recognized for more than three centuries ... that the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence. ' 83 According to this
view, the attorney-client privilege is "in derogation of the search
77. See generally Alliance Constr. Solutions, 54 P.3d at 864 (stating that the effec-
tiveness of legal representation depends in part on the attorney's ability to gain a full
understanding of the factual scenario underlying the representation).
78. Id. at 864-65.
79. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190
(4th Cir. 1991) ("In deciding when the privilege arose, we are mindful that the privi-
lege is 'inconsistent with the general duty to disclose and impedes the investigation of
the truth.' This court has consistently held that the privilege must be strictly con-
strued.") (quoting United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984)).
80. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1974), for the posi-
tion that "the 'fundamental maxim' recognized for more than three centuries ... [is]
that the public ... has the right to every man's evidence").
81. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("The interests of society and
the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or
innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and
presentation of each side of the case.").
82. United States v. Dessange Inc., No. S2 99 CR. 1182, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3734, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2000).
83. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. at 334 (citing
Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331).
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for the truth. '8 4 Holding the public's right to evidence on a higher
plane, some judges rule that the privilege "should be narrowly con-
strued."8 Typically, the decisions reflect a view that the privilege
is seen as a barrier to learning the truth.86 Judges that subscribe to
such a view often protect only those communications that are be-
tween a client and her lawyer.8 7
Another reason for a strict interpretation of the attorney-client
privilege is a fear that extending the privilege will invite abuse.
The fear is grounded in concrete examples that recently shocked
the country, from tobacco litigation to Enron, where, at least in the
tobacco case, the attorney-client privilege was used for fraudulent
purposes.88 For example, the tobacco companies had potentially
damaging studies and scientific experiments conducted through le-
gal counsel so they could be suppressed if they ultimately proved
unfavorable to the companies' interests. Compounding the prob-
lem was the companies' public avowal that the products were safe
and that all such studies and experiments were conducted by im-
partial scientists and would be fully disclosed, regardless of the
outcome.89
Retrospectively, there is no doubt that the attorney-client privi-
lege was abused when attorneys were used to cover up damaging
studies.90 Determining whether an abuse of the privilege has taken
84. United States v. Tele. & Data Sys., Inc., No. 02-C-0030-C, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15510, at *5 (W.D. Wis. July 16, 2002).
85. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14586, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (citing United States v. Weissman, 195
F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1999)).
86. Cyril V. Smith, Attorney-Client Privilege Ain't What it Used To Be, BALTI-
MORE Bus. J., Dec. 2003, at 2, available at http://baltimore.bizjournals.com/baltimore/
stories/2003/12/22/focus2.html.
87. See John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to documents between the attorney
and the investigator because at the time they were created they were not intended by
the parties to be confidential); United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding no attorney-client privilege when no attorney was present when the conversa-
tion took place between the client and the client's accountant).
88. Paul R. Rice, How the Tobacco Industry Lost Its Attorney Client Privilege, LE-
GAL TIMES, May 4, 1998, at 27 [hereinafter Rice, Tobacco Industry], available at http://
www.acprivilege.com/articles/article4.html.
89. Id. Rice notes how Philip Morris "went a step further. They had their lawyers
request and supervise these communications (reports, studies, etc.) thereby using the
credibility of the attorneys to make it appear as though each communication were an
instrumental part of the legal assistance being rendered." Id.
90. Id.; see also Document: Potential Smoking Habits of 5-Year-Olds Reviewed,
Mar. 7, 1998, at http://www.cnn.com/US/9803/07/minn.tobacco/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2004) (stating that the judge in the Minnesota tobacco case found that the "tobacco
companies 'blatantly abused' attorney-client privilege").
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place is particularly difficult during the trial, however, since the in-
formation requested by challenging attorneys relates in some ways
to legal assistance. 91 While a crime/fraud exception exists to pierce
the attorney-client privilege, 92 the fact that the privilege was used
for illegal purposes reinforces the idea shared by an increasing
number of legal professionals, including those in the Department
of Justice and the SEC, that the attorney-client privilege should be
limited.93
5. Kovel and Its Progeny
The seminal case for extending attorney-client privilege to third-
party consultants was United States v. Kovel, decided by the Second
Circuit in 1961. 94 In Kovel, a former IRS agent with accounting
skills who was employed by a law firm specializing in tax law,
claimed attorney-client privilege for the work he performed in con-
nection with one of the firm's clients. 95
In Kovel, the court used a two-step process to decide that the
attorney-client privilege should be extended. First, the Kovel court
recognized that the privilege would apply in situations where a
non-English speaking client provided his confidential information
to an interpreter employed by the attorney to translate for the at-
torney.96 Second, the court concluded that since accounting con-
91. See Rice, Tobacco Industry, supra note 88, at 27.
92. Id. (explaining that "[t]he crime/fraud exception is based on the recognition
that when the client seeks the lawyer's assistance to commit a crime or fraud, whether
or not the lawyer is or becomes aware of the client's unlawful aim, the privilege serves
no useful purpose and its protection should be withdrawn").
93. See Cole, supra, note 73, at 548-49. The Justice Department's Bureau of Pris-
ons Amendments (in effect since October 31, 2001), give the Attorney General the
power, "in cases where 'reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate
may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of
terrorism,' to order monitoring of communications between that inmate and his attor-
ney or attorney's agents." Id.
94. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 919.
96. Id. at 921. The court held that there are actually four instances to which the
attorney-client privilege would apply when an attorney is dealing with a client speak-
ing a foreign language:
(1) where attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to an inter-
preter to make a literal translation of the client's story;
(2) where the attorney employs the help of non-lawyer employee in the
room to help out;
(3) where the client brings a translator;
(4) where the attorney sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in foreign
language, with instructions to interview the client on the attorney's behalf
and then render his own summary of the situation so that the attorney can
give the client proper legal advice.
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cepts could be as incomprehensible as a foreign language, "the
presence of an accountant ... ought not destroy the privilege.
97
The Kovel court stressed, however, that not all accountants are in-
cluded within the protection of the privilege, noting that "[w]hat is
vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confi-
dence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.""
The court's decision laid the groundwork for broadening the cat-
egory of privileged persons because it recognized that during the
course of representation, attorneys may need the assistance of con-
sultants when dealing with matters they are unskilled and un-
trained to perform.99 Yet, the Kovel decision suggested that courts
should apply a high standard before a third party will be consid-
ered "privileged" for the purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 10 Indeed, the third party has to be "necessary, or at least
highly useful" to the attorney's representation of a client before
the party may be brought within the "circle of confidence.""1 1
The Kovel court recognized two categories of third parties who
could be brought into the circle of confidence. 2 The first category
includes those who are essential to the attorney, without whom
representation would be extremely difficult or impossible, as the
interpreter analogy illustrates. 10 3 Today this category encompasses
third-parties such as translators, investigators, scientific experts,
and accountants. 10 4 The second category holds agents of the attor-
ney, whose work is sufficiently important that it deserves protec-
tion, such as law clerks, assistants, and "aides of other sorts."' 0 5
This second category includes persons who may not be translating
documents for the attorney, but because of the "complexities of
Id.
97. Id. at 922.
98. Id. The presence of the accountant has to be "necessary, or at least highly
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer . Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. "Circle of confidentiality" is a term used by Professor Rice. See Rice,
Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 874.
102. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921-22.
103. Id. at 922.
104. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 874-75 n.57-58.
105. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921; see also United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Given the complexities of modern existence few,
if any, lawyers could as a practical matter represent the interests of their clients with-
out the assistance of a variety of trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar,
clerks, typists, messengers, and similar aides.").
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modern existence, 1 °6 they are often indispensable to the attor-
ney's ability to represent a client.'0 7
The Kovel decision and its progeny established a framework with
several overarching principles that courts use to measure the
boundaries of the privilege. First, in addition to the requirement of
confidentiality, the advice that is sought must be "legal, '1 0 8 not
business advice. Business advice would include "attorney's work in
drafting 'by-laws, promissory notes, security agreements, incorpo-
ration documents, partnership documents and tax information."" 09
Therefore, third parties who provide business advice are not con-
sidered privileged because the information is not considered "legal
advice."110
Second, the Kovel decision suggests that parties who are agents
of the client could be "privileged persons" if their presence "fur-
ther[s] the interest of the client in the consultation or those to
whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
lawyer is consulted."'1I Furthermore, the concept of the "agent"
was broadened to include outside consultants retained to perform
business services and whose knowledge and experience from that
service was important to the legal assistance later sought.1 1 2 De-
spite the expansion of the privilege in the corporate context, recent
abuses of the attorney-client privilege suggest that the attorney-cli-
ent claims of corporations will be subject to heavier scrutiny.'1 3
106. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
107. Id.
108. Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (2000) ("The attor-
ney-client privilege pertains to legal advice.").
109. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 227
(D.D.C. 1995)).
110. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (holding that "if the [accounting] advice sought is the
accountant's rather than the lawyer's no privilege exists").
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 70 (2002).
112. See In re Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 937 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that communications
between an independent consultant hired by the client and the client's lawyer were
protected by the attorney-client privilege where the purpose of communications were
to seek legal advice); Viacom Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 200 F.R.D. 213, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (extending the attorney-client privilege to a public relations firm hired by the
firm at the inception of litigation because the firm was considered a functional
equivalent of the company's employee).
113. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
the attorney-client privilege does not apply because the required elements of the at-
torney-client privilege were not met); see also United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136,
138 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that attorney-client privilege is not extended to an invest-
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II. THE CHANGING ROLE OF A LAWYER
Justice Holmes once wrote that "[t]he theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influ-
ence, whether of private talk or public print. '114 As Justice
Holmes' observation indicates, the potential effect of negative
press coverage of the judicial process has long been a concern of
the judicial system.' 15 One way the judicial system dealt with the
negative publicity was to restrict the lawyer's interaction with the
press. 1
16
The American Bar Association, when it promulgated 30 Canons
of Legal Ethics in 1908, dealt with publicity about pending or antic-
ipated litigation in Canon 20.117 This Canon broadly denounced
lawyers who trafficked in litigation information by talking about
their cases in the news media.118 It provided: "Newspaper publica-
tions by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may inter-
fere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally, they are to be condemned."11 9
Such strong views against extrajudicial speech reflect the profes-
sion's general position that the traditional role of an attorney is in
the courtroom.120
Despite the American Bar Association's efforts to control law-
yers' communication with the press, the promulgation of Canon 20
did not stem the aggressive press coverage. History records the
highly publicized trials of Sacco and Vanzetti, 2 1 the Lindbergh kid-
ment banker who provided tax advice to an in-house counsel because the investment
banker did not function as a "translator" under the Kovel doctrine).
114. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1811 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907)).
115. See, e.g., id. at 1816 (referring to the highly publicized trial of Aaron Van Burr,
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
116. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1819-22 (discussing attempts to control attorney
speech).
117. John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyer's Duty to Balance
News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. POLY. 77, 92 (2002) (explaining that the
Canons were an effort by the ABA to supplement judicial attempts at reducing
outside influences on jurors).
118. Id.
119. Donald Rotunda, Dealing With the Media: Ethical, Constitutional, and Practi-
cal Parameters, 84 ILL. B.J. 614, 615 (1996).
120. So hostile was the Canon towards lawyer communication with the press that,
even though it recognized "extreme circumstances" where a public statement could
be made, it was still antagonistic toward such extrajudicial speech. See id.
121. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1817. The murder trial shocked the world and
photos of them appeared in Boston newspapers almost immediately after their arrest.
Id.
2004] 1459
1460 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
122
napper, 2 and Dr. Sheppard.123 To this day speculations about the
guilt or innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti and the defendant in the
Lindbergh case persist.124 The sensational Sheppard case, other
cases, 125 and the Warren Commission's Report, 126 encouraged the
ABA to establish its own committee to "take steps to bring about a
fair balance between the right of the public to be informed and the
right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial."'
1 27
The resulting Reardon Commission proposed Rule 1.1, which
was adopted in part by the ABA in its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 7-107.128 Even though six decades elapsed af-
ter the Canons were published by the ABA, the Reardon Commis-
122. Id. at 1817-18. The Lindbergh kidnapping case generated tremendous public-
ity. A well-known journalist called for the conviction and electrocution of the defen-
dant Bruno Hauptman well before the trial began. Id.
123. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Dr. Sheppard, accused of mur-
dering his wife, petitioned the court claiming that he was denied a fair trial because
the court failed to protect him from the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity
of his prosecution. Id. The Supreme Court reversed Dr. Sheppard's murder convic-
tion upon finding that the trial court failed to protect Sheppard from "inherently prej-
udicial publicity which saturated the community" and prejudiced the jury. Id. at 363.
124. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1818 n.31 (citing WILLIAM YOUNG & DAVID E.
KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 3-9
(1985) for the position that the passionate controversy over whether one or both of
defendants were framed persists); see also Bob Groves, The Case Against Lindbergh:
What if There Was No Kidnapping, RECORD (Hackensack, NJ), Apr. 18, 1993, at L1.
125. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1818. "Not a term passes without this Court be-
ing importuned to review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of inflam-
matory newspaper accounts." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (overturning a murder conviction in a small town based on pretrial
publicity that made it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial).
126. See Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy, at 227 (1964) [hereinafter Warren Report], available at http://history-mat-
ters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wr/html/WCReport_0126a.htm. The Warren Commission
concluded that the media played a role in the murder of the alleged killer, Lee Har-
vey Oswald, by nightclub owner Jack Ruby. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030,
1067 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the recommendation of the Warren
Commission that: "Representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the
news media work together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and
presentation of information to the public so that there will be no interference with
pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair
trial." Id.
127. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1819 (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 77 (1966)).
128. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983). The Rule, di-
vided into three parts, controls extrajudicial speech of lawyers, by prohibiting state-
ments that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know would have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative process. Id. It gives examples of
what constitutes "likely to prejudice materially," as well as examples of permitted
statements that a lawyer may make. Id.
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sion still concentrated its efforts on attorney extrajudicial
speech.129 It failed to recognize that a lawyer, not trained in the art
of public relations, is often incapable of mitigating the negative
publicity that often adversely affects the course of a client's legal
proceedings. 130
The Commission saw lawyers as a big part of the problem and
sought to restrict lawyers' communications with the media. The
Commission believed that because "lawyers have special access to
information, including confidential statements from clients and in-
formation obtained through pretrial discovery or plea negotia-
tions ... lawyers' statements are likely to be received as especially
authoritative. ' 131 Although challenges to the Rule 132 resulted in a
somewhat more flexible 133 Model Rule 3.6, T3 the Rule was once
again modified after the Court's decision in United States v.
Gentile.135
While sensational media was limited in the past to print and tele-
vision, today its reach potential has grown exponentially. 36 The
public is flooded with images and photographs from numerous
sources that deliver the information at incredible speeds. 137 Not
only has traditional print media become more abundant, but televi-
sion networks and the Internet have expanded its reach.'
129. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1820-21.
130. Id. at 1822.
131. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1052.
132. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (strik-
ing down the Illinois version of DR 7-107); Watson, supra note 117, at 94 (discussing
various lawyers' associations challenging the Rule).
133. The Rule is more flexible because it has made a special provision permitting
an attorney to make extrajudicial statements. It states:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a rea-
sonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the sub-
stantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the
lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph
shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent
adverse publicity.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1995).
134. Id.; see also David Boyd, Form Over Substance? Fostering the Evolution of
National Standard for Attorney Conduct, SACRAMENTO LAW., Nov.-Dec., 2002, at
http://www.sacbar.org/members/saclawyer/nov.dec2002/ethics.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2004). At least 44 states have adopted Model Rules and the rest use the Rules
predecessor, the Model Code. Id.
135. See Watson, supra, note 117, at 97 ("Comments in the Annotated Model Rules
of Professional Conduct... reported that Model Rule 3.6 was 'substantially amended'
in August 10, 1994, to meet the concerns expressed in Gentile.").
136. See Minow & Cate, supra note 11, at 632, 635.
137. Id. at 633.
138. See Harris, supra note 10, at 786.
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The prosecutors and the media are intertwined where each influ-
ences the other. Objective information, such as details of a crime,
photographs of a victim or of the defendant, or even discussions
about the net worth of a celebrity figure under regulator scrutiny,
is framed to inflame the community. 139 Intense public reactions
may influence prosecutors to bring initial or heavier charges. 40 A
public saturated with every facet of the case, analyzed by legal TV
experts, may prejudice the jury pool. 41
The relationship between media, prosecutors, and the public
opinion is complex. Prosecutors influence public opinion with in-
formation they release about the crime and the defendant. 142 Pub-
lic opinion also influences prosecutors, and the prosecutors'
responses are reflected in the charges. 143 Such "media-prosecutor
alliances" usually result in the dissemination of unbalanced infor-
mation. 44 In fact, prosecutors have lied on numerous occasions to
advance the interests of their case. 45 Those accused of crime are
often not met with the fundamental presumption of innocence; in-
stead, there is a "presumption of guilt"'146 because the Justice De-
partment and law enforcement slowly gnaw away at this bedrock
principle. 47 A defense lawyer thus "gets started with the playing
field tilted negatively, with the presumption of innocence buried
under official pronouncements of guilt or castigation by the victim
and his or her family.' 148
139. Why Martha Stewart is Going to Iose Everything, "It's A Greed Thing," INB,
Dec. 3, 2002, at http://www.internetnewsbureau.com/archives/2002/decO2/marthas.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
140. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1837 ("Prosecutorial discretion has been called a
lawless area and ultimately a political choice."); see also Joel Cohen & Bennett L.
Gershman, The Spin, Confidentially, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 2003, at 22 (stating that opin-
ions about O.J. Simpson may have led prosecutors to forgo seeking the death penalty;
public opinion also played a role in the re-indictment of Bernard Goetz, who was
initially not indicted for shooting at a group of young black men, but was brought
before a grand jury with no new evidence after making incendiary public statements).
141. See Minow & Cate, supra note 11, at 632.
142. See Watson, supra note 117, at 102.
143. See Cohen & Gershman, supra note 140, at 22 (noting that public opinion may
affect a prosecutor's decision to drop or reconsider a defendant's criminal charges).
144. See Watson, supra note 117, at 85.
145. See Cohen & Gershman, supra note 140, at 22 (underscoring the irony that
Martha Stewart was prosecuted and convicted for lying about a crime that she was not
even tried for, while prosecutors who have lied to advance their case go unpunished).
146. See Watson supra note 117, at 89.
147. Stephen W. Grafman, End an Ignoble Spectacle, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at
31 (noting how the media circus surrounding the defendant erodes the bedrock
principle).
148. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 65.
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While the rules of Professional Responsibility caution lawyers
from contacting the media, many 'practitioners have begun to rec-
ognize that if they do not step into the spotlight and attempt to
explain the situation, their client will experience difficulty ob-
taining a fair trial and may self-incriminate by responding to media
attacks. 149 A New York jurist has noted that "[l]awyers now feel
that it is the essence of their function to try their case in the public
media." 150
In fact, the American Bar Association has begun to recognize
that the modern practice of law involves communicating with the
media.1 5 1 In August of 1994, American Bar Association amended
Model Rule 3.6.152 The Rule allows an attorney to "make a neces-
sary response to protect a client from undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity ... 153
The ABA revisions reflect a general recognition among practi-
tioners and theorists that the adversarial relationship that serves as
a key element of the American judicial system is being expanded to
outside the courtroom. 154 The amended rule implicitly signals that
the outside forum is a proper arena where the attorney's duty to
zealously represent her clients remains paramount. 55
Some commentators suggest that in criminal cases a lawyer's at-
tempts to balance the inaccuracies of the media may gain constitu-
tional importance because the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are implicated. 156 One commentator argues that a defen-
dant has a right to a "public defense" when a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial is endangered by negative press
coverage.157 The argument is supported by the proposition that
149. See Watson, supra note 117, at 84. Avoiding the media or answering with a
"no comment" could backfire on the client creating an implication of guilt. Id. at 88.
150. Id. at 84.
151. Id. at 97.
152. See Watson, supra note 117, at 97.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 98.
155. Id.
156. See Grafman, supra note 148 (claiming that "[b]randing a person a criminal
by ... public exposure is Constitutionally offensive, a modern-day scarlet letter that
besmirches our judicial process"); Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64 (discussing
Professor Garcia's study which indicated that the Supreme Court has failed to 1) ac-
knowledge "the connection between freedom of expression and the ideal of a fair
trial," 2) refused to place restraints on press access or reporting of courtroom pro-
ceedings in criminal cases, and 3) "not compensated for this freedom by according
more leeway to a defendant who has been .the subject of pretrial publicity").
157. See Watson, supra note 117, at 83 (quoting Max D. Stem's idea that a "defen-
dant has a right to a public defense to balance the negative consequences the defen-
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since a defendant has a First Amendment right to respond to the
charges in the news media, the defendant's attorney should be able
to exercise this right on the defendant's behalf.
158
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Gentile v. State
Bar.159 In Gentile, the defense attorney believed that the pre-in-
dictment press coverage prejudiced the potential jury pool and thus
the outcome of the eventual trial.1 60 The attorney attempted to
mitigate the circumstances by holding a news conference on behalf
of his client.' 6' The State Bar brought disciplinary charges against
the defense attorney for violating a Nevada Supreme Court Rule
prohibiting extrajudicial speech.162 A plurality of the Court held
that an attorney has a limited First Amendment right to speak to
the media to mitigate the effects of adverse publicity. 163 The Court
overturned Gentile's disciplinary conviction and held that to be
prohibited, an attorney's extrajudicial speech must pose a "sub-
stantial likelihood of material prejudice.1 64 The court decided not
to apply the "clear and present danger" test normally applied in
First Amendment cases. 16 5
The legacy that the Gentile decision leaves behind is the plurality
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, which looks into the future.
166
Justice Kennedy recognized that an attorney's role is much broader
than litigating inside a courtroom. 167 Justice Kennedy wrote:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.
He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal pro-
ceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may recommend a
plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse conse-
quences of a possible loss after trial, so too an attorney may take
reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the
adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a
prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper mo-
dant suffers when the public and the pool of potential jurors are informed by the news
media of the arrest or indictment").
158. Id.
159. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Doctrinally, the Supreme Court considered whether, in
order to be prohibited, extrajudicial speech by attorneys must pose a "clear and pre-
sent danger" to a judicial proceeding, a test usually applied to First Amendment is-
sues, or whether some lesser standard could apply. Id. at 1031.
160. Id. at 1042.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1033.
163. Id. at 1033-35, 1043.
164. Id. at 1063, 1074-75.
165. Id. at 1074-75.
166. Id. at 1043.
167. Id.
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tives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain
dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the
client does not deserve to be tried.1
68
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW
The Second Circuit recently addressed the issue of applicability
of the attorney-client privilege to public relations firms in three
cases. 169 Although all three cases had vastly different factual con-
ditions, each of them addressed whether the attorny-client privi-
lege should extend to public relations firms. The courts' reasoning
in each case were all somewhat different. The following section
will discuss the facts and the courts' holdings.
A. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003
Before being formally charged, 7 ° Martha Stewart was investi-
gated for a year and half by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in connection with her sale of ImClone stock the day before
the Food and Drug Administration announced that it would not
approve the cancer drug.17 Stewart's attorneys hired a public rela-
tion firm to balance "[the] often inaccurate press reports ... [that]
created a clear risk that the prosecutors and regulators ... would
feel public pressure to bring some kind of charge against her. 172
168. Id.
169. There is a fourth case that extends attorney-client privilege to public relations
firms. See H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc., v. Williams Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995). Aside from accepting Kovel's hold-
ing, the court engages in little analysis of its reasons for extending the attorney-client
privilege. Id.
170. Michael McMenamin, St. Martha: Why Martha Stewart Should Go to Heaven
and the SEC Should Go to Hell, REASONONLINE, Oct. 2003, at http://www.reason.com/
0310/fe.mm.st.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). Stewart was eventually charged with
insider trading, securities fraud, and obstruction of justice. Id. The fraud charges
were later dismissed. See Allan Chernoff, One of Martha's Charges Dismissed, CNN
Money, Feb. 27, 2004 at http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/27/news/companies/martha.
html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
171. See McMenamin, supra note 170. The author argues that Stewart was unfairly
singled out. Id. He calculates that Stewart saved a "mere" $45,000, compared to
others, such as CEO Sam Waksal's friends who made $600,000 and $30 million on the
sale of ImClone stock on December 27 and 28. Id. The ImClone colorectal drug,
Erbitux, later received approval from the Swiss government and the FDA. See Er-
bitux (TM) (Cetuximab) Receives FDA Approval to Treat Irinotecan Refractory or
Intolerant Metastatic Colorectal Cancer, GLOBEINVESTOR, Feb. 12, 2004, at http://
globeinvestor.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
172. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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During the grand jury investigation the United States Attorney's
office subpoenaed the communications and documents from the
public relations firm. 73 It is worth noting that although the court's
entire decision supports the expansion of the attorney-client privi-
lege to public relations firms in certain circumstances, the court did
not find that in the particular case those circumstances existed.
174
Nevertheless, the court's decision takes a step into broadening the
boundaries of the Kovel doctrine.175
The court's precedent is groundbreaking in several respects.
First, the court acknowledges that the job of an attorney has broad-
ened as a result of the constant barrage of mass media surrounding
high profile clients.1 76 The court also accepts that part of a lawyer's
legitimate legal services can include defending a person in the
court of public opinion because "in some circumstances, the advo-
cacy of a client's case in the public forum will be important to the
client's ability to achieve a fair and just result in pending or
threatened litigation. ' 177 Adopting Justice Kennedy's position in
Gentile, the court endorsed the view that "lain attorney's duties do
not begin inside the courtroom door." 178
Second, the court recognized that the complex relationship that
exists between prosecutors and the media can affect the fairness of
the judicial process.179 The court acknowledged that prosecutors
are influenced by public opinion in deciding whether to bring
charges, declining to prosecute or leaving matters to civil enforce-
ment proceedings, or in deciding which particular offenses to
charge (a decision which has important consequences during the
sentencing phase of the trial).' 80 The court also noted that prose-
cutors, through the media, often engage in activities that "color
public opinion" not only to the detriment of the person's general
reputation but to her ability to obtain a fair trial.181
173. Id. at 322-23.
174. Id. at 331-32 (stating, after in camera review, that conversations Ield between
the public relations consultant and Martha Stewart were not made for the purposes of
obtaining legal advice).
175. Id. at 331.
176. Id. at 330 ("[D]ealing with the media in a high profile case probably is not a
matter for amateurs. Target and her lawyers cannot be faulted for concluding that
professional public relations advice was needed."); see also id. at 326-27 ("[T]here has
been a strong tendency to view the lawyer's role more broadly.").
177. Id. at 330.
178. Id. at 327 (citing Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991)).
179. Id. at 330.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court mentions that while prosecutors, media, and law enforcement
personnel influence public opinion, public opinion also influences prosecutors in their
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The Stewart court also recognized that many lawyers are "ama-
teurs" when dealing with high profile cases and may require the
assistance of public relations "consultants. ' 182 In fact, the court
went so far as to recognize that a lawyer's ability to perform some
of her most "fundamental client functions," such as client advising,
seeking to avoid charges, and zealously seeking acquittal or vindi-
cation, would be "undermined seriously" if lawyers could not en-
gage in a frank discussion of "facts and strategies" with the
lawyers' public relation firms.183
The Stewart court treated public relations firms as consultants
and compares their role to that of non-testifying experts or jury
consultants. 184  This brings the public relations firm closer to
Kovel's "essential category" in which the experts advise and assist
the attorney in client representation. Such characterization carves
out a niche where public relations firms could be considered privi-
leged persons. The non-testifying experts and jury consultants re-
main in the background, helping the attorney formulate legal
advice and strategies.1 85 In adopting the comparison, the court in-
voked a similar image of a public relations firm-a consultant, as-
sisting the attorney in an area in which she is not trained, in order
to formulate a legal strategy for her client.
decision making process. Id. This is perhaps the most accurate reflection on the state
of things since it is not yet clear whether it is the hungry public that drives the media
to meet the demand, or whether the media feeds public opinion with what it wants to
deliver. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 10 ("[O]ne question remains whether
the media is giving the public what the public truly wants or dictating to the public
what the media wants to sell. Perhaps there exists a more complex supply-and-de-
mand relationship.").
182. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31. The court specifies
that lawyers may need skilled advice as to:
[W]hether and how possible statements to the press-ranging from "no com-
ment" to detailed factual presentations-likely would be reported in order
to advise a client as to whether the making of particular statements would be
in the client's legal interest. And there simply is no practical way for such
discussions to occur with the public relations consultants if the lawyers were
not able to inform the consultants of at least some non-public facts, as well
as the lawyers' defense strategies and tactics, free of the fear that the consul-
tants could be forced to disclose those discussions.
Id.
183. Id. at 330-31.
184. See id. at 331.
185. Id. at 326 (explaining that such experts advise the attorneys "[oln matters such
as whether the state of public opinion in a community makes a change of venue desir-
able, whether jurors from particular backgrounds are likely to be disposed favorably
to the client, [and] how a client should behave while testifying in order to impress
jurors favorably").
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In expanding the Kovel doctrine, by including one more possible
category of privileged persons, the Stewart court emphasized sev-
eral requirements. First, the communications must be "confiden-
tial. ' 186 The Restatement defines confidential information as
information that the communicating person believes "no one will
learn the contents of ... except a privileged person."187 The Stew-
art court adopted this definition of confidentiality. 188
Second, the information sought from the third party must be for
the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice,1 8 9 as opposed to
"saving" a public image for a client's business purposes.
The Stewart court's third requirement emphasized that it is the
lawyer who must hire the public relations firm. 90 Had Stewart
hired the public relations firm herself, even if she had done it to
"affect her legal situation," no attorney-client privilege would have
been recognized. 191 The last requirement is somewhat at odds with
the Kovel decision. In Kovel, the court recognized that an agent or
an expert of a client could be considered a privileged person-so
long as the communication was made in confidence for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. 192 One likely explanation for this adapta-
tion of the Kovel doctrine is that the Stewart court is attempting to
demarcate boundaries of where "legal advice" ends and "business
purposes" begin with respect to public relations consultant.
The Stewart court also did not require that an attorney be pre-
sent when communications between a client and the third party
occur, 1 93 subject to the provision that the communications be di-
rected by an attorney for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal
advice. 94
B. Calvin Klein Litigation-December 4, 2000
The attorneys for the plaintiff, Calvin Klein ("CK"), hired a pub-
lic relations firm in anticipation of a high profile civil suit filed
186. Id. at 331.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE-"IN CONFIDENCE" § 71 (2000).
188. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
189. Id. at 331.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
193. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331. But see United States v.
Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a private meeting between a client
and an accountant following the rendering of legal advice by the client's attorney was
not subject to the protection of the privilege).
194. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
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against a licensee and its chief executive. 195 CK's lawyers argued
that the purpose of hiring the public relations consultant was de-
fensive.196 The public relations firm was primarily retained to help
the attorneys provide legal advice as well as to "assure that the
media crisis that would ensue-including responses to requests by
the media about the law suit.., would be handled responsibly.'
a97
When the defendants sought documents from the public relations
firm, CK's attorneys invoked the attorney-client privilege to block
communication and document production.198
The court rejected all of plaintiff's arguments that recognized the
public relations firm as a privileged person. 199 Not swayed by the
plaintiff's "vague and largely rhetorical contentions," the court re-
jected the arguments on three grounds.2 °° First, the court found
that "few, if any, of the documents at issue appear to contain or
reveal confidential communications from the . . . client. ' 20 1 Sec-
ond, the court found that the public relations firm was not assisting
the attorneys in developing legal strategies or rendering advice.20 2
One possible explanation for this conclusion is that the court was
unconvinced that a public relations firm with a preexisting relation-
ship with the client was hired to do anything else than help to
maintain a good public image for the client's business.20 3 Third, the
court held that the privilege must be narrowly construed2 0 4 and not
be expanded to public relations firms whose activities may "also"
have been helpful to the client's attorneys.20 5
There are several possible interpretations of the case. One view
is that the facts in the case did not support the extension of the
attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff's pre-existing relationship
with the public relations firm makes it difficult to determine
195. Calving Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 54-55.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 54.
202. Id. at 54-55 (noting that the public relations firm gave "ordinary public rela-
tions advice").
203. See id. at 54.
204. Id.
205. Id. Note that the court's use of the word "also" strongly suggests that it
viewed the role of the public relations firm predominantly to improve/save the client's
business reputation, thereby failing to qualify for attorney-client privilege protection.
Id. The court found that "the privilege protects communications between a client and
an attorney, not communications that prove important to an attorney's legal advice to
a client." Id. (quoting United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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whether the public relations firm was indeed assisting the attorneys
in the rendition of legal services or whether the public relations
firm functioned primarily for the client's business purposes.20 6 For
example, the CK court was skeptical of the role that the public
relations firm played in the litigation. 0 7
The facts suggest that the court may never view a public relations
firm as a privileged person. 0 The CK court applied Kovel's
"translator" analogy, but found that the public relations firm did
not "translate" any document. 20 9 Furthermore, the court found
that
nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys,
simply by placing accountants, scientists, or investigators [or,
here, a public relations firm] on their payrolls... should be able
to invest all communications by clients to such persons with a
privilege the law has not seen fit to extend when the [third party
is] operating under their own steam. 10
The court thus concluded that the public relations firm provided
"ordinary public relations advice. "211 This view suggests that the
court does not recognize the possibility that a public relations firm
could assist an attorney in the representation of a client. The CK
court, therefore, declined to extend the protection of attorney-cli-
ent privilege to public relations firms. 21 2
C. Haugh v. Schroder Investment Management
North America, Ina
In Schroder, an employment age discrimination case, the plain-
tiff's attorney hired a public relations consultant in a suit against
the employer alleging unlawful age discrimination. 3 The defend-
ants sought certain communications and documents, 14 including
fifteen e-mails exchanged between the consultant and the client, as
206. Id. at 54.
207. Id. at 54-55. The court concluded that the public relations firm's activities,
such as "reviewing press coverage, making calls to various media to comment on de-
velopments in the litigation and even 'finding friendly reporters,"' cannot be consid-
ered sufficiently important to be brought within the circle of confidence. Id.
208. Id. at 54.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961)) (altera-
tion in orginal).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14586, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
214. Id. at *1.
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well as the a sixteenth e-mail, which was communicated between
the consultant and the client's attorney.215 The plaintiff asserted
attorney-client privilege, claiming that the public relations consult-
ant provided advice and assistance that enabled the attorney to
render legal services.216
The Schroder court did not find that the consultant performed
anything other than "standard" public relations services for the
plaintiff, and thus declined to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege.217 The court also claimed to have followed the principle
enunciated in Calvin Klein. The court's analysis, however, reveals
that it relied more on the reasoning and analysis of Judge Kaplan's
decision in the Martha Stewart case, than on the Calvin Klein
decision. 8
The Schroder court specifically stated that it did not decline to
follow the Martha Stewart decision, noting that there was no need
to determine whether In re Grand Jury Subpoenas was decided
correctly.21 9 Second, the court expressly stated that the case before
it was decided on its facts-suggesting that under different circum-
stances the outcome may have been different.
220
Third, the Schroder court relied on Judge Kaplan's terminology
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena221 to find that the plaintiff did not
show any "nexus" between the consultant's work and the attor-
ney's role in preparing the plaintiff's complaint or the plaintiff's
case.222 Fourth, factually the Schroeder case is closer to Martha
Stewart's grand jury case than to the CK case. Just as in Martha
Stewart's grand jury case, the Schroder case involved communica-
tions that were predominantly transmitted between the plaintiff
and the public relations consultant. Likewise, just as Judge Kaplan
found that there was no showing that established the nexus suffi-
ciently close to the provision or receipt of legal advice,223 Judge
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *8.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *9.
220. Id. at *1 ("The asserted attorney-client privilege cannot extend to a public
relations consultant on the facts of this case.") (emphasis added).
221. Id. at *9; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]here has been no showing that [communica-
tions between the public relations consultant and Martha Stewart] has a nexus suffi-
ciently close to the provision or receipt of legal advice.") (emphasis added).
222. Schroder, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *9.
223. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
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Cote found that "no requests for legal advice" were made in the
requested e-mails.224
The court in Schroder also relied on the Calvin Klein decision to
hold that the plaintiff has not shown that the public relations con-
sultant was "'performing functions materially different from those
that any ordinary public relations advisor would perform.- 225
While the holding has several interpretations, it is clear that plain-
tiffs would have to articulate specifically when and how the public
relations consultant aided the lawyer in the rendition of legal ser-
vices to make the communications privileged.
IV. PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERT: A PRIVILEGED PERSON IN
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
The cases addressed in the previous section raise significant
questions with respect to the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and how it applies to public relations experts. When, if ever, is
communicating with the media a legal service as opposed to a busi-
ness service? As the previous section indicated, not everything
that a lawyer does is a legal service for the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege. Although lawyers are constitutionally allowed to
communicate with the media on behalf of their clients within the
scope of the ethical rule, that does not necessarily mean that a law-
yer's communications with the media are always or perhaps ever a
legal service. It is conceivable that bolstering a client's reputation,
as in Gentile, does not advance the litigation but serves an auxiliary
purpose. If the lawyer is lobbying for the client, is that a legal ser-
vice? Perhaps communication with the media is more legitimately
viewed in certain kinds of cases, for example, in high profile crimi-
nal cases. The cases discussed in the previous sections lead to the
conclusion that, at least in those circumstances, talking to the me-
dia could be an aspect of the legal representation for the purposes
of attorney-client privilege.
Assuming that talking to the media constitutes legitimate legal
services, what legitimate, important roles might the public relations
expert play in assisting the lawyer, and what confidential communi-
cations are necessary to enable the expert to perform those roles?
The public relations expert's role can be seen from two perspec-
tives. First, the public relations expert might give advice to the
lawyer about how the lawyer should communicate with the media.
224. Schroder, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *6.
225. Id. at *8 (quoting Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
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In carrying out this function, the issue is whether the public rela-
tions expert needs to talk to the client or learn otherwise privileged
information, or can the public relations expert give the advice in
the abstract?
A second view of the public relations expert's role is that of the
lawyer's "mouthpiece"-an agent who engages with the media on
the lawyer's behalf. This also raises the question of whether such a
function is important enough. Why can the lawyer not communi-
cate directly with the media? Furthermore, the "mouthpiece role"
creates ambiguities. When is the public relations expert acting as
the lawyer's mouthpiece, which, under Kovel, may be legitimate,
and when is the public relations expert acting as a client's "mouth-
piece," which presumably is not proper for the purposes of attor-
ney-client privilege? The following discussion addresses these
questions, and offers recommendations to attorneys so they can en-
sure that their communications with the public relations expert are
privileged.
A. When is Lawyer Communication with the Media a
Legitimate Legal Service?
Several of the cases discussed in Part III suggest that in certain
circumstances, and especially in criminal cases, a lawyer's interac-
tion with the media constitutes a legitimate legal service. Our soci-
ety views criminal charges with greater seriousness than civil
offenses, and thus imposes greater punishments. Although in both
civil and criminal contexts the client's reputation can become sul-
lied, it is only in the criminal context that one stands the chance of
a prison sentence and the creation of a criminal record. The Sixth
Amendment speaks to the gravity of a criminal charge by guaran-
teeing the right to a fair trial to a criminal defendant. Yet, as the
media delivers sensational news reports and as public outrage
grows about a particular case, the prosecutors may be influenced to
indict or bring more severe charges since they carefully consider
public opinion polls in making charging decisions.226 In fact,
prosecutorial discretion has been called a lawless area and ulti-
mately a political choice.227
226. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330; Cohen & Gershman,
supra note 140, at 22.
227. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-31(1998) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that a prosecutor has vast power and immense discretion with respect
to criminal investigations, and that the primary check against abuse of this
prosecutorial discretion is political).
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It is these situations where the lawyer would be carrying out her
fundamental duties to her client by interacting with the media to
keep a prosecutor from indicting or from overreacting to public
opinion by bringing excessive charges. Under these conditions, as
the Martha Stewart court suggests, if a lawyer interacts with the
media to strategically aim a message at those officials whose
charges are of great consequences to the type of punishment a cli-
ent could receive and whose actions often determine a client's free-
dom, it should be considered a legitimate legal service. In fact, it is
the lawyer's duty to seek to avoid or narrow charges, zealously
seek acquittal or vindication, and advise the client of the legal risks
of speaking publicly. The plurality in the Supreme Court's decision
in Gentile recognized and indirectly encouraged lawyers to pursue
"lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or ...of
charges." '228 Thus, under circumstances where heavy negative news
coverage threatens to taint the judicial process by adversely influ-
encing the prosecutors, a lawyer's communication with the media is
less likely to be a business service. Since prosecutors are respon-
sive to public opinion, lawyers should have the opportunity to bal-
ance out the news coverage. Clients should not have to endure
higher charges simply because the prosecutors want the public to
know that they are tough on crime.
Although prosecutors are influenced by public opinion, they too
play a role in setting the public discourse with the information that
they reveal to the public via the media. In this complex prosecu-
tor-media interaction, even legitimate information linked to a cli-
ent can project guilt. Such coverage has the possibility of tainting
the jury pool. It is unlikely, however, that a lawyer's actions to
influence the jury pool will be ethical under the current rules of
professional responsibility. The Justices in Gentile explicitly reiter-
ated this view when they noted that even if the lawyer has constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech, she still has ethical obligations
that she swore to uphold.229 Those obligations include following
the precepts of Model Rule 3.6, which, even with its "fair reply"
provision, is still highly restrictive of attorney interaction with the
media.
Influencing the jury pool has never been an acceptable goal, and
that is, in fact, the reason why lawyers were historically highly re-
stricted from interacting with the media. The Gentile Court em-
228. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991).
229. See id. at 1072-73 (stating that the speech of those participating before a court
can be restricted).
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phasized that the outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by
impartial jurors based on the evidence presented at trial, and thus
any extra judicial statements by lawyers supplying their version of
the facts is seen as a threat to the fair process. 230 It is worth noting
that in none of the three cases evaluated in the previous section did
the parties claiming protection of the privilege express their motive
for hiring a public relations expert as to aid them in influencing the
jury pool. While influencing the jury pool may not be ethical con-
duct, a lawyer should nonetheless be allowed to communicate with
the media when she reasonably believes that prejudicial publicity
will encourage prosecutors to indict or bring excessive charges.
B. Are Public Relations Experts Important Enough?
As the above discussion indicates, communicating with the me-
dia to counteract damaging news coverage that threatens to under-
mine a client's right to a fair process could be an essential part of a
lawyer's legal services. Yet, many attorneys are not public rela-
tions experts since they are taught how to litigate and negotiate in
a legal setting, not how to advocate on a client's behalf in a public
forum.231 There have been many reported instances where a law-
yer, inexperienced in dealing with the media but feeling that she
must respond to the harmful coverage, injured her client's case by
speaking out. 232 Therefore, many attorneys, as the court in the
Martha Stewart grand jury trial acknowledged, may need to turn to
a public relations expert because they realize that the experts are
more than mere conveniences, they are an integral part of the legal
effort.233
i) Public Relations Experts as Advisors
Public relations experts help the lawyer deal with the morass of
public relations engagement. They provide skilled advice regard-
ing possible statements to the various forms of media ranging from
"no comment" to detailed factual presentations, and how such
statements may be reported. 34 They advise the attorney on
whether the client should speak to the media at all, and if so,
230. Id. at 1070.
231. See generally Moses, supra note 11 (explaining that there are clients who have
won in the courtroom, but have nevertheless been beaten in the media).
232. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64.
233. John Siegal & Jeremy R. Feinberg, Keeping a Client's Privilege Intact: Ruling
Sets Forth When Media Consultants' Presence Can be Risky, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003,
at S3.
234. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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whether to do it personally or through representatives. 23 5 Public
relations experts also advise the attorney as to how best to aim her
message at prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, whether to
respond to specific allegations, and advise the attorney on when is
the most appropriate time to communicate with the media.
The advice of a public relations expert is significant when an at-
torney is attempting to avoid charges or avoid excessive charges
being brought against her client. If the lawyer is not sufficiently
skilled and knowledgeable in the field of media relations, then it is
her duty to seek the assistance of an expert that can help her get
acquainted with the subject area and be able to navigate through it
for her client's legal benefit. After all, while communicating with
the media may seem simple, in reality the field is far more com-
plex. Most attorneys do not deal with the media on a daily basis,
and when a case calls for public engagement, they need the assis-
tance of public relations experts to advise them on how to interact
so that words are not taken out of context. The Kovel decision
envisions that a lawyer may seek outside help when she needs as-
sistance in a subject area in which she is not an expert in order to
advance her client's case. Lawyers should be able to retain public
relations experts to help deal with important aspects of the litiga-
tion, knowing that communications with the expert are protected.
There is simply no practical way for meaningful discussions to oc-
cur if the lawyer is unable to inform the public relations expert of
nonpublic facts, as well as the lawyer's defense strategies and
tactics.236
ii) Public Relations Experts Talking to the Client
While the Kovel court found protectable situations where the cli-
ent spoke directly to the translator without the attorney's presence,
whether the translator was provided by the attorney or by the cli-
ent, there may be a difference as to a public relations expert. As
previously noted, public relations experts, unlike engineers and fo-
rensic experts, always run the risk of appearing to have provided
business services for the client because their job could be useful to
the client outside the legal representation. Also, intuitively, com-
municating with the media is not nearly as complicated or arcane
as organic chemistry or fingerprint analysis. Indeed, the Calvin
Klein court indicated that public relations experts do not provide
235. Id.
236. Id.
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the "translator" function served by the accountant in Kovel.237
Likewise, the court in Schroder concluded that the public relations
expert provided standard public relations services, via Schroder's
attorney.238 Therefore, unless steps are taken to lessen the appear-
ance that a public relations expert is being hired for the client's
business purposes, it is difficult for judges to determine whether
there was a legitimate legal purpose in the relationship. It is not
hard to see how an attorney can serve as a conduit for a client's
business purposes-the client asks the lawyer to hire a public rela-
tions expert and, just as in the tobacco cases, the presence of the
lawyer is supposed to immunize the communications from an ad-
versary's attack.
The cases discussed in Part III demonstrate that courts are not in
agreement as to whether the attorney-client privilege would extend
if a client interacted directly with the public relations expert. The
court in Martha Stewart's grand jury trial, for example, did not see
it as problematic if the client talked directly to the public relations
consultants, without the presence of attorneys, as long as the com-
munications were aimed at giving or obtaining legal advice.239 Yet,
given the tone of the Calvin Klein and the Schroder decisions, and
the explicitly narrow view of the privilege adopted by both courts,
it is reasonable to infer that they are likely to see client-public rela-
tions expert communication as evidence of business service.
iii) Public Relations Expert as the Lawyer's Mouthpiece
A second possible role of a public relations expert is to be the
attorney's agent and in this capacity talk to the media on the law-
yer's behalf. The Kovel decision envisions the possibility that law-
yers may need agents to perform various tasks.24 ° One of the
reasons why a lawyer may decide to have the public relations ex-
pert speak on her behalf is if, for example, she decides to hold a
press conference and take questions from reporters, she may feel
that a public relations expert may be better able to handle the
questions. On the other hand, the decision may simply be one of
delegation of duties, with the paralegals and law school associates
doing the research, while the public relations expert handles the
237. Calving Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, at 54-55 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
238. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14586, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
239. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
240. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921 (2nd Cir. 1961).
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media. But, having the public relations expert talk to the media
creates ambiguities that are difficult to defend to a scrutinizing
court.
The concern is the same-whether the public relations consult-
ant is the lawyer's or the client's "mouthpiece," and how to tell the
difference. The suspicion that the public relations expert is provid-
ing business services for the client is heightened in circumstances
where the public relations expert speaks on a lawyer's behalf. Fur-
thermore, a nafve court may be unconvinced that a lawyer needs a
public relations expert to communicate with the media because
public speaking appears to be so facile. As the court in Calvin
Klein pointed out, when a public relations expert interacts with the
media they are "simply providing ordinary public relations ad-
"1241 dvice, which does not qualify for the protection under the privi-lege doctrine.
C. Lawyers and Public Relations Experts-Maintaining
the Privilege
In representing high profile clients whose chances of obtaining a
fair trial could be adversely influenced by heavy negative media
coverage, an attorney requiring the aid of a public relations expert
should not be dissuaded from relying on their knowledge and skills
simply because there is disagreement among courts as to whether
and under what circumstances the privilege attaches. After all,
none of the courts discussed have categorically stated that the priv-
ilege may never attach-they just have not been convinced given
the facts in particular cases. When communications between a
public relations expert and an attorney are challenged, the defend-
ing party will have to demonstrate to the judge the steps taken to
ensure that the communications were privileged and that the attor-
ney required the assistance and advice of a public relations expert
for the purposes of the representation. The judge will probably
conduct an in camera review and likely evaluate and determine
whether the privilege attaches based on the "totality of the circum-
stances," i.e., whether on the whole there was sufficient legal rea-
son to justify extending the attorney-client privilege to include a
public relations expert. In determining the issue, the judge will
have to evaluate whether talking to the media was a legitimate le-
gal service in the given circumstances. She will also have to judge
whether the public relations expert was a necessary agent in ad-
241. Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54-55.
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vancing the litigation forward or was instead providing business
services to the client.
The following factors are conclusions inferred from the cases
previously discussed that may help attorneys ensure that their com-
munications are privileged. The factors are not meant to be ap-
plied mechanically but demonstrating most, if not all of the facts,
make the decision to rely on a public relations expert easier to de-
fend and may lessen the likelihood that the public relations expert
will be viewed as an outside third-party who destroys the privilege.
First, in order to demonstrate that the media engagement was a
necessary legal service the lawyer must make a showing that heavy
negative publicity had the possibility of undermining her client's
chances of obtaining a fair trial by influencing the prosecutor to
indict or bring heavier charges. This can be done with pre-indict-
ment evidence from various media outlets which the attorney rea-
sonably believes tends to incite public outrage and therefore is
likely to effect the prosecutor's indictment decision. Demonstrat-
ing this is the necessary first step because it removes the specter of
doubt that the party claiming the protection of the privilege initi-
ated the engagement with the media prior to any negative publicity
about the client, which could create doubt as to whether such en-
gagement was indeed a legal service necessary for the representa-
tion. As the Calvin Klein court concluded, such preemptive
engagement will not be protected by the privilege.242
Second, the attorney must hire the public relations expert.
243
Hiring by itself, however, as the Calvin Klein and the Schroder
cases indicated, will not privilege the information since it does not
entirely remove the possibility that the public relations expert is
performing a business service for the client via the attorney.24 4 It is
also not the conclusion entirely based on Kovel because that deci-
sion envisioned that a client could bring his own translator.245 Fur-
242. Id. at 55.
243. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331 ("[The] Target would not
have enjoyed any privilege for her own communications with Firm if she had hired the
firm directly.").
244. See Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14586, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (finding that the public relations firm
merely provided standard public relations services for the plaintiff); Calvin Klein, 198
F.R.D. at 54 ("None of these vague and largely rhetorical contentions ... is particu-
larly helpful to assessing the purpose of the documents here in issue, many of which
appear on their face to be routine suggestions from a public relations firm as to how
to put the 'spin' most favorable to CKI on successive developments in the ongoing
litigation.").
245. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
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thermore, realistically the client is still paying for the expert,
whether the lawyer hires him or not because the cost will inevitably
be incorporated into the client's bill. Nevertheless, the difficulty of
drawing a line between legitimate legal service and business service
where public relations experts are concerned drives towards the
conclusion that the lawyer should do the hiring. The necessity for
such seemingly arbitrary line drawing, as Judge Kaplan noted, is
24necessary. 46 Judge Kaplan applied Kovel's rationale to public rela-
tions firms: drawing of seemingly arbitrary lines is "the inevitable
consequence of having to reconcile the absence of privilege for ac-
countants and the effective operation of the privilege of a client
and a lawyer under conditions where the lawyer needs outside
help. 247
Third, although the Kovel decision suggests that a client should
be able to communicate directly with an attorney's agent, with or
without the attorney's presence and whether or not the attorney
hired the agent, for the purposes of ensuring the attachment of the
privilege, it is best that the public relations expert only interact
with the attorney. 48 When only the lawyer communicates with the
public relations expert, the situation is more consistent with the
entire purpose for hiring the public relations expert-to assist the
lawyer in advancing the representation of her client. Also, as men-
tioned earlier, it is difficult for judges to determine whether there
was a legitimate legal purpose in the relationship or whether it was
a business service for a client, discussing ways to bolster the client's
reputation. If and when a client interacts directly with the public
relations expert, it adds to the possibility that it was a business ser-
vice because, presumably, any information that a public relations
expert needs in order to conduct her job can be obtained from the
attorney.
The fourth consideration that lawyers wishing to engage the ex-
pertise of a public relations expert should consider is interacting
directly with the media. As with the previous point, having the
public relations expert contact members of the media directly
could be seen as "ordinary public relations advice," i.e., business
service to the client. The Calvin Klein court was clear that such
services as "reviewing press coverage, making calls to various me-
dia to comment on developments in the litigation," and "finding
246. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
247. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
248. See id. at 921-22.
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friendly reporters" does not constitute legal services.249 Legal ser-
vices, as suggested by the court in Martha Stewart's grand jury
case, is having the public relations expert advise the lawyer on
which media outlets to use, when and how best to conduct the com-
munications, and whether the client should speak directly to the
media.2 ° The latter elements are more directly related to a law-
yer's duty to avoid charges being brought or to ensure that unnec-
essary excessive charges are not brought.
In addition to the fundamental aspect of the attorney-client priv-
ilege-that communications be confidential-the factors men-
tioned above return full circle to what the Kovel court expressed
was the crucial aspect of the privilege. "What is vital to the privi-
lege is that the communication be made in confidence for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. 251
CONCLUSION
Advocating in the court of public opinion is the defining charac-
teristic of some attorneys in recent times. The traditional role of an
attorney focusing only on the courtroom is outdated. In this era of
the Internet and twenty-four-hour cable news channels, advocating
in the public forum to avoid charges brought or reduce their sever-
ity, is more and more recognized as a necessity rather than a
choice. Failing to recognize this impinges upon clients' rights, ham-
pers the advancement of the legal profession, and acts in contradic-
tion to the explicit goals of the profession. If we embrace media
and protect it with broad First Amendment protections, we must
accept that lawyers need to protect their clients' right to a fair judi-
cial process. Public relations firms are often part of the modern
age response to this modern age problem. For our system of adju-
dication to be fair and just, if we protect the media's right to in-
flame the public opinion, to which prosecutors are highly attentive,
then we must permit attorneys to engage the media through the
assistance of public relations experts.
249. Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54-55.
250. See In re Grand Jury Supboena, 265 F. Supp. at 330-31.
251. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
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Aslax:
HUNGRY, HUNGRY HIPAA: WHEN PRIVACY
REGULATIONS GO TOO FAR
Meredith Kapushion*
Privacy has many different definitions ranging from informa-
tional privacy to civil libertarian ideas of personal autonomy.1 It is
difficult to define as it arises from a complex set of rules and insti-
tutions which determine the limitations and availability of informa-
tion.2 As we find new ways to harness the massive amounts of
available information, our lives may be subject to unwanted scru-
tiny and real losses stemming from privacy violations. 3 While abso-
lute privacy is unattainable, there are good reasons for pursuing
policies which might prevent the erosion of its boundaries-no
matter how gray or ill-defined those boundaries may be.4 In the
area of personal health and medical information, the sensitive na-
ture of the information at stake makes such losses all the more
perilous and potentially injurious.5
Congress, concerned with the specter of privacy violations made
possible by advances in technology and the use of electronic data
storage, enacted medical privacy regulations with the Health Insur-
* J.D. candidate, May 2005, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Econom-
ics and Philosophy, Hillsdale College, 1999. The author acknowledges the contribu-
tions and support of Karol Boudreaux, Jay Cochran, and Susan Dudley at The
Mercatus Center, George Mason University.
1. See, e.g., Fred Cate, Principles for Protecting Privacy, 22 CATO J. 33, 34-36
(2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-4.pdf; Shaun Spen-
cer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
844-51 (2002).
2. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REv. 119, 123-30 (2004).
3. See generally Joy L. Pritts, Developments and Trends in the Law: Altered States:
Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 325, 329 (2002). For a laundry list of damaging privacy
lapses, see Lois Collins, Rx for Privacy, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 2, 2001, at Al.
4. See generally Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY 149, 150-52 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); Peter D. Jacobson, Medical
Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1499
(2002).
5. See, e.g., Fabio A. Sciarrino, Ferguson v. City of Charleston: "The Doctor will
See You Now, Be Sure to Bring Your Privacy Rights in With You!," 12 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 197 (2002) (discussing case involving a South Carolina hospital that
tested expectant mothers for drug use without disclosure and reported results to law
enforcement); Spencer, supra note 1, at 887 nn.246-49 and accompanying text.
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ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 6
HIPAA imposes considerable regulatory burdens on health care
organizations in the hope that strict administration and control of
information will prevent both real and perceived injuries from un-
authorized and unwanted scrutiny of personal health data.7 These
concerns are by no means unfounded, but it remains to be seen
whether HIPAA's means of prevention are in fact the best cure.
Part I of this Comment traces a brief overview of the general
development and regulatory requirements of HIPAA. Part II criti-
ques HIPAA from a law and economics perspective, examining the
economics of privacy, the problematic conditions in the market for
health care services, whether HIPAA adequately addresses privacy
concerns, and the costs and consequences of HIPAA. Part III sug-
gests several alternatives for privacy advocates. In making policy
choices, the costs should be carefully weighed against the benefits,
and the outcomes should significantly solve the problems the policy
was intended to address. 8 The tradeoffs we accept in return for
greater privacy protections should reflect our individual prefer-
ences to the greatest extent possible, and the solution put into
place should have the flexibility to adjust to changing needs and
the appropriate incentives to improve over time. Ultimately,
HIPAA fails to meet these criteria, creates a number of new legal
and economic problems, and adds regulatory and financial burdens
to an already complex and costly health care system.
I. HIPAA's IMPLEMENTATION
While HIPAA's general policy goal was to protect the continuity
of employee health coverage when changing jobs,9 the primary
purpose of the privacy provisions was to address the public's con-
cern over employer access to sensitive employee medical informa-
6. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
7. See generally Lawrence Gostin & James Hodge, The Nationalization of Health
Information Privacy Protections, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 1113, 1113-15 (2002).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002).
9. HIPAA's preamble:
An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability
and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual mar-
kets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access
to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of
health insurance, and for other purposes.
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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tion.1° Other goals included providing additional safeguards
against third party access to "protected health information"
("PHI"),1 establishing procedures for information access, 2 and
giving patients notice and access rights to their medical
information.13
The HIPAA legislation gave Congress a self-imposed deadline of
three years to enact legislation protecting the privacy of health in-
formation.14 Congress required the privacy regulations to address
three specific areas:
1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have.
2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise of
such rights.
3) The uses and disclosures of such information that should be
authorized or required. 15
In lieu of Congress meeting the deadline, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") was authorized to enact such regula-
tions. 6 Congress failed to act before the HIPAA deadline in 1999.
The HHS Secretary then undertook the task, issuing final regula-
tions in April of 2001, which went into effect on April 14, 2003.17
Small group health plans (under $5 million) were given an addi-
tional year to meet the requirements with April 16, 2004 as the
10. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (1999).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See HIPAA § 264(c)(1), Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033 (1996).
15. Id. § 264(b).
16. Id. § 264(a). Some legislative watchdogs claim that the timing of HIPAA com-
bined with the three year deadline was driven by political gamesmanship. Both politi-
cal parties hedged their bets that they would control the executive branch when the
deadline was expected to pass, thereby allowing them to sidestep the legislative pro-
cess in pursuit of their respective political agenda. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, HEALTH
PRIVACY IN THE HANDS OF GOVERNMENT: THE HIPAA PRIVACY REGULATION-
TROUBLED PROCESS, TROUBLING RESULTS 12 (2003), available at
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/HIPAA-Report.pdf; see also Charlotte Twight,
Medicare's Progeny: The 1996 Health Care Legislation, 2 INDEP. REV. 373, 373-74
(1998). But see Mary Grealy, Health Privacy: The Beginning of the End or the End of
the Beginning?, CATO INST. HEALTH POL'Y STUDIES CONFERENCE 79, 80 (2001) (ar-
guing that failure to meet the deadline was "due to issues like private right of action
and the rights of minors"), available at http://www.cato.org/events/transcripts/
hipaa.pdf; cf Dick Armey, Just Gotta Learn From the Wrong Things You Done, 22
CATO J. 7 (2002) ("HIPAA is a classic example of legislative panic."), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-2.pdf.
17. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164.534 (2004).
2004] 1485
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
final deadline for compliance. 8 The HHS rules regulate only cov-
ered entities-health care providers, insurers, health plans, and
clearing houses which handle individually identifiable patient infor-
mation and transmit that information electronically.1 9 The privacy
provisions, however, cover all information regardless of format.2 °
Electronic transmission is relevant only to determine whether an
organization is a covered entity;21 covered entities are liable for all
unauthorized disclosures of an individual's PHI, whether handled
electronically or not. 2
The HIPAA provisions outline a number of penalties for non-
compliance and wrongful disclosure of PHI. Disclosure penalties
range from fines of $100 to $50,000 per violation. 23 Criminal penal-
ties for violations with proven intent can include fines up to
$250,000 and ten years imprisonment.24
Citing the need for reform and improving consumer confidence
in the integrity of medical records, the regulations set forth uni-
form national standards for patient privacy protection. The evi-
dence of privacy abuse, however, was largely anecdotal in nature,
and many of the examples given were already in breach of law or
contract and could not have been remedied, regardless of the pol-
icy in place.2 5 Despite this, Congress took steps to deter potential
future violations, and HIPAA marked the first time such a baseline
national privacy standard had been promulgated.26 The rules pre-
empt state laws only to the extent that they are less prohibitive,27
and do not replace them. 8 HIPAA intentionally creates a floor,
but not a ceiling, on privacy protections in an attempt to provide
consistent restrictions on the disclosure of PHI.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 160.103.
20. Id. § 164.501.
21. See id. § 160.103; see also Jeffrey Lovitsky, Consents and Authorizations Under
HIPAA, 76 FLA. B.J. 10, 11 (2002).
22. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.502(a).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6.
24. Id.
25. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 18.
26. See Rebecca Bishop, The Final Patient Privacy Regulations Under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-Promoting Patient Privacy or Public
Confusion?, 37 GA. L. REv. 723, 735-36 (2003).
27. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
28. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 2723, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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II. INTENT, EFFICIENCY, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A. The Economics of Privacy
It is difficult to treat privacy as a typical economic good. To fit
the definition of an economic good, the quantity of privacy de-
manded must exceed the quantity supplied at a price of zero.29
Simply put, if privacy were free, we would all want more. But what
does this mean in the everyday world? There is no "market" for
privacy per se,30 and as a bundle of rules and institutions that limit
the transferability of information, it is hard to think of privacy as a
"good" the way that one thinks of apples, BMWs, or financial ser-
vices as goods. Privacy is distinguished from the tangible goods
which may complement it-window shades, caller I.D., trench
coats, and fedoras-and from the substantive information it gov-
erns. The "bundle" is intangible, nontransferable, and possesses
few, if any, of the characteristics we would traditionally ascribe to
property.31
Despite fitting the model loosely, privacy is nonetheless an eco-
nomic good.32 It is scarce, that is, we generally don't want to relin-
quish control over personal information unless we get something in
return, and likewise, we would be willing to pay for more privacy
up to the point where the marginal benefits equal the marginal
costs. 33 As inapposite as it may initially seem, the metaphor of the
market applies and it is instructive to think of privacy within the
framework of supply and demand. The demand for privacy is
driven by the competing consumption interests of market partici-
pants who would prefer other rules and institutions to govern the
flow of information. Supply is similarly determined by the costs of
ensuring more privacy.34 In this context, market participants who
29. DAVID JOHNSON, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY 26 (1991) ("[A]n economic good is one that is scarce relative to peo-
ple's wants and, thus, commands a positive price on the market.")
30. A market for privacy qua privacy does not presently exist, although markets
clearly do exist for goods and services which may give rise to greater privacy protec-
tion. Likewise, there are markets for personal information, but not for the rules and
policies that govern those markets. In other words, there is, at present, no direct
means for an individual to select or bargain for the conditions of their personal infor-
mation market.
31. See, e.g., John Gould, Privacy and the Economics of Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 827, 827-35 (1980).
32. See generally George Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and
Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 625 (1980).
33. See generally MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 241 (1962)
(explaining marginal utility and principles of exchange).
34. Stigler, supra note 32, at 628.
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value relaxed privacy protections will compete against those who
favor more stringent policies.
As a brief aside, it is relevant to note that the current tone of the
privacy debate leaves little wiggle room for those with competing
demand interests. Fred Cate notes that
[i]t is frankly difficult to find the 'other' side of the privacy de-
bate in large part because the benefits that result from open in-
formation flows (and may be placed at risk when privacy
protections interfere with those flows) are so integral a part of
our lives that they are seldom explicitly recognized or fully
understood.35
To avoid demonizing those who are "anti-privacy, '36 it is useful to
think of some of the positive effects of relaxed privacy standards
from a broader social policy standpoint. For instance, fewer re-
strictions on information allow insurance markets to operate effi-
ciently, reduce transaction costs among privacy providers, facilitate
education and research, and lower overall costs for consumers.37
These and other advantages benefit society in the aggregate and
should not be easily discounted. The effect of any given privacy
policy is to create a tradeoff between these benefits and those
gained from limiting access to information.38 Where the balance
falls will depend on how we value these tradeoffs.39 The important
thing is that we are informed as we make these decisions and con-
sider that an increase in the amount of privacy may be more harm-
ful than beneficial after a certain point.4"
Privacy also presents another problem. While there may be a
variety of options to choose from in buying any given privacy pol-
icy, the value of that policy is obscured until future valuations are
revealed. Unlike most goods, the value of privacy is difficult to
gage because damages from disclosure may be entirely unknown at
the time the policy is agreed upon or "purchased," as is the likeli-
35. Cate, supra note 1, at 36.
36. Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the
Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
4, 5 (2000). "Just as no one is 'pro-abortion' or 'anti-life,' no one can be 'anti-privacy,'
yet that's the only label left by the rhetoric." Id.
37. See Stigler, supra note 32, at 628-33.
38. See generally Lawrence Gostin & James Hodge, Personal Privacy and Com-
mon Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Pri-
vacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1439-42 (2002).
39. Id.
40. See infra Part II.E.
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hood of that disclosure occurring.41 Most consumers do not know
what their future medical condition will be at the time they sub-
scribe to a medical plan. They are essentially buying a "black box"
based on risk preferences and speculation about future conditions
based on limited present information. The acceptable risk of PHI
disclosure is entirely unresolved until the substance of the PHI is
known.42 Thus, the ultimate value of privacy is not revealed until
long after a policy is in place.
Despite this drawback, privacy may still be treated as an eco-
nomic good and priced as such. All time-preferenced goods in-
volve some measure of risk evaluation and speculation in pricing.43
Just as insurance policies reflect different risk preferences by offer-
ing an array of policies priced by actuarial estimates, so too can
privacy policies reflect individual preferences by following a similar
strategy. 44 One solution is to concentrate or bundle the prefer-
ences of individual consumers. This could take the form of group
policy plans, provider set standards, or some hybrid between the
two.
There is a problem, however, in that catering to individual pref-
erences can become very costly, very quickly. While it is conceiva-
ble that an individual could contract with every covered entity they
come into contact with, the costs could mushroom as providers
scrambled to accommodate a variety of needs, and regulatory over-
sight is replaced by extensive contract enforcement. This is not a
foregone conclusion, however. The incentive to develop a way to
meet the need for customized solutions while keeping costs. mini-
mized is as strong as the demand driving it. Entrepreneurs in
41. See Richard Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Intended and Unintended Conse-
quences, 22 CATO J., 13, 15 (2002) (noting that judgments are made behind a Rawisian
veil of ignorance) [hereinafter Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy], available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-3.pdf.
42. For example, take a patient who is diagnosed with a condition that carries a
costly social stigma. The value of keeping their medical information confidential esca-
lates in proportion to the consequences of disclosure. The patient's demand for pri-
vacy at the time of "purchase" is substantially less than at the relevant time of policy
enforcement.
43. See generally Mario Rizzo, Time in Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 111 (Peter Boettke ed., 1994).
44. The mechanics may be complex, but such a system would offer a variety of
choices with greater flexibility on the part of providers and insurers, while ultimately
leaving the decision in the hands of the consumer. Ideally, an array of competing
policies would emerge to effectively meet the demands of a wide spectrum of consum-
ers. Market pressures to supply the best product at the lowest cost would also tend to
prevent unwanted information disclosures and minimize implementation and enforce-
ment costs.
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search of potential profits will search for ways to capitalize on the
potential profits and will likely find innovative solutions.45
Critics of this type of market-oriented approach point out that
this kind of price discrimination is not possible within the current
system because of "pervasive market failures. 46
Although they are correct in their assessment that the conditions
for a traditional competitive market do not presently exist, 47 it is
not a foregone conclusion that the market has failed or cannot pro-
vide an efficient outcome. Problems such as high transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and bargaining power disparities are
commonplace in the real world and many (if not all) economists
are well aware that the theoretical constraints and ceteris paribus
clauses that delimit economic models do not hold true in actual
practice. 48 Despite this, markets tend to work, even when the con-
ditions suggest the classical economics framework will have little
predictive power.4 9 Further, when particular markets are treated
within an experimental framework, economists often discover that
these discrepancies may not be problems at all.5° This is not to say
that the market always works flawlessly or that complications are
irrelevant. Without looking at the actual functions of a particular
market and at how the participants behave within the rules and
institutions that exist, it is simply inaccurate to conclude that the
underlying conditions inevitably lead to market failure or that
there are not effective measures for changing the rules of the game
in order to yield optimal outcomes.
With the advent of HIPAA, a uniform standard is imposed which
cannot adjust to individual preferences without risking liability for
45. See generally Sanford Ikeda, Market Processes 23, 23-25 in THE ELGAR COM-
PANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter Boettke ed., 1994); Israel Kirzner, Entrepre-
neurship, 103, 103-110 in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter
Boettke ed., 1994).
46. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 891-907. But see JAY COCHRAN, MERCATUS
CTR., PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY
IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION 13 (2001), available at http://www.mercatus.org/
pdf/materials/78.pdf (noting that the HHS claim of market failure based on informa-
tion asymmetry and externalities presupposes poorly defined property rights).
47. See, e.g., James Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH. L. REV. 1, 59-66 (2003).
48. See Mark Pauly, Regulation of Bad Things That Almost Never Happen But
Could: HIPAA and the Individual Insurance Market, 22 CATO J. 59, 60-61 (2002) (dis-
cussing the problem of imperfect consumer information and insurance), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/j ournal/cj22nl/cj22nl-5.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Vernon Smith, Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental
Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis," 20 ECON. INQUIRY 167, 167 (1982).
50. See id.
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covered entities. Rather than enable more refined price discrimi-
nation by offering consumers a variety of choices priced along the
demand curve, a "one-size-fits-all" federal policy ensures that there
is no price discrimination whatsoever.5 1 Scarce resources are not
allocated according to their most valued uses, and the benefits of a
competitive market are lost to waste.5 2 HIPAA fails to match con-
sumer preferences to competing policies, and the end result is guar-
anteed inefficiency and true market failure.
To illustrate part of the problem, consider a hypothetical hospital
that caters only to patients with the lowest of privacy preferences.
Even with all patients choosing to sign authorization and consent
forms, the hospital would not escape the administrative and opera-
tive burdens that HIPAA imposes. The federal regulations man-
date that the hospital jump through every compliance hoop,
regardless of consumer preferences. 3 The patients end up bearing
the financial costs of a system that offers them little or no substan-
tial benefit.54
In the real world, preferences are rarely so uniform.55 Consum-
ers have wildly divergent preferences based on their individual
needs and tempered by the costs they are willing to bear. When
patients have heterogeneous preferences, HIPAA is only able to
cater to one segment of the market.56 The costs are not borne in
proportion to individual demand, and those with low privacy pref-
erences end up subsidizing the privacy interests of those with high
privacy preferences. 57 The net effect is a wealth transfer from the
former group to the latter.58
51. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 1.
52. For a discussion on the difficulty of obtaining market efficiency through cen-
tral or government planning, see generally RICHARD McKENZIE, COMPETING VISIONS
(1985). McKenzie notes that the "economic problem" is not simply one of scarcity,
but one of information coordination. Id. at 104-05, 108-12.
53. See generally Mary K. Martin, Some Things Old, Some Things New: The
HIPAA Health Information Privacy Regulations, 59 BENCH & B. MINN. 32, 33-34
(2002); Elizabeth Morris et al., HIPAA and Its Impact on Michigan's Health Profes-
sionals, 81 MICH. B.J. 29 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 1, at 38-43 (discussing the limits of notice and con-
sent and comparing an opt-out to an opt-in rule).
55. See Richard Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a
Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 679 (1980).
56. See generally Gary M. Anderson, The Economic Theory of Regulation, in
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICs 294, 295-297 (Peter Boettke ed.,
1994). In economic terms, this is a "deadweight loss," the uncaptured wealth that
would otherwise be yielded in an efficient market.
57. See COCHRAN, supra note 46, at 5.
58. Id.
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B. The Underlying Conditions of the Health Care Market
Stepping away from economic theory, it is useful to ask what led
to the problems associated with medical privacy and health care
providers in the first place. HIPAA was enacted to deal with the
real conflict that exists between employee privacy and employer
health care provision,5 9 but how did this conflict arise? What led to
the emergence of employer provision of health care? How did
health care shift from a simple individual "fee for services" ar-
rangement to a complex system of health plans, insurers, adminis-
trators, and federal regulation? The answer is not a simple one,
but at least part of it lies in the Internal Revenue Code and the rise
of third party payers. 60 Over time, policy changes and industry de-
velopments have shifted the role of purchasing and bargaining for
medical services away from the consumer and towards employers,
insurers, and group plan administrators.61 The tax code provides
significant incentives for employers to manage and provide medical
coverage as part of the package of benefits that employees re-
ceive. The tax burden for employer outlays is lower than if they
paid the same amount to the employee directly,63 and the resulting
shift toward employer provision of medical benefits has become so
commonplace that it is effectively mandatory in all but the lowest
compensated occupations.64
59. See generally PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 3.
60. Id. at 2.
61. See Victoria Craig Bruce, Medical Savings Accounts: Progress and Problems
Under HIPAA, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS, Aug. 8, 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa411.pdf.
One of the major factors driving health care costs higher has been the in-
creasing share of medical bills paid by third-party payers (private health in-
surers, employers, and government agencies) in the U.S. health care system.
Most health care consumers do not pay directly for their own health care.
Nearly 97 percent of hospital bills and more than 84 percent of physicians'
fees are paid by private health insurance. On average, 80 cents of every
dollar used to purchase health care is paid by someone other than the con-
sumer who receives the care.
Id. at 3.
62. PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 3; see also JOHN GOODMAN & GERALD
MUSGRAVE, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE
COSTS WITH MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS (1992), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st168/; S. Butler & C. Gavora, How Tax Reforms Would
Help Improve Patient Confidentiality, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 19,
1999, at 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxesbg1242.cfm.
63. Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 3.
64. See generally Anne Maltz, Health Insurance 101, 690 PLI LIT. 523, 537-38
(2003).
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While it may reduce individual transaction costs to seek jobs
which bundle medical insurance with wages, this makes health ser-
vices costlier overall.65 At the margin, individuals have few incen-
tives to either engage in risk-averse behavior or to keep claim costs
low by monitoring the medical services they receive.66 Depending
on the particular type of health plan provided, employees may face
strong incentives to consume more medical services, particularly if
deductibles are low relative to individual demand and/or if individ-
ual account savings fail to roll over to successive periods. The
more an individual is insulated from the costs of their choices, the
more likely they are to spend. Thus, plans with poor incentive
structures result in greater costs overall. This free rider and collec-
tive action problem is remedied in part by the employers' interests
in keeping costs low, but this indirect bargaining and monitoring is
considerably less efficient than its direct alternative. The tradeoff
between group plan savings and losses attributable to agency
problems is complicated by tax incentives and the increasing com-
plexity of insurance and benefits plans,68 so it is unclear what the
efficient market outcome would actually look like. It is almost cer-
tain, however, that if employers were given tax neutral treatment,
third party payers would play a substantially smaller role.69
As it stands, the current system places employers in the position
of having to monitor the health services that are being provided to
their employees. Without some sort of accountability check on the
type and quality of care provided, employers have no means of
keeping insurance costs down or monitoring what exactly they are
paying for.70 This creates a real dilemma for both employers and
employees, as the tradeoff for accountability is the diminution of
medical privacy. As one policy study notes:
65. See Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 4.
66. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Consider, for example, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 that, in subsidizing prescriptions, distances the payer from
the beneficiary thereby creating additional distortion in the health care market.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
69. See generally M. Susan Marquis & Stephen Long, To Offer or Not to Offer:
The Role of Price in Employers' Health Insurance Decisions, 36 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 935 (2001) (study finding that employer demand for health insurance is relatively
inelastic with regards to changes in rate premiums and noting prior studies that have
found varying results for studies based on the stated preferences of employers), avail-
able at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/hsr/ArticleAbstracts/Marquis365.html.
70. See Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 4.
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Congress will not be able to address the privacy issue fully until
it addresses the tax treatment of employer-provided health cov-
erage. Providing tax credits directly to individuals so that they
can purchase and own their own health insurance would vastly
improve confidentiality of medical records and minimize regula-
tory intrusion into the patient-doctor relationship.7'
This and other reform solutions are well worth considering
before turning to more government regulation. If it were not for
the tax code encouraging employers to play the awkward part of
middleman in health care provision, many of the privacy concerns
that led to the HIPAA legislation may never have arisen at all. The
incidental benefit of changing the payment system to eliminate or
reduce the roll of middlemen is to reduce the demand for informa-
tion and thereby facilitate greater privacy protections.
C. HIPAA's Policy Failings
Unfortunately, HIPAA does little to address the accountability
tradeoff, and largely fails to meet its own policy goal of establishing
employer/employee privacy safeguards. Employers can effectively
sidestep HIPAA's protections because of a number of broad con-
sent exceptions7 and a lack of prohibitions on employers requiring
PHI disclosure authorizations as a condition of employment.73
71. Id.
72. See Charlotte Twight, Prying Eyes: The End of Medical Privacy (Jan. 21, 2003),
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,76087,00.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter Twight, Prying Eyes].
73. HHS also recognizes this problem:
Jeffrey Blair: [B]ut if we go back to the original thinking of why we needed
privacy protections, if I recall correctly, the greatest concern that the public
had was that their health care information might be inappropriately accessed
by their employers. And that that might jeopardize either their ability to be
hired, or their ability to retain their employment. Of course, HIPAA at-
tempted to address this as well as it could within the framework that Con-
gress gave us.
Mark Rothstein: [H]IPAA actually does really very little, if anything to ad-
dress that problem that you referred to. That is, individuals being concerned
that their employers have access to their health records. And the reason for
that is it is lawful for an employer to require that an individual sign an au-
thorization as a condition of employment, after the individual has received a
conditional offer.
So, as a result, the disclosure of an individual's entire medical record to an
employer is lawful under HIPAA. It's illegal in California and Minnesota,
that have specific statutes that address this issue, but in the other 48 states,
it's lawful. And so, therefore, HIPAA really doesn't help things. HIPAA
will prevent the wrongful disclosure without an authorization, but as long as
there was a valid authorization signed, there would not be a problem.
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These and other exceptions may leave patients with inadequate pri-
vacy protections. Not only do the regulations open the door to the
underprotection of privacy, the penalties often encourage draco-
nian overenforcement of the regulations, in some cases, yielding
too much privacy. 4
Given the morass of regulations and accreditation requirements
that health care providers already have to contend with, it is not
surprising that when faced with uncertainty or the prospect of lia-
bility, the tendency is to err on the side of caution and overenforce-
ment.75 When the stakes are high, uncertainly is an unappealing
option, and covered entities are more likely to adopt reactionary
policies that favor their interests over those of the patients they
serve. A common example of this problem is often cited anecdot-
ally: although the HIPAA rules require hospitals to allow patients
to opt-out of the patient directory,76 many hospitals treat it as an
opt-in rule. Unless the patient explicitly authorizes the listing, hos-
pitals will not reveal that information-even in the extreme situa-
tion where an unconscious and dying patient's friends and relatives
are trying to locate her.77 While some providers may be unknow-
Meeting transcript, HHS, National Committee on Vital Health Statistics (June 24,
2003), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/030624tr.htm.
74. See, e.g., Kathleen Dracup & Christopher Bryan-Brown, Editorial, The Law of
Unintended Consequences, 13 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 97, 98 (2004). Dracup and
Bryan-Brown state:
Horror stories are appearing in the literature, warning of unintended conse-
quences. For example, a recent letter to the editor in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine describes a situation in which a patient underwent cardiac
transplantation. Postoperatively, routine blood cultures on the patient re-
vealed a bacteremia. The infectious disease specialist at the recipient's hos-
pital contacted the donor's hospital to ascertain the identity of the infection
so that immediate antibiotic treatment could be initiated for the (now immu-
nosuppressed) patient. The donor's hospital refused to release the informa-
tion, citing HIPAA regulations and policies, because the (now deceased)
donor had not given authorization for release of PHI.
Id.
75. Id.; see also Radly Balko, The Barriers Don't Exist, TECH CEN. STATION, June
4, 2004 (discussing the reluctance of insurers to price according to individual risk
based on the false perception that federal regulations prohibit them from doing so),
available at http://www.techcentralstation.com/060404H.html.
76. 45 C.F.R. §164.510(a)(2).
77. See Laurie Tarkan, Sorry, That Information is Off Limits: A Privacy Law's
Unintended Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at F5; see also Jack Rovner et al., Man-
aging the Privacy Challenge: Compliance with the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 15
HEALTH L. 18, 28-29 (2002); Yolanda Woodlee, Hospital Bill is Family's Only Clue:
Relatives Weren't Notified of Md. Man's Hit-and-Run Death, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2004, at B5.
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ingly misapplying the law, many knowingly overreach for fear of
the litigation and penalties that threaten to ensue.78
In a similar vein, consent forms tend to be overbroad to avoid
potential liability."9 While HIPAA takes steps to redress this by
requiring plain language descriptions of the information and its
means of disclosure,80 it is largely ineffective given that few pa-
tients bother to read the authorization forms at all-much less in
critical detail."1 While HIPAA shifts control towards patients, this
is not clearly in their favor. They have the option to sign or not to
sign, but they lose the diversity of options they have to choose from
and may be left with a stark choice between relinquishing their pri-
vacy via a consent form or forgoing treatment altogether.
There are also numerous exceptions to the consent requirements
that are not within the patient's control.
[T]oday patient consent is not required for disclosures of your
personal medical information by covered entities in connection
with medical treatment, payment or health care operations. Al-
though patient authorization is required in certain other situa-
tions, a laundry list of over-broad exceptions retained from the
original rules largely guts the authorization requirement. 82
The gains that might initially seem to advance the interests of ar-
dent privacy advocates are quickly swallowed by this and other
problematic HIPAA rules which inadequately protect patient
privacy.83
Privacy advocates should also be concerned with HIPAA's
"transactions rule." The rule sets forth a standardized format for
medical records, 4 which allows for centralized data collection on a
scale not previously feasible. This move might bode well from a
long-run cost-efficiency perspective, but it raises serious concerns
78. See Judith Graham, Privacy Law a Bitter Pill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2004, at 1.
79. See Joseph Slobodzian, Judge Upholds Changes to Medical-Privacy Law, PHIL-
ADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 2004, at A12 ("Patients may refuse to sign the HIPAA
form, but patient advocates argue that option is practically meaningless. Since the
rule, advocates say, most doctors or medical providers refuse to assume civil and crim-
inal liability for wrongly disclosed patient information and require patients to sign
before they provide care.").
80. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 870-71.
81. See Cate, supra note 1, at 38.
82. Twight, Prying Eyes, supra note 72.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
84. 45 C.F.R. §162.
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for privacy.85 Consider, for example, the failed proposal to create a
National Data Center put forth by the Johnson administration .
6
What began as a proposal to consolidate agency efforts and cut
back on costs turned into a behemoth database that would track
individuals by consolidating nearly every piece of public informa-
tion available on them in one location.8 7 Following negative reac-
tions from the public and Congress, the measure was abandoned
on grounds of creating a security threat if the database were com-
promised and for putting civil liberties at risk.88 These same con-
cerns led to widespread opposition of Congress' plan to create a
National Health Identifier ("NHI") as part of the original HIPAA
legislation.8 9 These requirements were copied almost verbatim
from the rejected 1993 Clinton health security bill.90 Although the
NHI proposal was eventually withdrawn, similar threats to privacy
remain as the security requirements of HIPAA dictate a standard-
ized format for medical records, which includes Social Security
numbers. 9' In practice, if not in principle, this is essentially
equivalent to the NHI proposal.9"
D. HIPAA's Costs
In addition to the structural problems outlined above, HIPAA
also comes with a high price tag. There are direct and indirect
costs of administration, as well as a number of hidden costs in the
form of unintended consequences. Turning first to the direct costs,
even the conservative HHS .estimates are substantial. HHS esti-
mated the start up costs of compliance at $3.5 billion with contin-
ued annual costs of $1.6 billion.93 These cost estimates account for
such sunk costs as initial policy development and implementation,
renegotiation of contracts between business associates, technology
improvements, and other administrative burdens.94 Ongoing costs
85. See Charlotte Twight, Health and Human Services "Privacy" Standards: The
Coming Destruction of American Medical Privacy, 6 INDEP. REV. 485, 486-88 (2002)
[hereinafter Twight, Health and Human Services].
86. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 868.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See 64 F.R. 59,918, 59,921 (1999).
90. Twight, Health and Human Services, supra note 85, at 486.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id. at 488.
93. See COCHRAN, supra note 46, at 3-4 (comparing HHS' estimates with indepen-
dent cost estimates of $4 billion and $1.8 billion respectively, with a total long-run cost
of roughly $30 billion).
94. Id. at 2.
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include personnel training, amendment and correction require-
ments, and patient authorizations." Combined, these expenditures
yield long-run baseline costs between $25 and $30 billion.96
Along with direct expenditures, HIPAA also adds to the costs
and inefficiencies of the health care market in the form of indirect
costs. By adding a layer of regulatory red tape, HIPAA distorts the
market process by introducing costs which disproportionately af-
fect covered entities. While the rules may be the same for every-
one, the costs of implementing them are not. Large insurance and
health care companies will gain stronger positions in the market as
they are more able to bear the costs of compliance. In contrast,
small organizations will face greater proportional costs. HHS rec-
ognized this problem and gave an additional year for small health
plans (not small providers) to comply, but this stopgap, applied
only to a fraction of affected parties, does not address the underly-
ing problem. The regulations also hinder new entrants to the mar-
ket who now face higher start up costs as a result of the compliance
requirements. These barriers to market entry make the market less
competitive overall, and as the costs of entering and remaining in
the market rise, so too do the costs of health care provision.97
Lastly, HIPAA has a number of additional hidden costs in the
form of unintended consequences. Some market players will inva-
riably profit at the expense of others when new regulatory burdens
take effect: here, there are a number of winners and losers.
HIPAA is an economic boon to the tech industry98 and to legal
firms and others that specialize in HIPAA compliance.99 Some in-
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id. at 4.
97. See Cass Sunstein, Privacy and Medicine: A Comment, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 709,
713-24 (2001).
A serious danger is that a system designed to protect privacy, even in the
way that is most sensible, might impose costs in excess of benefits, simply
because it is so hard to manage. Time and effort are scarce commodities and
far from trivial concerns. But the more important problem is that a burden-
some system for the protection of privacy could undermine patient care it-
self, not least by making it more expensive.
98. See Peter Dizikes, Tech Firms See New Medical Privacy Rules as Boon (May
10, 2001), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/dailynews/medicalimagingOlO510.
html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Sandeep Junnarker, Law Prescribes Overhaul of Ag-
ing System, (June 16, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2030-6681_3-1001641.html?tag=
vs4_toc (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
99. See, e.g., Jessica M. Lewis, HIPAA: Demystifying the Implications for Financial
Institutions, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 156 n.133 (2004) (noting that Bank One
gained a competitive edge by advertising itself as the first bank to become Claredi
certified).
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surance companies are already offering protections for liabilities
derived explicitly from HIPAA violations. 00 While this may ap-
pear to create new jobs, it is only at the expense of scarce resources
that would otherwise be put to use more efficiently elsewhere.'
The regulations also adversely affect charities and medical re-
search. Charitable organizations that raise money for health
causes depend on many former and current patients for charitable
revenues 10 2 With the advent of HIPAA, they can no longer access
or purchase targeted lists without patient consent. 10 3 This restraint
puts charities devoted to medical illness and treatment that are de-
pendent on individual donations at a significant disadvantage. 10 4
Likewise, HIPAA makes it more difficult for pharmaceutical com-
panies, medical device manufacturers, epidemiologists,' 05  and
clinical researchers to conduct clinical trials.10 6 Researchers no
longer have easy access to the medical information that allows
them to reach the relevant test subjects.0 7 This hurdle will make
the already lengthy and expensive delay between product inven-
tion and market availability even more encumbered.
Other industries may also face higher costs by virtue of falling
with the "covered entities" category, even though they are not os-
tensibly part of the health care industry. Law firms, 0 8 banks,10 9
and insurers (outside of health insurance), to name but a few, are
100. See Arnold Rosenbaum, HIPAA Liability More than Meets the Eye, HEALTH-
IT WORLD (Nov. 13, 2003), at http://www.imakenews.com/health-itworld/e-article000
200880.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
101. See HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 17 (3rd ed. 1978) ("The art
of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects
of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely
for one group but for all groups.").
102. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 15-16.
103. Tarkan, supra note 81; see also John Eggertsen et al., HIPAA Privacy Regula-
tions: A Summary, SH078 ALI-ABA 29, 68 (2003).
104. Tarkan, supra note 81.
105. See American College of Epidemiology (ACE) Testimony on Impact of HIPAA
on Research, Before the Department of Health & Human Services' Nat'l Comm. on
Vital Health Stats' Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality (Nov. 20, 2003) (remarks
by Martha Linet, M.D., M.P.H., ACE President-Elect), available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/031120p3.htm.
106. See Lynne Glover, Conducting Clinical Trials Made More Difficult by New Pri-
vacy Regs, PIT-rSBURGH Bus. TIMES, June 6, 2003; see also Epstein, HIPAA on Pri-
vacy, supra note 41, at 18.
107. HHS has included certain exceptions for public health related activities. For a
detailed discussion, see generally Diana M. Bonti et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule:
Reviewing the Post-Compliance Impact on Public Health Practice and Research, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 70, 70-72 (2003).
108. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
109. See Lewis, supra note 99, at 141.
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among those that will face additional costs. In turn, these costs will
be transferred to consumers in the form of higher costs for legal
and banking services, and higher insurance premiums. This
"trickle down" effect is hard to trace and is unlikely to be fully
accounted for in any HIPAA cost estimate.
E. HIPAA's Legal Problems
HIPAA also raises a number of legal problems. There are tricky
issues with some of the more straightforward legal questions. For
instance, when is there a violation? When does a plaintiff have
standing, and, what are the possible remedies and defenses? In ad-
dition to these types of standard litigation questions, HIPAA raises
issues that are unique-namely, problems related to the "minimum
necessary" standard and state law preemption problems. The typi-
cal litigation problems are worth exploring, but are beyond the
scope of this paper. It is worthwhile, however, to spend some time
looking at the "minimum necessary" standard and preemption
problems as they have already generated considerable debate in
the literature and litigation in the courts.
The "minimum necessary" standard requires that a covered en-
tity make reasonable efforts to limit PHI to the minimum neces-
sary to accomplish the purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.11
This attempt to further limit the misuse of PHI creates one of the
greatest compliance challenges for covered entities."' Even for
routine and recurring disclosures or requests, covered entities must
implement policies and procedures to meet the standard.'1 2 Aside
from the implementation burden, the main problem with the stan-
dard is that it is remarkably vague. Commentators have argued
that it is "contrary to sound medical practice" and "unworkable in
daily treatment situations. 11 3 Although it has thus far survived
constitutional challenges, 4 this assurance offers little consolation
to covered entities struggling to implement the rule.115 The inher-
ent ambiguity of a "reasonableness" test combined with the near
infinite number of facts and circumstances that factor into one's
subjective judgment create a dangerous pitfall for covered entities.
110. See 45 C.F.R. §164.502.
111. Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out-The Burdens and Challenges of
HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the 'Minimum Necessary' Stan-
dard, and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 158 (2003).
112. Id. at 160.
113. Id. at 159; see also Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 25.
114. See S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
115. See generally Guthrie, supra note 111, at 159-68.
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In addition to the ambiguities of the "minimum necessary" re-
quirement, HIPAA also creates state law preemption problems.116
The regulations call for federal preemption of state law except for a
number of problematic exceptions. HIPAA does not preempt state
law if the state law meets one of the following conditions:
1) Is necessary to prevent fraud and abuse;
2) Ensures appropriate State regulation of insurance and health
plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute or regulation;
3) Allows for state reporting on health care delivery or costs;
4) Serves a compelling need related to public health, safety, or
welfare, that warrants the intrusion into privacy when balanced
against the need to be served;
5) Regulates the manufacture, registration, distribution, dispens-
ing, or other control of any controlled substances, or that is
deemed a controlled substance by state law;
6) Is more stringent than the HIPAA rule;
7) Provides for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse,
birth, or death, or for the conduct of public health surveillance,
investigation, or intervention; or
8) Requires a health plan to report, or to provide access to, in-
formation for the purpose of management audits, financial au-
dits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or
certification of facilities or individuals. 117
Although these exceptions may seem benign on the surface, they
cause considerable confusion as to when state law preempts the
federal rule.118 The issues are not straightforward or easily dis-
pensed with, and states are already seeing substantial litigation as
courts address the issue. 1 9 Until these issues are more firmly set-
tled, we can only expect more of the same.
Regardless of the wisdom behind the preemption exceptions,
much of the blame for generating this litigation falls squarely on
HHS. Presumably to cut back on compliance costs, changes were
116. See generally J.S. Christie, Jr., The HIPAA Privacy Rules From a Litigation
Perspective, 64 ALA. LAW. 126, 132 (2003).
117. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2001).
118. See generally Bishop, supra note 26, at 723.
119. See, e.g., Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004) (finding
preclusion where HIPAA is "more stringent" than Maryland's disclosure regulation);
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
6, 2004) (stating that Illinois law supercedes HIPAA where state law has more restric-
tive disclosure requirements, even with a court ordered subpoena); Lemieux v. Tan-
dem Health Care, 862 So.2d 745, 748 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting in dicta
that Florida substantive law is more stringent than HIPAA on the issue of disclosure
and thus Florida law supercedes the less protective federal regulations, even though
HIPAA's procedural requirements are more stringent).
2004] 1501
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
made to the final rule which eliminated a state's ability to seek out
an advisory opinion on preemption. 120 While this reduces the bur-
den on HHS, it fails to clarify the legal issues and merely shifts the
burden onto courts to resolve the question at the state level.
Beyond the particular legal questions engendered by HIPAA,
the regulations also invite new litigation. Although HIPAA does
not create any new federal private rights of action for wrongful
disclosures of PHI, 21 the privacy standards are now being incorpo-
rated into state common law causes of action 122 and may be used to
extend actions to parties previously exempt for lack of privity. 123
For better or worse, this expansion of state law claims adds bur-
dens to the court system and consumes legal resources.
There are also new legal costs outside of the claims themselves.
Namely, lawyers face increased discovery costs and litigation obsta-
cles in accessing medical records.1 24 Attorneys also have greater
internal compliance costs in the form of procedural safeguards for
protecting client PHI, creating and monitoring arrangements with
covered entities with respect to PHI, and in-house staff training. 125
When assessing HIPAA's legal costs, it would be a mistake to look
simply at the damages awarded to successful plaintiffs or the costs
of new claim litigation generally. The costs of HIPAA are much
broader and ought to be accounted for. Resolving legal issues as a
matter of first impression, working through more red tape during
discovery, and adding encumbrances to law firms and attorneys
must be added to the sum.
III. ALTERNATIVES
HIPAA's high costs, questionable benefits, and numerous eco-
nomic, legal, and administrative consequences make a strong case
for repeal. Not only does it seem reasonable to conclude that the
benefits fail to exceed the costs, it may be that the policy may not
120. See Guthrie, supra note 111, at 155; Brian Zoeller, Health and Human Ser-
vices' Privacy Proposal: A Failed Attempt at Health Information Privacy Protection, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 1065, 1081 nn.90-91 and accompanying text.
121. See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules
and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 618 (2002).
122. Id. at 652-58.
123. Id. at 662-65.
124. See Lori Baer & Christiana Callahan, The Impact of HIPAA Privacy Regula-
tions on Discovery of Plaintiffs' Medical Records, 12 LJN's PROD. LIAB. L. & STRAT-
EGY 1 (2003).
125. See Alexander Gareeb, Practical Implications of HIPAA, 27 L.A. LAw 12
(2004).
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produce any net benefits, regardless of cost. 126 As an alternative,
we should consider less intrusive options that address the privacy
concerns that led to HIPAA, while avoiding the many problems it
has raised. A good solution meets the criteria of sound policy im-
plementation, 127  while minimizing the regulatory costs and
burdens. 2
8
Several possible solutions have already been noted: a broad re-
examination of the structure of the health care payment system, a
revision of the tax code,'129 and the development of a privacy insur-
ance market.130 The advantage of these types of reform is that they
address certain underlying concerns of the health care market that
regulatory reform generally neglects. The agency problems, poor
incentive structures, collective action difficulties, and moral
hazards that plague the health care system are at the root of rising
costs and frustrations with medical coverage. 131 Only by changing
the rules of the game can we expect any real resolution to these
problems. But, given that such reforms would require radical
changes to the health care market and the current political climate,
more incremental change seems likely.
Another possible route is to adopt clear guidelines for better pri-
vacy policies. Fred Cate sets forth one such framework. He sug-
gests regulators "should focus on harm, not control; use narrow,
precise definitions; employ appropriate consent requirements; ap-
ply regulations consistently; and evaluate the constitutionality of
rules.' 1 32 Similarly, Cass Sunstein offers a narrower framework for
evaluating health privacy:
A free society should begin with a strong presumption in favor
of full patient control over personal information. The presump-
tion is rebutted when disclosure to others is necessary (1) for
good patient care, as in the case of consultations and medical
teams; (2) to compile information that will produce scientific or
126. See Cate, supra note 1, at 37; Mike Koetting, The Regulation of Managed Care
Organizations and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 703, 703-04,
707 (2001).
127. See supra text accompanying note 8.
128. See also Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 22-24 (discussing the
public choice problems of HIPAA and the difficulties of reversing bureaucratic
entrenchment).
129. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
132. Cate, supra note 1, at 53.
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medical progress; (3) to protect third parties from serious risks
of harm; and (4) to prevent harm to patients themselves. 133
Whether Cate or Sunstein has the right approach is debatable,
but given the current regulatory environment and the promise of a
better alternative, it may not be a bad idea to let their ideas play
out. The current approach to privacy is muddied and simply not
feasible. A more consistent and principled approach holds the
promise of clarifying our legal rights and the value of those rights
in any given tradeoff. At least with a clear sense of what is at
stake, we can begin to make rational decisions about when, where,
and how information ought to be handled.
As a final alternative, we may simply want to go back to the
beginning. Prior to HIPAA, choices about privacy were exercised
by those closest to the situation and circumstances, namely health
care practitioners and intermediaries constrained by state privacy,
contract, and tort laws.13 4 They were also constrained by custom
and common sense, norms we too often undervalue. 35 Not every
solution to a problem need be a legal one, and the lack of wide-
spread or systematic privacy abuse prior to HIPAA suggests there
may not be a place for one. 136 Assuming, arguendo, that there is
such a place, it may be best to bolster the protections that already
exist for patient privacy at the state level, keeping in mind that
there are significant tradeoffs to enhancing those protections. 37
Regardless of which path we take, there are good reasons for
taking a more market-oriented approach. Among other things, it
offers a variety of alternatives, eliminates or reduces the overall
administrative burden, and removes the need for esoteric debates
over what amount of privacy is the "right" amount for individual
133. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 710.
134. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 20.
135. Sunstein suggests physician norms may be the best place to begin. See Sun-
stein, supra note 97, at 710.
136. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
137. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 14.
The former [pre-HIPAA] world should not be treated as though it were the
state of nature, in which no one knew about privacy or cared about the con-
sequences that might flow from the inopportune release of information.
Quite the opposite, the tradeoffs between the control of information and the
need for its dissemination into different arenas did not first surface in 1995
or 1996. Rather, it has long been at the center of the discussion for research
protocols used by physicians, hospitals, and research centers. The protection
of medical records was always a big deal, one that was subject to regulation
as well as contract.
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consumers. 138 Although, the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith can-
not point us to the solution, it does encourage innovation, choice,
and most of all competition. We have no guaranteed means of
knowing in advance who will win and who will lose, but it is impor-
tant to set aside any pessimism, and remember that the openness of
the market is precisely what makes it work. 39
As a corollary, it is also important to consider the benefits of
competing legal regimes. By allowing states to experiment with
different legal solutions that balance the privacy interests of con-
sumers with the interests of the health care industry, we are more
likely to see innovation and improvement. 140 State legislators can
more readily change the laws when they become ineffective or ex-
cessive, and can more readily respond to the people affected. And,
at least in principle, states can learn from each other and compare
what does or does not make a system work and adjust accordingly.
Under a uniform regime, we lose much of the incentive to create
better laws at the state level. And although HHS officials may
have the best of intentions, they face a much more difficult task in
creating rules that best satisfy the conditions of each state's inter-
ests and existing legal framework. The agency is much less likely to
finesse a solution that works for any single state, much less any
particular health care market within that state.
CONCLUSION
In sum, HIPAA is not a good deal for patients, the health care
industry, or any "covered entity" that has the misfortune to fall
within its reach. The advantages of strengthening and simplifying
the rules under a uniform standard are gained at the expense of
experimentation and competition between states and among prov-
iders. The administrative burdens HIPAA imposes are, at best, a
marginal benefit for a small segment of consumers. At its worst,
HIPAA imposes costs directly and indirectly on nearly everyone
and offers little in return. HIPAA's main agenda of resolving the
employer/employee information disclosure problem remains
138. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 4, at 1506; cf. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 709-10.
139. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77-
91 (1996).
140. See generally, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, A Recipe for Cookies: State
Regulation of Consumer Marketing Information, at 1, 23-25, 36-38 (Prepared for the
American Enterprise Institute, Federalism Project Roundtable on Internet Privacy,
January 30, 2001) (discussing the advantages of state versus federal regulation in the
context of consumer information privacy), available at http://www.gmu.edu/depart-
ments/law/faculty/papers/docs/01-04.pdf.
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largely unresolved, and HIPAA does nothing to address the under-
lying agency problem. In place of a sound policy bolstering privacy
protections, HHS has given us a stack of regulations that amount
to a costly administrative headache with a number of wealth redis-
tributive effects in tow. Alternatively, we should repeal HIPAA
and consider less centralized, more competitive, and more effective
options.
HOUSING GIDEON: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN EVICTION CASES
Rachel Kleinman*
INTRODUCTION
In Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Black commented that "reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth."1
Since Justice Black made this proclamation in 1963, most Ameri-
cans intuitively accept the idea of an indigent's constitutional right
to counsel in a criminal trial. While lawmakers and advocates de-
bate over how best to deliver these services, and whether or not the
right is being met adequately, they generally do not question
whether the right exists.2 Neither the legislative nor the judicial
branch, however, has recognized an analogous right to counsel in
civil matters. Though government sponsored legal services, public
interest law offices and organizations, and pro bono programs at
private firms provide legal services to indigent clients, the legal ser-
vices provided to indigents in civil cases fall far short of the number
that are provided to people who are able to pay for legal help.4
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A., American
Studies, Brown University, 1996. I would like to thank Professor Russell Pearce for
whose class in Ethics and Public Interest Law I began this project, and Professor
Eduardo Penalver whose guidance and input throughout my research and writing was
invaluable. I would also like to thank all of my family and friends, and dedicate this
Comment to my mother whose support has been unwavering, and my father who will
always be my inspiration as a lawyer.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
2. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Tuning
Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (examining the Su-
preme Court's lack of guidance regarding the representation requirement); see gener-
ally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783
(1997) (recognizing that while the right to counsel exists in criminal cases, indigents
often receive insufficient or no counsel).
3. See infra Part I (discussing the holding of Gideon v. Wainwright and the argu-
ments that the holding should apply to civil cases).
4. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting
Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 342 (1978) (not-
ing the gap between available legal services and the level of services needed to pro-
vide representation to indigents).
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Scholars and practitioners make both constitutional and ethical
arguments for the expansion of legal services and for the recogni-
tion of a right to counsel for the indigent client in civil matters.5
The correct functioning of the adversarial process itself relies on
the assumption that both sides are coming to the process with
equal legal resources. 6 Equality of resources, however, is fre-
quently not a reality for indigent litigants.7 In the area of housing
law and evictions, for example, advocates have argued that recog-
nizing a right to counsel is the only way for government to mini-
mize the effect of inequality in access to justice, and, in many cases,
the only way to prevent homelessness.8 Others have cited both
feasibility and public policy in arguments against recognizing a
right to counsel in eviction proceedings. 9
Part I of this comment lays out some of the arguments for recog-
nizing a right to counsel for indigents as well as some of the pro-
posed solutions for making such a right a reality, focusing on the
arguments made in favor of extending a right to counsel for indi-
gents involved in eviction proceedings.' 0 Part II discusses some of
the problematic aspects of recognizing the right to counsel for indi-
gent tenants, including Barbara Bezdek's critique of reliance on
"access to justice" strategies"1 and Gary Bellow and Jeanne Ket-
5. See infra Part I (outlining arguments for recognizing a right to counsel in civil
cases).
6. See Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1987,
2022 (1999) ("The adversarial system presumes that both sides will be represented by
counsel."); see generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for
a Good Society: Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (discussing the
connection between "equal justice under the law" and the assistance of council).
7. See, e.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A
Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1,
1 (2003) (noting that in some civil courts ninety percent of defendants are without
council) (citing Engler, supra note 6, at 2047 n.263).
8. See Andrew Scherer, Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to
Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
557, 561 (1988) (advocating appointment of counsel for indigent tenants faced with
eviction and exploring the statutory bases for such an appointment); see generally Ken
Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in
New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 527 (1991) (analyzing the housing problems
encountered by poor New York tenants and arguing for a right to counsel in housing
proceedings).
9. See infra Part II (discussing various arguments against recognizing a right to
counsel for indigents in eviction hearings).
10. See infra Part I (outlining arguments in favor of a right to counsel for indigents
in eviction proceedings).
11. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 539-42 (1992) (noting that
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tleson's arguments against using the wholesale expansion of legal
services as a strategy for ameliorating inequality in the civil justice
system.12 Part III argues that despite these important criticisms, a
strong doctrinal basis as well as a deep need-especially in the case
of eviction proceedings-to recognize a right to counsel for indi-
gents still exists. 3
I. IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS IN
EVICTION PROCEEDINGS
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright 4 that
the Constitution guarantees every person charged with a felony the
right to an attorney even if he or she cannot afford one.' 5 Since the
Supreme Court recognized the Constitutional right to counsel in
criminal cases, advocates have argued for a civil version of
Gideon. 6 Proponents of this right argue that in many civil cases
the stakes are as high as those in criminal cases, and consequently
the concept of equitable access to justice is empty without a recog-
nized right to counsel in these cases. 7
A. Equal Protection Argument
Advocates for the right to counsel for indigent litigants have ar-
gued that indigents have a right to counsel in civil cases under the
Equal Protection Clause. 18 Generally, if a law "neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [a court] will uphold
the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end."'19 This rational basis test is relatively easy for
"access to justice" systems emanate from a viewpoint that separates law from other
political and social realms and places law in an artificial position of power).
12. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4, at 380.
13. See infra Part III.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Id. at 339 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which held that de-
nying a request for court-appointed counsel by an indigent defendant facing a state
felony charge was not necessarily a violation of the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
16. See infra notes 17-108 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Leonard W. Schroeter, Civil Gideon: If Not Why Not?, ATJ JURIS-
PRUDENCE, June 1999, passim (providing a detailed history of the right to counsel and
the "Civil Gideon" movement, and arguing that the fundamental right of access to
justice "encompasses a right to counsel in civil cases"), available at
http://www.wsba.org/atj/committees/jurisprudence/civgid.doc.
18. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 12 (asserting that "equality before
the law" cannot exist unless both litigants in a case have access to the court system on
equal terms).
19. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citation omitted).
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a government actor to satisfy.2 ° If the court determines that legis-
lation burdens a fundamental right or discriminates based on a sus-
pect classification, however, it will apply a "more searching judicial
inquiry. ' 21 In order to persuade a court to apply the much tougher
"strict scrutiny" analysis to determine whether a right to counsel
exists in civil proceedings, one would have to prove either that the
assistance of council is a fundamental right, or that discrimination
based on wealth should be considered a suspect category.22
Leonard Schroeter argues that the right to counsel should be
considered a fundamental right.23 This right, he argues, is a prod-
uct of natural law, and can be seen in American jurisprudential
tradition most clearly in the Declaration of Independence.24
Schroeter notes that most scholars see the Declaration of Indepen-
dence as asserting the "self-evident truths of individual dignity, the
right to be treated equally, and rights that cannot be taken from us
which are classified as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. "25
And, Schroeter argues, the most essential of these fundamental
rights is access to justice, a right that cannot be recognized without
the courts also recognizing a right to counsel.26 Proving that a right
is "fundamental," however, is an extremely tough hurdle in almost
any context.27 For a right to be considered fundamental, the court
considers whether the right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.28 It is unlikely that the right to counsel in civil
cases would be considered fundamental.29
A court could also apply a strict scrutiny test if it considered
those living in poverty a suspect class.3" Although the Court gener-
20. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 19 (observing that under a rational
basis standard, the judiciary generally gives deference to the legislature).
21. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 n.4 (1938); see also Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (detailing the strict
scrutiny test) (citations omitted).
22. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 19-31.
23. Schroeter, supra note 17, at 62.
24. Id. at 62-63.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 20 (explaining that a right is not fundamental unless it is "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution") (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (finding that education has never been considered
a fundamental right)).
28. Id.
29. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
30. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (race,
alienage, and national origin are suspect classes); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996) (finding that claiming discrimination based on poverty will not merit a strict
scrutiny analysis unless a group could show absolute deprivation).
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31ally reserves this category for discrimination based on race, in
Griffin v. Illinois,32 a case regarding the provision of free trial tran-
scripts to indigent defendants, the Supreme Court held that une-
qual treatment based on economic need is as impermissible as
discrimination based on "religion, race, or color. ' 33 In a later case
addressing the right to counsel for indigents in criminal appeals,
however, Justice Clark wrote in the dissent that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause
does not impose on the States an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.
To so construe it would be to read into the Constitution a philos-
ophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our basic con-
cepts of the proper relations between government and society.
The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils of
poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to
give to some whatever others can afford.34
In 1973, the Court appeared to embrace Justice Clark's view
when it held in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that the poor were not a
suspect class triggering strict scrutiny.35 In its holding, the Court
reasoned that, "at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages. '36 Thus, though cases like Griffin provide some hope,
an argument for a right to counsel based on an Equal Protection
argument is unlikely to prevail since it would necessitate a court
recognizing a new fundamental right or suspect class, which the Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to do.37
B. Due Process
In his article arguing for the recognition of a constitutional right
to counsel for indigents in eviction proceedings, Andrew Scherer
employs a procedural Due Process argument rather than an Equal
Protection one to argue that poor people have a legal right to
counsel when threatened by landlords with eviction from their
31. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
33. Id. at 17.
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
35. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (finding that Texas's school financing system based on
property taxes did not violate the Constitution).
36. Id. at 24.
37. See Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is Home. Why the Homeless Deserve
Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 511 (2003).
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homes.38 His article also argues that the promises of Gideon, with
respect to fair and equitable access to justice, have fallen short in
terms of the real lives of those living in poverty.39
In Mathews v. Eldridge,40 the Supreme Court created the test for
determining what constitutional due process is required when
someone is facing the loss of property.4 The framework requires
the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.42
Scherer applies the Mathews balancing test to the hypothetical of
a poor tenant faced with the loss of her home.43 He identifies the
interest at stake for indigent tenants in the case of eviction as both
a property interest and a liberty interest.44 He argues that a tenant
has a property interest in her home. A person or family that loses
in an eviction proceeding is faced with the loss of the place where
they live, and possibly the loss of possessions within the home.46
Scherer probes deeper to identify the liberty interest involved in
eviction proceedings. Quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana,47 he defines
liberty as "'the right of the citizen ... to use [his faculties] in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood
by any lawful calling; to pursue any lawful trade or vocation." 48
38. Scherer, supra note 8, at 557.
39. Id. at 562.
40. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
41. Id. at 349 (holding, in part, that "an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
the termination of [Social Security] disability benefits and that the present administra-
tive procedures fully comport with due process").
42. Id. at 335.
43. Scherer, supra note 8, at 562-79 (concluding that applying the three-factor Ma-
thews balancing test to the case of an indigent person faced with eviction supports
guaranteeing appointment of counsel).
44. Id. at 564-69.
45. Id. at 564 ("The right of the tenant to continued occupancy of his home is a
traditionally recognized property right.").
46. See id. at 564-66 (discussing the possibility that the tenant might lose his or her
home and become homeless); Evi Schueller, Unconscionable Due Process for Public
Housing Tenants, 37 U.C. DAvIs. L. REV. 1175, 1183-85 (2004) (discussing the consti-
tutionality of civil asset forfeiture).
47. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
48. Scherer, supra note 8, at 567 (quoting Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589) (alterations in
original).
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He thus identifies any procedure or policy that infringes on "the
fundamental rights of liberty" as a restraint on the individual's lib-
erty interest.49
According to Scherer, the liberty interest in the case of eviction
proceedings "is one which falls within the rubric enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services."5 In
Lassiter, the Court refused to recognize a right to counsel for peo-
ple faced with termination of their parental rights.5 1 In his decision
for the majority, Justice Stewart derives from precedent "the pre-
sumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.
52
Since the risk of eviction for the indigent tenant also carries with
it the risk of homelessness, Scherer argues that the liberty interest
involved in a poor person losing their home rises to the level of a
deprivation of physical liberty as required by Lassiter.53  As
Scherer points out, those who live on the street or in shelter sys-
tems are at risk for incarceration and institutionalization.5 4 And,
even when they are free from prisons and other institutions, they
are subject to severe restraints on their liberty.
Scherer's argument that eviction proceedings implicate physical
liberty is demonstrated in the case of United States v. Leasehold
Interest in 121 Nostrand Avenue,56 an action to enforce a forfeiture
statute against public housing tenants. In this case, the court dis-
cussed the damaging effects of homelessness and poverty in New
York City.57 Speaking of what would happen to the Smiths, the
family involved in the case if it were to lose its housing, the court
said that, despite the overcrowding in the family's apartment, the
family would be better off in its home "than they would be as at-
omized individuals in the streets, foster homes or shelters of New
York. Exclusion from their apartment risks driving the eighteen
Smith family residents far below a minimum standard for civilized
living. "58
49. Id. at 567 (defining this individual liberty interest as fundamental under the
Constitution).
50. Id. at 568.
51. 452 U.S. 18, 19 (1981).
52. Id. at 26-27.
53. Scherer, supra note 8, at 568.
54. Id.
55. Id. (noting that the homeless are at a greater risk of developing various dis-
eases and physical problems).
56. 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
57. Id. at 1023.
58. Id.
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Scherer also points to a number of the devastating effects of
homelessness to illustrate the loss of personal freedom that those
without permanent shelter experience. Homeless individuals are
more likely to suffer from chronic medical issues.5 9 Without access
to a healthy diet or the means to take care of personal hygiene,
homeless people with health problems such as epilepsy and diabe-
tes may have an extremely difficult time keeping these conditions
under control.6 ° The risk of contracting other illnesses is also high
for this population.61
Homelessness also has severe social consequences. Those who
lose their homes can also lose their connection to their communi-
ties, and the social and economic support that comes along with
community and kinship ties.62 Without a permanent address it is
also difficult for homeless people to vote or to find and keep a
job.63 Homeless children are subject to additional consequences,
including gaps in school attendance and removal from their parents
and siblings if placed in foster care.64
According to Scherer, the repercussions of homelessness make
up the liberty interest that is at stake for indigent families and indi-
viduals who are faced with the threat of eviction from their homes.
Viewed in this light, the potential loss to tenants can be compared
to the liberty interest at stake in criminal prosecutions where the
defendant risks incarceration.65
The second part of the Mathews test requires an analysis of the
risk of error in eviction proceedings, as well as the role that declar-
ing a right to counsel might have in alleviating this risk.66 The pos-
sibility of error in lopsided eviction hearings is large.67 While most
landlords are represented by counsel, most tenants facing eviction
are poor, and therefore unable to afford attorneys.68 Though there
59. Scherer, supra note 8, at 568 (citation omitted).
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 568 n.45 and accompanying text ("For example, a high incidence of se-
vere malnutrition, anemia, lice infestation and tooth decay have been documented
among homeless youth.").
62. Id. at 569 (arguing that these relationships are crucial to "one's sense of iden-
tity and well-being").
63. See id. at 569 (claiming homelessness at any age hampers a person's ability to
function as a productive member of society).
64. See id. (discussing the effects of community separation on children).
65. See id. at 563 (comparing the "equally devastating effects" of losses in criminal
courts, family courts, and housing courts).
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
67. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 571-73 ("[T]he unrepresented indigent tenant [is]
severely disadvantaged in her ability to defend an eviction case.").
68. See id.
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are a limited number of legal services available to indigent tenants,
most go through eviction proceedings pro se.69
The modern legal relationship between landlord and tenant is an
extremely complex one.70 Each party involved in an eviction pro-
ceeding has to deal with an intricate body of law, including housing
codes to protect the tenant, and legislation that limits landlords'
grounds for eviction.71 Mastery of these laws and regulations is
generally a prerequisite for either side to obtain a winning out-
come.72 It is not difficult to imagine a case in which an indigent
tenant is not aware of, or, for some other reason, is unable to pre-
sent in court valid legal defenses which could change the outcome
of a decision.73
Additionally, eviction hearings are adversarial proceedings that
require a specific knowledge of the rules of procedure and evi-
dence.74 The unrepresented, indigent litigant often does not have
any access to this knowledge or the time in which to educate her-
self about these rules. 75 Again, there is a high risk that a tenant's
absence of legal knowledge could lead to an incorrect outcome in a
case that will cost the litigant her home.76 Thus, the risk of error in
these proceedings is high.
Given the complex law involved in these proceedings, there is no
question that the side represented by experienced legal counsel has
a distinct advantage over the pro se litigant. 77 A Supreme Court
case, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services held that there was
no right to counsel in cases involving the termination of parental
rights, in part because the Court could not find a determinative
difference in outcomes resulting from having counsel for these pro-
ceedings. 78 In contrast, in their 2001 study on the impact of counsel
for poor tenants in New York City's housing court, Carroll Seron,
Gregg Van Ryzin, Martin Frankel, and Jean Kovath discovered
69. See id. at 572 n.59 (noting that only 20.8% of all tenants in New York City's
Housing Courts were represented) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 569.
71. See id. at 570 (discussing various efforts of state and federal legislatures aimed
at aiding tenants).
72. See id. at 570.
73. See, e.g., id. at 557-58 (relaying a story of indigent South Bronx tenant who
probably would have avoided eviction if she had been represented by counsel).
74. See id. at 572 (discussing the "technical and complex nature" of eviction
proceedings).
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
78. 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981).
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that the existence of legal representation had a large impact on the
outcome of eviction cases.79 Their research provided evidence that
the presence of legal representation for indigent tenants contrib-
utes to case resolutions that include fewer evictions and more rent
abatements and apartment repairs. ° Similarly, in his examination
of a study regarding eviction proceedings in New Haven, Connecti-
cut, Steven Gunn concluded that "legal services attorneys were
able to prevent or delay [tenant] evictions, helping the tenants ei-
ther to remain in their homes or to secure alternate housing with-
out suffering sudden dislocation or homelessness. ' 81
Though Scherer's Due Process analysis describes conditions ex-
isting more than twenty years ago, his article predicts that the pres-
ence of counsel would have a positive impact on the outcome of
eviction cases.82 His article identifies the heavy caseloads of hous-
ing courts as one factor that increases the disadvantage to the pro
se defendant.83 Heavy caseloads can lead courts to do less than
thorough examination of evidence and to implement time saving
devices that could violate the tenant's right to a fair hearing.84
High dockets can contribute to judicial failure to determine
whether unarticulated defenses exist. Scherer further argues that
the time pressures of court appearances and filings can intimidate
the inexperienced litigant (sometimes so much so that the litigant
agrees to an inequitable settlement). 86 Attorneys can mitigate the
effects of these time pressures and the risk of error in eviction pro-
ceedings by bringing forward legal defenses and counterclaims.87
Evaluating the third prong of the Mathews test, Scherer further
argues that no countervailing government interest outweighs the
liberty interest at stake, the risk of error, and the advantages of
having counsel in eviction proceedings.88 In fact, according to
Scherer, the government's primary interests should be to avoid
79. See Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35
LAW & Soc'y REV. 419, 419 (2001) (noting that only twenty-two percent of repre-
sented tenants had final judgments against them, while fifty-one percent of tenants
without legal representation had final judgments against them).
80. See id.
81. Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice
Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 385, 421 (1995).
82. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 573-76.
83. See id. at 573.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 573-74.
87. See id. at 575-76.
88. Id. at 576-79.
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wrongful evictions, to prevent the negative effects of homelessness,
and to ensure the quality of life of its citizens. 89 There are costs
associated with promoting these interests and the problem of lim-
ited resources must be addressed. 90 Despite these costs, Scherer
argues that the government savings resulting from the prevention
of homelessness and the provision of social services to fewer peo-
ple could offset the cost of providing counsel to indigents.91 When
all of these interests are balanced, Scherer argues that the cost to
the government of providing counsel would be outweighed by the
tremendous benefits representation in eviction proceedings would
provide.92
C. New York State Right to Counsel
Though the federal Due Process argument for the right to coun-
sel in civil cases has not yet been successful in court, there is sup-
port for the right to counsel for indigents in eviction cases through
the Due Process clauses in numerous state constitutions.93 As
Scherer notes, many state constitutions contain Due Process
clauses, and state courts have at times interpreted these clauses as
conferring broader rights than those bestowed by the federal Con-
stitution.94 For example, the New York Court of Appeals "has con-
strued broad protections from the 'unique language' of the state's
constitutional due process clause and given greater protection to
New York residents than those afforded in the U.S.
Constitution."95
In his article about eviction proceedings in New York, Karas ar-
gues that the courts should recognize the right to counsel for indi-
gent defendants based on New York State's Due Process clause. 96
Karas adds that "[w]hile the courts can do little to improve the
89. See id. at 577-78. Though increased access to counsel will certainly not cure
affordable housing shortages or homelessness, Scherer's argument is that providing
counsel and preventing wrongful evictions will at least be a big step in the right direc-
tion. Id. at 591-92.
90. See id. at 577.
91. See id. at 578-79.
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., Miss. Const. art. III, § 14 (1890) ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property except by due process of law."); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1864)
("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.").
94. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 583.
95. See Karas, supra note 8, at 541 (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.,
379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (N.Y. 1978)); see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.").
96. See Karas, supra note 8, at 543.
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New York housing market or public assistance programs, they can
demonstrate their commitment and obligation to preserve due pro-
cess of law by providing counsel for tenants faced with eviction."97
D. Provision of Expanded Legal Services
Those who argue that indigents have a legal right to counsel in
eviction cases, such as Scherer and Karas, present suggestions for
how the state could meet the demand for attorneys. 98 One option
is for states to expand current systems for appointing attorneys to
criminal defendants to include attorneys for civil cases.99 Such an
expansion would likely tend to replicate the problems that already
exist on the criminal defense side.100 In states where any member
of the bar can be appointed to defend an indigent client, the state
cannot guarantee a lawyer with expertise in the particular area for
which the client requires legal assitance.10 1 In states where courts
appoint attorneys who have voluntarily placed themselves on a list
of those willing to take indigent cases, the compensation from the
state for representing an indigent client is vastly lower than the
compensation that the lawyers could earn from a paying client. 102
Low rates serve to reduce the pool of competent attorneys who are
willing to take on these cases, and induce those who do to take on
as many cases as possible in order to make a living. 10 3 Thus, if this
system were adopted in civil cases, similar factors could contribute
to a lower quality of lawyering than is provided to the paying
client.
The state could also provide qualified attorneys to indigents in
housing cases by increasing funding for public legal services. Legal
services organizations cannot now meet the demand for represen-
97. Id. at 543.
98. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 589-91 (advocating the creation of a pool of vol-
unteer attorneys or, in the alternative, legislative funding for tenant representation);
see also Karas, supra note 8, at 556-61 (suggesting the solicitation of volunteer attor-
neys or mandatory court appointments).
99. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 8, at 590 (concluding that such an expansion
would not be the most efficient solution).
100. See id; see generally Bright, supra note 2.
101. See Bright, supra note 2, at 789 (stating that judges may appoint attorneys who
try cases quickly rather than capably).
102. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 253 (2001) (noting
that ceilings on fees for representing indigent clients can result in payment as low as
$2 an hour).
103. See id.
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tation in eviction proceedings. 104 If the courts were to recognize a
right to counsel, the legislature could accompany this finding with
an increase in funding for organizations that already have the
needed expertise for defending tenants in eviction hearings.
Though this may be appealing in theory, it seems unlikely to be
politically viable. 1 5
A third option for providing attorneys in civil cases, including
evictions, is for the state to rely on a scheme in which lawyers vol-
unteer their legal services free of charge. Unless the court en-
forced a system of mandatory pro bono service for attorneys and
law students, however, it is unlikely that supply could ever meet
demand. 10 6 The arguments for requiring all members of the bar to
provide free legal services to the poor are wide-ranging, and cer-
tainly go beyond the issue of recognizing a right to counsel in evic-
tion cases.0 7 Though the legal community has been engaged in
debate about instituting mandatory pro bono for decades and the
ABA has adopted Model Rule 6.1 which calls for the performance
of fifty hours a year of pro bono service, no state or federal govern-
ment has adopted such a system.'0 8
Though the provision of an adequate supply of attorneys for in-
digents in need of help with eviction proceedings would certainly
prove complicated, these complications do not weaken the doctri-
nal arguments for judicial-recognition of the right to counsel in
eviction cases. In fact, a judicial recognition of the right to counsel
could serve as incentive for politicians, lawyers, and scholars to
come up with creative and appropriate remedies for increasing in-
digents' access to legal services.
H. CRITIQUES OF RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The arguments against recognizing a right to representation for
indigents in eviction proceedings go beyond questions about possi-
ble methods by which the state could provide such legal represen-
104. See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that, although there
are legal resources available to indigent litigants in civil cases, the demand exceeds
the supply).
105. See id. at 4-5 (noting that those in power often view the pro bono initiatives
currently in place as sufficient to meet the needs of indigent civil litigants, thereby
rendering increased funding for such programs unnecessary).
106. See id.; Karas, supra note 8, at 557 (positing that "the supply of available attor-
neys will likely remain insufficient without a mandatory pro bono requirement").
107. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 102, at 761-74 (discussing an attorney's ethi-
cal obligation to provide pro bono services).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
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tation. Critics point to cost, increased incentive to litigate, the
likelihood that access to counsel will not rectify many structural
deficiencies in housing courts, and the possibility of increased ine-
quality within the justice system as reasons for not recognizing this
right.109 Though each of these critiques raises interesting problems,
none of them ultimately destroys the doctrinal support or the bru-
tal need for counsel for indigents facing the loss of their homes.
A. Government Cost
One critique of recognizing a right to counsel follows directly
from Scherer's position that the Due Process clause confers a fed-
eral right to counsel, and more precisely from the balancing test
put forth in Mathews v. Eldridge1 ° While Scherer and others ar-
gue that cost should be unimportant in a court's recognition of this
right to counsel,"1 one cannot ignore that the financial cost to the
government of providing legal services might arguably outweigh
other government interests in providing such services. A court
that finds that the government's interest in conserving resources
(or using resources in another manner) outweighs the personal in-
terests of people facing eviction from their homes, might reach a
different outcome than Scherer did in the Mathews balancing
test.
1 13
Proponents of the right to counsel make compelling arguments
that, no matter the cost, the government interest is served by the
provision of counsel to indigents and increased equality with re-
spect to access to justice. 1 4 Although the existence of limited re-
sources is an issue in recognizing any positive right, a judicial
109. See infra notes 110-75 and accompanying text.
110. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 563 (arguing that application of the three-pro-
nged Mathews test leads to the conclusion that indigent tenants facing eviction should
be appointed counsel).
111. See id. at 577-78 (stating that "cost alone should not deter the government
from vindicating important legal rights").
112. See Karas, supra note 8, at 547 (stating that if providing "the right to counsel
would involve mass expenditure of public monies, the courts could conclude that the
balance of interests, public and private, weigh against provision of counsel").
113. See id.
114. See Gunn, supra note 81, at 421 (concluding that counsel for indigents in evic-
tion proceedings provides an essential service to both individual tenants and society
as a whole); Karas, supra note 8, at 547 (arguing that the provision of legal services to
the poor in eviction proceedings would result in the government saving money by
reducing the amount that would need to be spent on services for the homeless);
Scherer, supra note 8, at 577-78 (concluding that the benefits, both social and finan-
cial, of providing free legal counsel to indigent tenants facing eviction outweigh the
fiscal costs).
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recognition of high cost as a legitimate governmental interest could
lead to the revocation of any number of rights, especially in times
of fiscal crisis. While advocates and policy makers would certainly
have to take government cost into account in creating an effective
system to ensure that a right to counsel is met, the financial cost to
government should not come into play in a court's determination
of whether such a constitutional right exists.115
B. Landlord Cost
On the surface, a more compelling economic argument addresses
the costs that a recognition of the right to counsel for tenants fac-
ing eviction proceedings would impose on landlords and, possibly,
tenants. In 1973, John Bolton and Stephen Holtzer published the
results of a study they had conducted concerning the effects of le-
gal representation for indigents in eviction cases in New Haven.1 6
Based on the results of this study, Bolton and Holtzer concluded
that providing legal counsel to defendants in eviction proceedings
actually increased the financial burden on poor people.
1 1 7
Bolton and Holtzer set out to assess the wider impact of legal
counsel in eviction cases in New Haven by comparing cases in
which tenants received free legal assistance with those in which te-
nants litigated pro se or were represented by private counsel.'
1 8
They examined the length of the eviction proceedings in cases
where the New Haven Legal Assistance Association ("LAA") pro-
vided tenants with legal representation, and concluded that the
presence of LAA counsel resulted in an increase in the amount of
time it took for eviction proceedings to take place.119 Bolton and
Holtzer argue that the time differential created by lawyers' zealous
representation of tenants puts financial burdens on landlords.12 °
Landlords facing tenants represented by counsel have increased le-
gal fees of their own, and they do not receive rent from tenants
pending the outcomes of these hearings. 121 These costs, according
115. See Scherer, supra note 8, at 577.
116. John Bolton & Stephen Holtzer, Legal Services and Landlord-Tenant Litiga-
tion: A Critical Analysis, 82 YALE L.J. 1495 (1973).
117. See id. at 1503.
118. See id. at 1495-97.
119. See id. at 1497-98 (noting that the time required for disposition when the ten-
ant was represented by a LAA attorney was over four times longer than when the
tenant was represented by a private attorney).
120. See id. at 1499, 1502.
121. See id.
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to Bolton and Holtzer, are then passed on to other tenants in the
form of rent increases and poorer quality in housing conditions.
1 22
Additionally, Bolton and Holtzer argue that free legal counsel in
eviction proceedings often does not alter the results. 123 They claim
that legal services lawyers usually represent tenants who are being
evicted for non-payment of rent and therefore have limited legal
defenses to eviction.124 Thus representation, while prolonging the
process and increasing costs, rarely actually prevents eviction. 125
Based on their observations about the complications with levels of
legal representation in 1973, it is likely that Bolton and Holtzer
would criticize the expansion of such services.
In response to the New Haven study and others like it, however,
Steven Gunn argues that the costs to landlords and tenants of rep-
resentation are overstated and can be explained by flaws in the
design of the studies. 26 To begin with, Bolton and Holtzer in-
cluded defendants who did not contest their evictions in their con-
trol group of unrepresented tenants.1 27 The group of represented
tenants obviously only includes those tenants who were contesting
an eviction. Since uncontested cases are quickly adjudicated, Bol-
ton and Holtzer's inclusion of these tenants in their control group
artificially enlarges the difference in length of cases where tenants
are represented and those where they are not. 128
Gunn points to another important methodological flaw within
Bolton and Holtzer's study. The authors of the study calculated all
cases where a landlord withdrew his action as successful evic-
tions.1 29 According to Gunn, this move seriously underestimates
the favorable outcomes that LAA attorneys brought about through
their representation. 130 When a landlord withdraws his eviction ac-
tion, it can often be because the parties have successfully negoti-
ated, and not because the tenant has agreed to vacate. 3 These
122. See id. at 1502-03.
123. See id. at 1498 ("[T]he landlord almost inevitably obtains judgment of
possession.").
124. See id. 1498 n.8, n.14 (discussing the limited defenses available in a summary
process action).
125. See id. at 1498 n.14 (noting that of the ninety-seven cases defended by LAA in
the sample, the tenant only obtained judgment in two).
126. See Gunn, supra note 81, at 387 (discussing the major problems in Bolton and
Holtzer's methodology).
127. Id.
128. Id. (arguing that a more appropriate control group would consist of unrepre-
sented tenants who contested their eviction).
129. Id. at 388.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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negotiations can include agreements for landlords to repair sub-
standard housing. 132  Gunn also adds that, while Bolton and
Holtzer are correct in their assertion that the majority of repre-
sented tenants were facing eviction for non-payment of rent, most
of them also had valid defenses or counterclaims. 33 Thus, accord-
ing to Gunn, while landlords might bear some costs if the judiciary
were to recognize a right to counsel, these costs do not outweigh
the overall benefits to indigent tenants or to society as a whole.13 4
C. Incentive to Litigate
Some critics oppose an increase in access to lawyers because of
fear over what they perceive as an overly-litigious society. 13 If the
right to counsel were absolute, critics say, then there would be
nothing to prevent indigent clients from bringing frivolous claims
or putting forth unmeritorious defenses. 136 Some legal scholars
have pointed out, however, that in countries where a right to coun-
sel in civil cases has already been recognized, the government has
devised successful systems by which to screen cases. 137 Addition-
ally, in eviction cases, the party with a lawyer has the opportunity
to bring any and all claims that she believes to have legal merit.
Giving this opportunity to the indigent defendant, whether or not it
increases litigiousness, is an important way for the courts to pro-
vide equal access. Finally, in eviction cases the tenant does not ini-
tiate the proceedings. Thus, while access to an attorney may
increase an indigent's incentive to fight back, it would not lead to
an increase in the number of cases brought to court.
D. Beyond the Risk of Homelessness
Scherer's Due Process argument relies on the example of a ten-
ant who becomes homeless because of an error in an eviction
case. 138 Thus, it addresses neither the larger issue of homelessness
that does not stem from a wrongful eviction, nor the problem of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 420-21.
134. Id. at 421.
135. See RHODE AND LUBAN, supra note 102, at 727 ("If parties had a right to
subsidized lawyers in any civil case, what would deter them from pursuing unmerited
claims and inflicting unwarranted costs, not only on the state.., but also on innocent
individual opponents?").
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part I.B (discussing a Due Process argument for recognizing a right
to council in eviction cases).
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tenants whose wrongful eviction would not result in homelessness.
Though it seems unlikely that any argument for increased access to
counsel could result in a solution to homelessness, it is possible to
make a Due Process argument for those tenants who do not face
homelessness as a result of eviction.
Though Scherer's description of the liberty interest at stake
when a tenant becomes homeless is compelling, focusing almost ex-
clusively on this harm weakens his argument. Instead of adopting
this approach, in her article Property and Personhood, Margaret
Radin uses the example of the relationship of a tenant to his rented
home to illustrate her conception of a "personhood" interest in
property.139 As she describes it, "[t]he premise underlying the per-
sonhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development-
to be a person-an individual needs some control over resources in
the external environment.' 140
Looking at privacy-related jurisprudence, she argues that the
home can be seen as "a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and
freedom of association. ' '114  While tenants' homes may be seen as
partially belonging to them because of the rent they have paid, and
partially belonging to the landlord, Radin argues that strong land-
lord-tenant laws actually reflect society's valuation of tenants' per-
sonhood interest in property as superior to a landlord's property
interest.142 This special relationship to the home, Radin argues,
goes beyond society's interest in providing a "sanctuary" for indi-
vidual liberty. 143 She maintains that society (and the courts) see
the home as "the scene of one's history and future, one's life and
growth." 144 Considering this conception of the home, one can see
how homelessness may be the most severe, though certainly not
the only interest at stake in eviction proceedings.
If the home is a space that embodies a person's history and fu-
ture, a forced separation from this physical space would almost un-
139. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 991-92
(1982).
140. Id. at 957 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 991. Radin discusses the case Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in
which the Supreme Court held that a state can not prosecute individuals for having
obscene materials in their home. Id. at 558. She argues that it is clear from this
decision that the Court was influenced by the traditional conception of the home be-
ing connected to autonomy and personhood. Radin, supra note 139, at 992.
142. Radin, supra note 139, at 992-93.
143. Id. at 992 (describing the state's invasion of the "sanctity of the home" as a
violation of one's personhood).
144. Id.
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doubtedly have negative psychological effects on a tenant. 45
Additionally, being forced out of one's home could dislocate a per-
son not just from the four walls of the home, but from the commu-
nity at large.' 4 6 Those who are evicted could lose their personal
connection to family, friends, and other neighbors, as well as to the
support networks that these people provide. 4 The argument for
the right to counsel in eviction cases could be bolstered if, in addi-
tion to describing the risk of homelessness, proponents pointed to
the possible loss of this personhood interest involved in evictions.
An argument that focuses primarily on the risk of homelessness
allows room for critics to argue that other reforms have alleviated
the need for the assistance of counsel. For example, in New York
City, where advocates have won a recognized right to housing for
homeless individuals, 48 the risk of homelessness after an eviction is
decreased. Thus, while a great need for indigents to have represen-
tation in eviction cases may still exist, the liberty interest at stake
would no longer appear to tip the scales in the Mathews test.
E. The Exaggerated Role of the Attorney
Other criticisms of focusing on a right to counsel stem from an
argument that such strategies rely on an exaggerated vision of the
power of the advocate. In her article about housing court in Balti-
more, Barbara Bezdek identifies the source of inequitable out-
comes as being broader than a lack of legal representation. 149 She
argues that the mostly female, black, and poor tenants15 0 that come
through the court are "silenced by dynamics occurring in and
around the court room. This is due both to differences in speech
and to dissonant interpretations between speakers and listeners,
since they do not share a culture of claiming."151 Bezdek's study
does point to better outcomes for tenants who had the assistance of
another person in housing court.152 This assistance, however, did
not have to come from a lawyer to produce a better outcome for a
145. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
147. See id.
148. See Callahan v. Carey, 762 N.Y.S.2d 349, 349 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that a
1981 consent decree required New York State to provide temporary shelter to home-
less individuals).
149. See Bezdek, supra note 11, at 539-40 (offering a critique of the standard "ac-
cess to justice" analysis).
150. See id. at 540.
151. Id. at 536.
152. Id. at 562.
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tenant.153 This observation leads Bezdek to speculate that "quali-
ties other than legal representation" are important in overcoming
the silencing effect of housing court.154 Thus, while the presence of
an attorney may help an individual tenant articulate legal claims
and defenses, a recognition of the right to counsel might not signifi-
cantly alter the bias of the court towards landlords. 55
Persuasive arguments about the potential pitfalls of recognizing
a right to counsel for poor people come from Gary Bellow and
Jeanne Kettleson in their 1978 article about fairness in public inter-
est practice. 56 Bellow and Kettleson's argument grows out of an
understanding the inequities in the administration of justice in this
country, and the disadvantages that are largely borne by poor peo-
ple and other groups who do not have access to legal counsel. 57
Despite this understanding, Bellow and Kettleson express real con-
cern about a large scale expansion of the number of lawyers in-
volved in resolving disputes.158
Bellow and Kettleson begin their analysis discussing arguments
in favor of recognizing a right to counsel for indigents in civil
cases. 159 They point to the enormous gap between the demand for
legal services for the poor and the legal services actually provided,
and recognize that publicly-funded legal services can provide indi-
gent clients with their only opportunity for meaningful access to
and participation in the legal system.' 60
After pointing out the relative advantage in the justice system
for those who have counsel, however, Bellow and Kettleson pro-
ceed to argue that the provision of access to this counsel will not
effectively address the inequalities that are built into our system.16 1
They argue instead that lawyers, even in larger numbers, are un-
likely to substantively alter the balance of power in the United
States. 162 In fact, Bellow and Kettleson examine the possibility
that increased representation could potentially perpetuate the
153. See id. (noting that most in-court assistance is, in fact, given by non-attorneys).
154. Id. at 563.
155. Cf. id. (observing that "landlords' interests occupy the bench [in housing
courts] at every moment").
156. See generally Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 4.
157. See id. at 379.
158. See id. at 379-80.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 379.
161. See id. (noting that the legal disadvantages facing public interest lawyers are
"rooted in deeply entrenched patterns of inequality and exclusion").
162. Id. at 379-80.
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same inequalities of the system that lead to the need for publicly-
funded legal services. 63
Though Bellow and Kettleson agree that there is a short-term
benefit by providing attorneys to the poor, they maintain that the
bar and members of the legal profession cannot hope to provide
the poor meaningful access to justice until they reexamine the
repercussions of having an intensely adversarial, complicated, and
professionalized system.164 They argue that while expansion of this
system might seem like the best way to level the playing field, in
the long run, this expansion might actually "intensify the legal dis-
advantages that public interest law is supposed to ameliorate. 165
Bellow and Kettleson maintain that proponents of the right to
counsel for indigents in civil cases must consider the likelihood that
providing legal services to everyone in an unequal society "may
exacerbate the very problems of unfairness and inequality that ac-
cess is ultimately intended to resolve. 1 66
Bellow and Kettleson claim that arguments for recognizing a
right to counsel and for expanding the provision of legal services
tend to ignore the realities that accompany these services. 167 Be-
cause legal services lawyers often have the power to decide what
becomes defined as a "legal problem," as their numbers and fund-
ing increase, lawyers would tend to include more and more
problems within the universe of legally addressable issues.' 68 Sup-
ply would once again be dwarfed by demand, and the expansion of
legal services would simply replicate the problems with access that
currently exist, but on an even-larger scale.169 Thus, even if a court
were to recognize a right to counsel in civil cases, the problem of
scarcity, and the economic and social inequalities that go hand-in-
hand with this scarcity, would persist.170
163. See id.
164. Id. at 379 (arguing that the inherent flaws of our social and political institu-
tions present problems of scarcity and fairness that cannot be solved merely by inject-
ing more public interest lawyers into the system).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 379-80.
167. Id. at 380.
168. See id. ("[D]efinitions of legal need are not static.").
169. See id. (noting that "demand for services will increase to the limits of available
supply").
170. Id. at 383. The authors point out that disadvantaged clients often do not have
the resources to take advantage of litigation gains. Id. For example, a client who wins
a lawsuit requiring special education services for her child may not have transporta-
tion to parent conferences, easy telecommunication services to contact the school, or
money to pay for a lawyer who could help this child as he grows and his educational
needs change. Id. at 383 n.177.
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Instead of an expansion of legal services, Bellow and Kettleson
call for a re-conception of the role of the lawyer." t Though they
think that the bar should support the provision of more lawyers for
the poor in the short term, they argue that in order to create
change at this level, the ABA needs to amend the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. 17 2 They believe that the bar should al-
ter the code to proscribe one side taking advantage of the other
side's ignorance or inexperience with the law.' 73 Their vision of the
code would also demand that lawyers make efforts to prevent seri-
ous personal injury to any party, require attorneys who are going
up against pro se litigants to advise them how and why to get coun-
sel, and compel such attorneys to communicate to the court any
valid defenses that they reasonably believe could be available to
the unrepresented side.174 According to Bellow and Kettleson,
these changes would "remove a particularly unwarranted competi-
tive edge of those who are experienced in using legal institutions,"
no matter the size of the legal system. 175
III. SOLUTIONS FOR INDIGENT TENANTS
A. Beyond the Model Rules
Since Bellow and Kettleson made their arguments in 1978, poor
people and advocates have watched the federal government de-
crease its commitment to legal services and set limits on the way
that publicly funded providers are allowed to serve their clients.7
In this light, arguments about the futility of looking to the expan-
sion of legal services as a way to address inequities are more con-
vincing than ever. Bellow and Kettleson's model for change,
however, has flaws of its own. These flaws become particularly ap-
parent when examined in light of the arguments for a right to coun-
sel in eviction cases.
Lack of counsel for indigents facing the loss of their homes is
much more than an indicator of the inequities of our system of
171. Id. at 384-85.
172. Id. at 386-87. Since Bellow and Kettleson's article was published in 1977, the
Model Rules have been amended. These amendments, however, have not incorpo-
rated Bellow and Kettleson's proposed amendments.
173. Id. at 387.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. See Legal Services Corporation Restrictions-Fact Sheets, at http://www.bren-
nancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheets.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2004) (presenting
fact sheets regarding the restrictions on funding from the Legal Services Corporation
for bringing class actions, representing aliens, and soliciting clients).
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justice. The deficiency of legal services for tenants is a reality that
leads to increased homelessness, poverty, and disenfranchise-
ment.177 As advocates have pointed out, tenants who have the as-
sistance of counsel fare better than those who do not in eviction
proceedings. 178 Therefore, though legal assistahce will not correct
all of the inequities in housing court nor the larger problem of
homelessness, and despite the potential pitfalls associated with in-
creasing the size of the adversary system, advocates must make ar-
guments that indigent tenants have a right to access legal advice
and representation. Bellow and Kettleson do recognize the need
to increase the adversarial system in the short term, but they de-
emphasize the necessity of providing lawyers for the poor in favor
of an emphasis on reforming the Model Rules. 179 Though it is cru-
cial for advocates to look at possibilities for long term systemic
change if they are truly committed to providing equal access to jus-
tice, in reality poor tenants do not have the luxury of relying on
idealistic procedural solutions to the problem of eviction.
While Bellow and Kettleson are rightfully cautious about em-
bracing a wholesale expansion of legal services to include attorneys
for poor people in all civil cases, they do not address the possibili-
ties of a slower, piecemeal expansion. Such an expansion would
require the courts to create a hierarchy of legal needs, and to de-
clare a right to counsel in areas where the need is the most press-
ing. The courts could erase the possibility of lawyers expanding the
universe of problems to be addressed by the legal system by
describing the problems (e.g. eviction proceedings) to be addressed
from the outset. In essence, this is what the Mathews balancing test
allows courts to do: evaluate the need for a right to counsel in spe-
cific areas. With these limits, Bellow and Kettleson would not be
able to subject the expansion of legal services to the same analysis
as the declaration of a right to counsel in general. The judiciary
could have a huge impact on peoples' lives by recognizing a right to
counsel in eviction proceedings, and they could do this without in-
creasing the number of issues resolved by the adversarial process.
In addition to de-emphasizing short term solutions, Bellow and
Kettleson rely too heavily on the ABA and the Model Rules to
precipitate a radical change in lawyers' perceptions of their roles.
In theory, the Model Rules are the governing ethical code of all
attorneys. In as much as the Model Rules reflect the aspirations
177. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
179. See Bellow and Kettleson, supra note 4, at 386-88.
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and ideals of the legal profession, the bar should amend them to
reflect any shift in understanding of the lawyer's role. But in light
of the marginalization of public service and ethics among lawyers,
it is unlikely that advocates could successfully use the Model Rules
to overturn deeply-entrenched understandings of the lawyer as a
zealous advocate and a player in an adversarial system. °
To create a widespread change in the lawyer's role, advocates
need to start their project at the training academies for the next
generation of lawyers. Law schools do teach professional responsi-
bility and ethics, but these topics remain "no better than a second
class subject in the eyes of students and faculty.' 18 1 Most law
schools do not even require students to take a legal ethics class
until their upper class years. 182 By the second year, students have
already taken a number of law classes, and their professors may
not have asked them to think about the Model Rules or other
sources of ethical standards while learning and applying legal doc-
trine. Thus, it is unlikely that a shift in the understanding of a law-
yer's role embodied in the Model Rules will have a large trickle
down effect on law students.
In order to make the changes in a lawyer's perception of her role
that Bellow and Kettleson recognize as necessary to promote
equality in the justice system, law school faculties and administra-
tors, along with practitioners, need to be on the front lines of any
push for change. Law schools need to place more emphasis on le-
gal ethics and change the content of such classes.' 83
If courts were to recognize the right to counsel for indigents in
eviction cases and in other situations where the stakes are similarly
high, many more attorneys could end up representing indigent cli-
ents and being forced to face the inequities that are built in to our
adversary system. Perhaps a critical mass of attorneys, confronted
with and frustrated by these inequities, would serve as the impetus
for a widespread recognition of the need for change in the lawyer's
role. In the meantime, however, it is crucial for us to look for sub-
stantive solutions to the lack of affordable housing and homeless-
180. See generally Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's
Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001) (discussing the role of the modern
lawyer).
181. Russell G. Pearce, Legal Ethics Must Be the Heart of the Law School Curricu-
lum, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 159 (2001-2002).
182. Id. at 160 n.7.
183. See id. at 160 (discussing the place of ethics in law school curricula).
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ness that can make immediate and concrete differences in people's
lives.
B. Problem-Solving Courts and the Active Judge
Other substantive solutions that could produce better outcomes
for tenants lie in between the recognition of a right to counsel and
a complete transformation in the conception of the lawyer's role.
For example, in recent years, most states have experimented with
so called "problem-solving courts.' 1 84 Such courts are usually
structured to handle the whole range of a person's legal and social
issues at once, and to provide solutions to these problems that ben-
efit the community in which the courts are situated. 185 It is possible
that these courts, which generally aim to give voice to a litigant's
story, could alleviate the "silencing" problem identified by
Bezdek. 86 This might serve to reduce error and allow a forum for
a tenant's argument to be articulated without the presence of
counsel.
In a talk about the Harlem Community Justice Center, Rolando
Acosta, the presiding judge, discussed the benefits of handling
housing issues in a non-traditional court. 18 7 Through the Housing
Court that is part of the Justice Center, judges are able to "increase
the stability and improve the overall health of the housing stock in
Upper Manhattan . . . by linking tenants to service and benefit
providers, to city and state government and other local service
providers.118 8 In such courts, the judge and other court employees
take on the role of monitors, trying to ensure that the landlord re-
ceives the rent and the tenant receives decent housing. 189 Though
many states' attempts at problem-solving courts are still in the ex-
perimental stages, these courts may actually be able to help circum-
vent the risk of homelessness and the lack of affordable, decent
housing.
Additionally, judges who preside over traditional housing courts
where the average litigant is proceeding pro se may have the power
184. See generally Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief
Primer, 23 LAW & POL'Y (2001), available at http:// www.courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob-solvcourts.pdf.
185. Id; see also, Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem Solving Ap-
proach, 22 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 125, 127-28 (2004).
186. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Roland Acosta, The Birth of a Problem-Solving Court, 29 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1758 (2002).
188. Id. at 1762.
189. See id.
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to impact fairer outcomes. In his article addressing solutions to the
"pro se crisis," 190 Russell Engler argues that the traditional role of
the judge is based on the assumption that in an adversarial system,
both parties are represented by counsel. 191 Since this idealized ver-
sion of the system does not describe the reality of most housing
courts, Engler argues that it is appropriate for judges, mediators,
and clerks in these courts to reexamine their traditional roles.192
Though the traditional role of the judiciary is one of impartiality,' 93
Engler proposes that the housing court itself should provide help
to the unrepresented party and should explain to all parties why it
is giving more aid to one party than the other.194 This help can
consist of giving legal advice, calling witnesses, and conducting di-
rect or cross-examinations for the pro se litigant. 195 As Engler
states, a judge "must be as active as necessary to ensure that the
legal system's promise of fairness and substantial justice is not frus-
trated by the litigant's appearance without a lawyer. 19 6 A judge
who is willing to seek justice actively for the tenant in housing
court can fill some of the void left by the absence of counsel, thus
maintaining the overall impartiality of the system. 197
CONCLUSION
Overall, advocates make very strong legal, practical, and moral
arguments for a recognition of a right to counsel in eviction cases.
In order for the poor to have any sort of meaningful access to jus-
tice in complicated and high stakes eviction proceedings, it seems
crucial and just for the courts to recognize this right. As critics
point out, however, when we look towards expansion as a way to
solve social and political problems, we must be critical of the sys-
tem we are expanding. Advocates for expanding the right to coun-
sel must take precautions not to replicate the weaknesses of the
adversarial system, thus amplifying the system's negative effects
and its contribution to inequality. With a combined effort, how-
ever, the courts, law schools, and practicing professionals may actu-
ally create lasting change in a system which now produces so much
inequality.
190. Engler, supra note 6, at 1987.
191. See id. at 1988.
192. See id. at 1990.
193. See id. at 2023.
194. See id. at 2023-24, 2028.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 2028
197. See id. at 2028-31.
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IN PURSUIT OF SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OCC'S
ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING STANDARD
Diana McMonagle*
To borrow a concept from the animal kingdom . . . a classic
predator traps the unwary and preys on the weak. Put in the
lending context, a predatory lender ensnares ... vulnerable cus-
tomers, offering loan products designed to prey on their weak-
ness, bleed them financially and . . . strip them of their most
precious possessions.1
PROLOGUE
George Campbell lived his entire life in the same home in
Queens, New York.' Disabled, living solely on monthly Supple-
mental Security Income checks, Mr. Campbell had one significant
financial asset: the value of his home appreciated substantially over
the years and he amassed considerable equity in the property.3 A
few years ago, an aggressive mortgage broker persuaded Mr.
Campbell to take out a second mortgage to finance much-needed
repairs.4 The broker claimed Mr. Campbell, with neither a check-
ing account nor an established credit history, was ineligible for a
bank loan.5 Unable to read well, Mr. Campbell did not understand
his obligations under the agreement; like countless other unsus-
pecting borrowers in the United States, Mr. Campbell became the
victim of a predatory lender.6 The terms of the mortgage required
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A., Political Sci-
ence, Fordham University, 2001. I wish to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for in-
troducing me to the topic of predatory lending and for her invaluable guidance in
developing my ideas. Special thanks to Christiana Brennan for her constructive ad-
vice and ceaseless encouragement. This Comment is dedicated to my family, Karen,
Jack, and Kristen McMonagle, whom I credit for all my accomplishments.
1. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, The Predatory Lending Challenge, 61
MORTGAGE BANKING 117, 118 (2000).
2. See, Dennis Hevesi, New Curbs on Predatory Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2002, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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monthly payments almost equal to Mr. Campbell's social security
income.7 Predictably, he defaulted.8
INTRODUCTION
Predatory lenders are unscrupulous, aggressively marketing their
loans to borrowers who cannot afford their credit on the onerous
terms offered. Their prey are some of the most vulnerable mem-
bers of society: the elderly, persons living in low-income areas, the
socially and economically disadvantaged, the financially unsophisti-
cated. The consequences are devastating, and include enormous
personal losses, foreclosures on homes, and the devastation that
foreclosure brings to entire neighborhoods. Many common abu-
sive lending practices are already illegal under federal law,9 yet
predatory lending continues to destroy communities. 10
In response to this escalating problem, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC"), a federal regulator of the na-
tional banking industry, issued a Final Rule on January 7, 2004
("Final Rule").11 The OCC has always prohibited banks from en-
gaging in predatory lending, but difficulties defining "predatory"
and the problematic application of conflicting state-lending laws
has caused significant supervisory and enforcement problems. 2
The Final Rule addresses these problems and sets forth a uniform
federal standard to guide banking policies on predatory practices
and to aid regulators' identification of predatory loans. 3 The Final
Rule forbids national banks from making consumer loans, includ-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914)
(prohibiting deceptive and unfair trade practices); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1666 (1968) (imposing disclosure requirements in lending); Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994) (protecting against certain high-
rate and high-fee loans); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2002) (prohibiting
loan flipping under certain circumstances).
10. See Hevesi, supra note 2.
11. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2004); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
12. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Fi-
nal Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers; Includes Strong Stan-
dard to Keep Predatory Lending Out of National Banks (Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter
OCC Final Rule Press Release], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/New-
sRelease.aspx?Doc=ZN918H7T.xml. Before promulgation of the Final Rule, national
banks were subject to state as well as federal anti-predatory lending laws. Id. This
caused regulatory problems for banks with branches in states with inconsistent laws.
Id.
13. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
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ing mortgage loans, car loans, and student loans, 4 based predomi-
nantly on the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral.15 The
rationale lies in the OCC's belief that the value of a borrower's
collateral does not indicate their ability to repay the loan. As a
result, such loans are now per se predatory, and for that reason,
prohibited. 6
The Final Rule also preempts several categories of state banking
laws 7 that are no longer enforceable against national banks.'
8
States now have little authority to regulate the lending practices of
those national banks situated within their jurisdictions.19 Specifi-
cally, the Final Rule preempts state regulation of lending licenses,
loan terms, interest rates, terms of credit, disclosure requirements,
and other conditions of lending.2" The Final Rule also codifies the
judge-made determination that the OCC has authority to enforce
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act")2 and
regulations thereunder against unfair and deceptive trade practices
in banking.22
Effectively, as a result of the Final Rule national banks are no
longer subject to state anti-predatory lending laws.23 The OCC
14. See Memorandum from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Pre-
emption Final Rule Questions and Answers 7 (Jan. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.go4/2004-3dPreemptionQNAs.pdf.
15. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
16. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
17. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(d), 34.4(a). Pursuant to the National Bank Act, the
OCC has authority to issue preemption regulation. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a); see also CSBS
v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has authority under the National Bank Act to issue regulations preempting
state laws that are inconsistent with national banking activities).
18. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007-7.4009. The OCC's authority to preempt state laws
that place limitations and restrictions on national banks is based on constitutional
principles under the Supremacy Clause. See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819) (applying the doctrine of preemption to banking regulation).
19. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008. The Final Rule also identifies those state laws that are
not preempted. State laws that only incidentally affect lending are not preempted,
including state regulation over matters pertaining to contract law, debt collection
remedies, zoning restrictions, tort law, rules for the transfer of property, tax law, crim-
inal law, and homestead rights. Id.; 12 C.F.R. §34.4(b).
20. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4.
21. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914). The Final
Rule gives the OCC authority to enforce the FTC Act. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c),
34.3(c). Yet, the OCC's authority is limited to enforcement alone and the Federal
Reserve maintains exclusive authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the
FTC Act. § 15 U.S.C. 45(a).
22. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
23. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.4.
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standard has replaced a multitude of state laws, and national banks
are now only accountable to the OCC and its single standard.24
This Comment will analyze the potential ineffectiveness and pos-
sible consequences of the OCC's anti-predatory lending standard
and argue that, despite the perceived comfort in having a single
federal standard for evaluating predatory lending, the standard set
forth in the Final Rule is inadequate, and inherently flawed.
Part I of this Comment attempts to define predatory lending and
distinguishes predatory lending from non-predatory subprime
lending. Part I also explains the OCC's role in regulating preda-
tory lending. 6 Part II examines the standard set forth in the Final
Rule and analyzes it in light of the agency's justifications for adopt-
ing the rule,27 which include agency concerns for the maintenance
of the safety and soundness of the national banking system and the
goal of ensuring fair and equal access to financial services for all
Americans. 8 Part II concludes that the OCC's preemption of state
anti-predatory lending laws and substitution of a single anti-preda-
tory lending standard cannot reasonably be justified on these
grounds.29 Part II also explores the potential negative social and
economic consequences that this regulation may have for low-in-
come borrowers.3 ° Part II suggests that this effect may increase the
predatory lending problem by forcing these individuals to seek sub-
prime loans from the largely unregulated non-bank sector, the seg-
ment of the financial industry notorious for committing predatory
lending. 31 Part III proposes a solution to ameliorate the potential
social and economic costs of the regulation.32 It suggests that the
OCC should interpret and enforce the regulation so that it only
prohibits loans extended with a calculated intent to foreclose, and
provides guidelines for determining a bank's intent.33
24. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(e), 34.4(b).
25. See infra notes 34-65 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 66-88 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 89-165 and. accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 99-165 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 109-33, 139-65 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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I. PREDATORY LENDING IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THE
ROLE OF THE OCC
A. Defining the Problem
John D. Hawke, Comptroller of the Currency, defines predatory
lending as "the aggressive marketing of credit to people who sim-
ply cannot afford it."'34 This may be an oversimplification. Other
commentators argue that the term in fact applies to a catalogue of
exploitative lending practices that generally fall into one of two
categories.3 1 The first consists of illegal and unconscionable lend-
ing tactics, such as forging signatures on loan documents, fraudu-
lently misrepresenting the terms of a loan, double billing, hidden
fees, and charging for services that were never rendered. 36 The
second category addresses activities which are not as obviously
abusive--legal lending practices which are misused by unprinci-
pled lenders. This includes loan flipping,37 equity stripping, 38 high
interest rates and hidden fees, 39 among other abusive lending prac-
tices. 40 Still others believe that the term defies traditional defini-
34. John D. Hawke, Jr., Remarks Before The Federalist Society (July 24, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-57a.pdf.
35. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization,
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 513 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Loan flipping is the frequent refinancing of a loan, where the service fees and
credit insurance costs are financed by the loan so that the principal continually rises,
even as the borrower makes payments on the loan. For a discussion of the Federal
Reserve Board's attempt to curb predatory loan flipping, see Michael J. Pyle, Com-
ment, A "Flip" Look at Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End
Abusive Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919, 1924 (2003) (analyzing the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's Regulation Z prohibiting certain forms of loan flipping).
38. In mortgage lending, equity stripping refers to two related practices. One is
the practice of lending to individuals with considerable equity in their home who have
no means to repay the loan. See Better Business Bureau, Beware of Predatory Prac-
tices in Home Mortgage Lending, at http://bbb.org/alerts/article.asp?ID=240 (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2004). When the homeowner defaults the lender forecloses and sells the
home, stripping the borrower of his equity. Id. The term also applies to the practice
where lenders charge excessive fees at closing that are paid out of the borrower's
equity. See ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LEND-
ING 4 (2001), available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/Quantl0-01.pdf. This
practice is particularly deceptive because when paid out of equity the borrower "does
not feel the pain of counting out thousands of dollars in cash. The borrower parts
with the money only later, when the loan is paid off and the equity value remaining in
his or her home is reduced by the amount of fees owed." Id.
39. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 513.
40. See, e.g., id. at 512-14; ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS FOR RE-
FORM Now, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA
(2002) (outlining the scope of predatory lending in the subprime market) [hereinafter
ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002], available at http://www.acorn.org/
index.php?id=102.
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tion, since it encompasses loan terms and products that, on their
face, are impossible to differentiate from legitimate lending prac-
tices.4 1 These commentators instead characterize predatory lend-
ing on a "you know [it] when you see it" 42 basis, recognizing that
any practice "targeted at vulnerable populations [that causes] dev-
astating personal losses, including bankruptcy, poverty, and fore-
closure" is predatory.43
Another problem in defining predatory lending arises because
predatory lending occurs primarily in the subprime market. 44 Sub-
prime loans are loans with higher interest rates designed for bor-
rowers who would not qualify for loans at the prime rate because
of a blemished, or nonexistent, credit history.45 The emergence
and growth of the subprime market is considered a national eco-
nomic success, 4 6 and has given low-income borrowers access to
credit where they did not have access before. 47 By allowing fami-
lies and individuals who are ineligible for prime rate loans to ob-
tain subprime rate mortgages, the increased availability of
subprime credit has been critical in aiding a recent increase in rates
of homeownership.48 Subprime lending has also been credited with
increasing mortgage lending to minority borrowers, particularly
Hispanics and African-Americans during the 1990s. 49 The difficult
question is whether regulators can proscribe predatory lending
while at the same time encouraging beneficial subprime lending.
While not all subprime lenders are predatory, nearly all preda-
tory loans are subprime.50 Although predatory loans constitute
only a subset of subprime lending, the whole is sometimes mis-
41. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 513.
42. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1261.
45. See id.
46. See ROBERT E. LITAN, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE RISKS OF PREMA-
TURE STATE REGULATION OF PREDATORY LENDING (2003) (noting that national sub-
prime mortgage originations increased from $34 billion in 1994 to over $173 billion in
2001), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-1C75-11D5-AB7B-
00508B95258D/28871/PredReport200991.pdf.
47. See Charles W. Calomiris & Robert E. Litan, Homeownership That's Too Im-
portant to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A17.
48. Cf. Litan, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that subprime mortgage lending in-
creased from $34 billion in 1994 to over $160 billion in 1999).
49. See id.
50. Prepared Testimony of John. D. Hawke, Jr. Comptroller of the Currency:
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (May 24, 2000)
[hereinafter Testimony of Comptroller Hawke].
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taken for the part, resulting in an overly-broad and inaccurate defi-
nition.5 1 A primary distinction between subprime and predatory
lending lies in the lender's intent in extending the loan.52 Preda-
tory lenders profit from intentionally and systematically taking ad-
vantage of unsophisticated borrowers, and purposefully structure
loans to cause economic harm to the borrower--at a significant
profit for the lender.5 3 Non-predatory subprime lenders lend with
a different intent, that is, to provide valuable credit to individuals
with a higher risk of default. The higher interest and foreclosure
rates that accompany subprime loans result from the additional
risk inherent in lending to an individual with imperfect credit, not
from intentional planning on the part of the lender. The substance
of "ground level" interactions between the lender and the bor-
rower is often indicative of a lender's intent.54 Some lenders inten-
tionally seek out vulnerable loan candidates,55 going so far as to
review public property lien records to find homeowners with seri-
ous debt. 6 After identifying their victims, these lenders become
salesmen, aggressively promoting loans that the frequently desper-
ate borrowers cannot afford.
Predatory lenders prey on the most vulnerable members of soci-
ety.5 7 Their typical victims are financially unsophisticated individu-
als 58 who are often "disconnected" from the traditional credit
51. See id.
52. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1260. Engel & McCoy have set forth a
list of five characteristics that distinguish predatory lending from legitimate subprime
lending:
1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers,
2) harmful rent seeking,
3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices,
4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as
fraud, and
5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Id.
53. See id.
54. Williams & Bylsma, supra note 1, at 118.
55. Intentionally targeting low-income borrowers for high cost loans is commonly
referred to as "reverse redlining." See Anne-Marie Motto, Note, Skirting the Law:
How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2002).
56. See Sandra Block, Guidelines Can Help Reduce Risk of Foreclosure, USA To-
DAY, Sept. 20, 2002, at 3B.
57. Cf. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEOUAL 2002, supra note 40, at 1 (showing
that the poor and minorities are victims of predatory lending at significantly higher
rates than white and more affluent individuals).
58. See Michelle W. Lewis, Perspectives on Predatory Lending: The Philadelphia
Experience, 12 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 491, 508 (2003). Financially
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economy,59 in that they have limited experience with banks and
often have not developed an official credit history.6" Often, these
borrowers have relied on the "fringe" credit market: check cashing
establishments, pawnshops, and other local businesses that offer
credit and limited financial services at significantly higher fees than
traditional banks.61
Victims of predatory lending are also generally from low-income
communities. 62 This is partly because low-income borrowers often
seek loans when they are desperate for cash, and may not have the
information or ability to properly compare lenders,63 making them
more susceptible to aggressive predatory lenders.64 In addition,
this class of borrowers makes up a greater percentage of the class
of victims adversely affected by predatory lenders, because low-
income individuals generally have fewer resources than more afflu-
ent individuals, and are more liable to default.65
B. The Role of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Concerns about the growth of predatory lending abuses
prompted action by the OCC,66 a bureau of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury charged with regulating the national banking sys-
tem.67 The OCC, under the direction of Comptroller Hawke, char-
ters new banks and has exclusive "visitorial powers" to examine
and supervise the affairs of existing national banks.68 Its primary
goal is to maintain stability and fair competition within the banking
system. 69 The agency breaks this goal down into four objectives.
The first is to ensure the safety and soundness of the national bank-
unsophisticated victims fall into three categories: "[T]hose who know too little (who
need education and information), those who know too much (who are afraid to ask
questions), and those who expect something for nothing (who are attracted to
promises of 'buy now, don't pay until 2005')." Id.
59. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1281.
60. For purposes of this Comment, "official credit history" refers to an individual's
credit history as recorded on their credit report.
61. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1281.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1282.
64. Id. at 1281-82.
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 5-18.
67. See The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1864) (authorizing the Comptrol-
ler to hire a staff to supervise and examine national banks).
68. See 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2004).
69. See About the OCC, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2004).
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ing system.7" That is, to maintain the financial health of banks and
the integrity of the banking system.71 Second, the agency aims to
foster competition by allowing banks to offer new products and
services. 72 The third goal is to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of the OCC.73 Finally, the agency strives to ensure fair and
equal access to financial services for all Americans.74 This Com-
ment focuses on the first and last of these objectives.
The OCC is not the sole federal regulator of the national bank-
ing system. 75 The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation also have regulatory authority.76 Banks pick
their primary regulator when they elect to have either a national or
a state charter.77 The OCC is responsible for the nationally
chartered banks,78 whereas the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation regulate -the state chartered
banks. 79 Some commentators believe that this competition influ-
ences the substance of banking regulations ° because banks' ability
to choose their regulator creates a competitive atmosphere 81 by
"enabl[ing] banking organizations to shop for the most lenient reg-
ulator."'82 These commentators believe that this competition fuels
a "race to the bottom, '83 where the regulators, in an attempt to
70. See id.
71. Safety and soundness regulations aim to control a bank's exposure to risk,
often by imposing financial safeguards such as minimum capital requirements and
limitations on risky endeavors. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 75 (3d ed. 2001).
72. See About the OCC, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 75; see also John A. Weinberg, Competition Among Bank Regulators,
88 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. 19 (2002).
78. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
79. State chartered banks are also subject to regulation by the state in which they
are chartered. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 19.
80. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70.
81. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 19.
82. MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 74-75.
83. Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20 (discussing how proposals to restructure and
consolidate bank regulation are partly based on the idea that regulators are currently
engaged in a race to the bottom). But see RICHARD J. ROSEN, Do REGULATORS
SEARCH FOR THE QUIET LIFE? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATORS AND THE
REGULATED IN BANKING (2001) (explaining that competition can be beneficial, as
banks tend to improve their performance following a switch from one regulator to
another and that under certain conditions, regulatory competition leads to optimal
standard setting), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/
papers/wp2001-05.pdf.
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attract new banks to their constituency and to retain the banks that
they already regulate, 84 will comply with industry demands.85
Commentators claim that this often results in regulations that dis-
proportionately favor the industry at the expense of the agency's
interest in managing bank operations86 and the public interest.87
The OCC is particularly susceptible to the pressures of competition
because, unlike most federal agencies, it is funded entirely by the
banks it regulates, in the form of examination fees. 88
II. T;IE OCC's RESPONSE TO THE PREDATORY
LENDING PROBLEM
The OCC has made clear its position that predatory lending
practices "whether in connection with mortgage lending or other
national bank activities ... have no place in the national banking
system. '8 9 Such practices are inconsistent with the agency's goals
of fair access to credit for all Americans, community development
and renewal, and increased opportunities for homeownership. 90
In February 2003, the OCC issued an Advisory Letter addressing
its views on predatory lending ("Advisory Letter"). 91 The Advi-
sory Letter communicated the OCC's position that predatory lend-
ing would not be tolerated in the banking system.92 It provided
banks with notice of what practices the agency considered preda-
tory, and guidlines for avoiding the purchase of predatory loans
originated by third parties.93 It also advised banks as to what lend-
84. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20.
85. See, e.g., Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Before the House Comm.
on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. (2004) (state-
ment of Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa), available at http://financialser-
vices.house.gov/media/pdf/012804tm.pdf.
86. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 20.
87. See ROSEN, supra note 83, at 5.
88. MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 70. Since the agency's budget depends exclu-
sively on the number of banks it regulates, there is a great incentive for the OCC to
make its regulations lenient and favorable to industry, so as not to lose "market
share" to another regulator. Id. at 75; see also Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Dependent
on Lenders' Fees, the OCC Takes Banks Side Against Local Laws, WALL ST. J., Jan.
28, 2002, at Al.
89. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (20g4); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
90. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2,
Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices (Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2], available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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ing practices may be considered unfair and deceptive under Section
5 of the FTC Act.94 According to the Comptroller, the purpose of
the Advisory Letter was to provide guidance "to deal effectively
with predatory lending without setting up a rigid system that cre-
ates burdens and obstacles to serve low-income customers. 95
Despite the Comptroller's previous interest in avoiding a "rigid
system," the OCC issued the Final Rule on January 7, 2004,96 con-
tradicting its previously stated intent.97 The Rule sets forth a single
anti-predatory lending standard ("Standard"), which provides that
"[a] national bank shall not make a consumer loan . . . based
predominantly on the bank's realization of the foreclosure or liqui-
dation value of the borrower's collateral, without regard to the bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan according to its terms." 98 Notably
missing from the rule is any reference to the bank's intent in ex-
tending the loan. Under the Standard a lender who intends to take
advantage of a borrower is treated the same as a lender who lends
in the possibly negligent, though earnest, hope that the borrower
will be able to fulfill the terms of the loan.
A. Analysis of the Standard and the OCC's Objectives
The OCC relies on two agency objectives in support of its adop-
tion of the Final Rule: the maintenance of the safety and soundness
of the national banking system, and the provision of fair and equal
access to financial services for all Americans.
94. Id. According to the Advisory Letter, practices may be labeled deceptive if
"[t]here is a representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead; [t]he act
or practice would likely mislead a reasonable consumer [in the targeted audience];
and the representation, omission, act, or practice is likely to mislead in a material
way." Id. In addition, a practice may be labeled unfair for purposes of the FTC Act if
"[t]he practice causes substantial consumer injury such as monetary harm; [tihe injury
is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competition; and the [ilnjury
caused by the practice is one that consumers could not reasonably have avoided." Id.
95. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Guide-
lines to National Banks to Guard Against Abusive Lending Practices; Invites Com-
ments on Request to Determine that Georgia Law is Preempted (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.occ.treas.govlscripts/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=EMRDRG7D.
xml.
96. The Final Rule amends Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7 (2003),
and Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34 (2003).
97. Administrative rules promulgated through the notice and comment process (as
was this OCC Final Rule) are considered "legislative," are binding as law on the regu-
lated industry, and are given Chevron deference during judicial review. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). By contrast, Ad-
visory Letters are nonbinding and do not carry the force of law.
98. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008, 34.3.
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1. Principles of Safety and Soundness
The OCC relied upon a safety and soundness rationale for pre-
empting state regulation of national banks. The Comptroller
stated that
"[w~hen national banks are unable to operate under uniform,
consistent and predictable standards, their business suffers and
so does the safety and soundness of the national banking sys-
tem .... The application of multiple and often unpredictable
state laws interferes with their ability to plan and manage their
business, as well as their ability to serve the people ... and the
economy of the United States."99
Safety and soundness goals are common to all of the federal bank
regulators.'00 In general terms, maintaining safety and soundness
refers to maintenance of the financial health of banks and the in-
tegrity of the banking system.' 0l Safety and soundness regulations
aim to control a bank's exposure to risk, often by imposing finan-
cial safeguards such as minimum capital requirements, limitations
on risky lending, and other safeguards.
10 2
The OCC also relied on a safety and soundness rationale for
adopting the Standard. The press release that accompanied the Fi-
nal Rule states: "The prohibition on basing loans on the foreclo-
sure value of the borrower's collateral is grounded in safety and
soundness principles. 1 0 3 As applied to predatory lending, the
OCC takes the position that loans extended with the expectation of
foreclosing on the borrower's collateral for repayment are inher-
ently unsafe and unsound10 4 because loans extended in reliance on
the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral carry a greater
risk of default than loans extended after a careful calculation of the
borrower's ability to repay through future income and other finan-
cial resources.' The OCC believes that repeat origination or
purchase of such loans from brokers would constitute a threat to
the safety and soundness of the banking system because these
loans carry a high risk of default, 6 and defaults expose a bank to
loss when the sale of the collateral does not cover the balance of
99. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
100. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 75.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
104. Bank Activities and Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2004); Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. § 34.3 (2004).
105. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
106. OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, supra note 90.
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the loan after accounting for all the costs associated with liquida-
tion.'0 7 Yet, while safety and soundness concerns may justify the
preemption of state laws, they do not justify the adoption of the
Standard. Predatory lending is not prevalent in the national bank-
ing system, and therefore is not a significant threat to its Safety and
Soundness. Furthermore, application of the Standard will not pro-
hibit most predatory lending practices.
a. Most National Banks Are Not Engaged in Predatory Lending
Many American communities are plagued by predatory lend-
ing, 10 8 but national banks are not the primary offenders because
most national banks do not originate predatory loans.10 9 Accord-
ing to the Comptroller, there are only "isolated cases of abusive
practices" 0 among regulated banks.1 ' The Standard is a "pre-
ventative measure," to ensure regulated banks do not become in-
volved in predatory lending.1 2
The OCC has also expressed concerns that national banks could
inadvertently facilitate predatory lending by purchasing predatory
loans from brokers and other third parties.1 3 This is a legitimate
concern and was addressed by the OCC in its February 2003 Advi-
sory Letter. 14 The Advisory Letter outlined common abusive
lending practices and advised banks to exercise caution in purchas-
ing brokered and third party originated loans." 5 The OCC urged
national banks only to do business with companies that have strong
anti-predatory lending policies in connection with loans they sell or
pool for securitization. 116
107. Id.
108. See generally, ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 34 (docu-
menting the increase in predatory lending that has accompanied increased subprime
lending).
109. See James M. Rockett, Contradictory Laws, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 2003, at 47
(stating that consumer advocates do not cite national banks as predatory lenders); see
also Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2003, at C7 ("According to [a spokesman for the OCC] most of the predatory
lending occurs among non-bank institutions"). But see Michael Hudson, Banking on
Misery: Citigroup, Wall Street, and the Fleecing of the South, S. EXPOSURE (2003) (dis-
cussing Citigroup's involvement in predatory lending), available at
http://www.southernstudies.org/reports/bankingonmisery.pdf.
110. OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
111. But see Hudson, supra note 109 (noting charges of predatory lending against
Citigroup).
112. See OCC Final Rule Press Release, supra note 12.
113. See OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, supra note 90.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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b. Application of the Standard Will Not Prohibit Most Predatory
Lending Practices
For those isolated cases where national banks engage in preda-
tory lending,1" 7 the Standard will do little to stop them. As dis-
cussed earlier, defining predatory lending is difficult because it
consists of a multitude of abusive lending practices. 118 Application
of the Standard will only prohibit one practice, equity stripping,
where a lender extends a loan to a borrower who has no reasona-
ble means to repay, and upon the anticipated default, the lender
forecloses on the collateral and strips whatever equity remains in
the property." 9 Comptroller Hawke has referred to equity strip-
ping as "the most egregious aspect of predatory lending,"'120 be-
cause it involves a deliberate seizure of the borrower's collateral
and the valuable equity therein. A lender, who is aware that the
borrower cannot afford the loan but extends the loan anyway, an-
ticipating the borrower's default, is in clear violation of the
Standard.
Application of the Standard will do little to prohibit other preda-
tory practices in secured lending. It will not prohibit lenders from
charging unjustifiably high interest rates and service fees, so long as
it is reasonable for the bank to believe that the borrower will be
able to repay the loan from future income. For the same reason,
the Standard will not affect loan packing, a practice in which credit
insurance premiums are incorporated into the principal and fi-
nanced over the span of the loan. 2 1 (This practice is labeled pred-
atory when the lender either does not inform the borrower of the
cost of the insurance and/or that it is optional.) 2 2 Similarly, it will
have no effect on negative amortization, where the borrower's
principal balance increases monthly because the scheduled pay-
ments are so low that they do not cover the monthly interest. 2 3 In
effect, onerous terms are permissible according to the OCC rule, so
long as the borrower can afford the monthly payments. Yet all
117. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 109.
118. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
119. See id.
120. Statement of Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding the
Issuance of Regulations Concerning Preemption and Visitorial Powers (Jan. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter Statement of Comptroller Hawke], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
2004-3aComptrollersstatement.pdf.
121. See Motto, supra note 55, at 864 ("[Olne noted subprime lender sets quotas on
credit insurance, which is 'pure profit,' mainly because the lender itself underwrites
it.").
122. See id.
123. See id. at 865.
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these practices are predatory; they take advantage of the borrower,
jeopardizing his financial welfare, at a significant profit for the
lender. 124
The OCC may be able to take action against such behaviors
under its FTC Act enforcement authority,2 5 if they qualify as un-
fair and deceptive trade practices under that Act.12 6 Yet, the effect
of this authority is questionable. Under the Act, the Federal Re-
serve Board has exclusive authority to promulgate regulations
against unfair and deceptive banking practices. 127 The OCC
merely has enforcement authority, the power to sanction national
banks for violating the Act. 28 Whether this authority will effec-
tively prohibit those types of predatory lending that are not pro-
scribed by the Standard depends largely on the OCC's use of the
authority. Strict enforcement of the Act is unlikely, because as
noted earlier, the competitive nature of banking regulation creates
a strong financial incentive for the OCC to support lenient regula-
tion as it derives all of its funding from the banks it regulates.129
Moreover, application of the Standard will not prohibit preda-
tory lending practices in unsecured lending. The Standard provides
that banks cannot grant a loan based predominantly on the "fore-
closure or liquidation value of the borrower's collateral, without
regard to the borrower's ability to repay. ' 130 Therefore, the Stan-
dard requires banks to investigate a borrower's ability to repay the
loan from income only when the bank is extending a secured
loan.1 3 1 The Standard is inapplicable to unsecured loans. 132 Ac-
cordingly, a bank can be in full compliance with the Standard yet
make unsecured loans to individuals who have no foreseeable
means to repay the debt.133
2. Fair and Equal Access to Financial Services
for All Americans
To further support the regulation, OCC representatives have
stated that the Standard is consistent with the agency's fair and
124. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 1261 (explaining that loans structured to
result in serious financial harm to the borrower are predatory).
125. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
126. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1).
127. Id.
128. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
130. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(b), 34.3(b).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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equal access objectives and will not adversely affect access to finan-
cial services. 3 4 Comptroller Hawke argues that application of the
Standard will deal with the predatory lending problem without im-
peding access for low-income borrowers to legitimate subprime
credit.135 Hawke has also stated that predatory lending practices
are inconsistent with the OCC's fair-lending goals, 36 because they
are often discriminatory. Low-income individuals, minorities, and
the elderly are the most vulnerable to aggressive lending tactics
and are often specifically targeted by predatory lenders.137 By
combating predatory lending, the OCC hopes to reduce this dis-
crimination within the banking system,'138 but by squeezing banks
to prevent predatory lending, the OCC may unintentionally foster
the growth of predatory lending in minority communities.
a. The Pre-Standard Condition: An Unequal Distribution
of Financial Services
Individuals seeking subprime loans often do not have access to
legitimate subprime loans from banks for two reasons: banks often
do not service low-income neighborhoods,' 39 and those banks with
branches in low-income neighborhoods often do not offer sub-
prime loans.140 According to a study by the Association of Commu-
nity Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN"), banks have
effectively abandoned low-income and minority communities.141
The study analyzed Federal Reserve data, and found that the num-
ber of branch offices in low and lower-middle class neighborhoods
fell twenty-one percent from 1975 to 1995, while the total number
of banks rose twenty-nine percent during that same time. 42 Physi-
134. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes
Steps to Keep Abusive Practices Out of National Banking System While Ensuring Con-
tinued Access to Credit for Low-Income Americans (July 31, 2003), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/scripts/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=9YWB2OJB.xml.
135. Id.
136. See Testimony of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 50.
137. See, e.g., Calomiris & Litan, supra note 47; Motto, supra note 55, at 860-61;
Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, supra note 109.
138. See Spitzer Threatens to Sue U.S. Regulator Over Loan Exemption, supra note
109.
139. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
140. Despite the growth of subprime lending, some banks remain cautious and
often unwilling to originate subprime mortgage loans. See Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, OCC Working Paper, Economic Issues in Predatory Lending, July,
2003 [hereinafter OCC Working Paper], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
workingpaper.pdf.
141. ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
142. Id.
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cal presence is important; the study notes that "the proximity of a
bank's branches to low and moderate income neighborhoods is di-
rectly related to the level of lending made by the bank in those
neighborhoods."' 43
Furthermore, national banks are not major players in the sub-
prime market. 144 Most subprime lenders are non-bank mortgage
and finance companies that are not regulated by the OCC14 (and
aside from consumer protection laws, are subject to little federal
regulation). A report by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") shows that in 2001 only twenty percent of
the lenders whose business focus was subprime mortgage lending
were banks or their affiliates.1 46 Banks are cautious of extending
subprime credit, either because bank management is risk averse or
because they fear potential damage to the bank's reputation if they
lend to higher risk customers. 147
While finance companies and non-bank mortgage lenders extend
the majority of subprime credit, 48 some banks have realized the
value in subprime lending.1 49 The Center for Responsible Lending
("CRL") disagrees with the HUD analysis, stating "many of the
depository institutions doing primarily prime lending are also do-
ing some subprime lending. Given that many national banks are
prime mortgage originators, a national bank could be a large sub-
prime lender without being classified as such by HUD."' 50 The
predatory non-bank lenders, however, are present and thriving.
143. Id.
144. See OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 4 (noting that in 2001 there were
178 subprime mortgage lenders, and only 36 were banks or their affiliates); see also
Litan, supra note 46, at 6 (documenting the market share for the top twenty largest
subprime lenders for first quarter of 2002). Citigroup, however, is an exception to this
generalization. See generally Hudson, supra note 109 (documenting Citigroup's in-
volvement in predatory subprime lending).
145. See OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 5.
146. Id. at 4.
147. See Litan, supra note 46, at 5. Bank management is also wary of the increased
safety and soundness regulatory scrutiny that comes along with charging higher inter-
est rates and the increased foreclosure rates that often accompany subprime lending.
Id.; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 136, at 4.
148. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
149. Litan, supra note 40, at 4. Banks are becoming increasingly more involved in
the subprime market. Id. For the first quarter of 2002 only one of the top five sub-
prime lenders, comprising approximately sixty percent of the market share, was a
bank. Id. That bank, however, holds over twenty-one percent of the market share.
Id.
150. Center for Responsible Lending, Comments on OCC Working Paper, at 7,
available at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/CRLCommentsonOCCWorking
Paper.pdf.
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b. The Standard May Further Impede Access to Legitimate
Subprime Credit
The OCC is aware that many state anti-predatory lending laws
have had the unintended effect of making non-predatory credit in-
accessible for many creditworthy subprime borrowers. 151 In an
analysis of the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on na-
tional banks, both OCC and independent empirical studies docu-
ment the fact that these laws restrict the availability of credit to
subprime borrowers. 152 Specifically, after the enactment of North
Carolina's anti-predatory lending law in 1999,15 the origination of
subprime mortgages in North Carolina decreased by fourteen per-
cent,'54 and fell fifty percent for borrowers with incomes below
$25,000.155 Similarly, Chicago's anti-predatory lending drove many
seeking a subprime mortgage into the non-bank sector, 56 and in
Philadelphia, a law targeting predatory lenders caused many legiti-
mate subprime lenders to withdraw from the market. 57
The agency used these unintended effects of state anti-predatory
lending laws as support for its decision to preempt state regulation
of national banks.158  The OCC's position is that they were
"avoid[ing] the overbroad and unintended adverse effects of...
one-size-fits-all [state] laws.' 1 59 The OCC, however, has failed to
explain why the federal Standard will not similarly affect access to
legitimate subprime credit.
In addition to the geographic unavailability of banks, and the
general reluctance of banks to make subprime loans, application of
151. See Hawke, supra note 34; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 20.
152. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
153. N.C. Sess. Law 1999-332 at §§ 1-5.
154. Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Credit Research Center Working Pa-
per No. 66, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Caro-
lina's Predatory Lending Law (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/
pdf/RevisedWP66.pdf.
155. See Calomiris & Litan, supra note 47. But see ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL.,
THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIP-
TIVE ASSESSMENT (2003) (arguing that there was no reduction in access to credit for
subprime borrowers as a result of North Carolina's laws), available at
http://www.kenanflagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC-NC_-AntiPredatoryLaw
Impact.pdf.
156. Hawke, supra note 34.
157. Id.
158. See id. According to Comptroller Hawke, "[in] preemption situations, the
only relevant issue is whether the state law would impair or interfere with the national
bank's exercise of powers granted to it under federal law. If such an impact is found
to exist, federal law must prevail." Id.
159. Id.
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the Standard may act as an additional obstacle to legitimate sub-
prime credit. It has the potential to prohibit access to bank loans
for an entire class of individuals; those borrowers with equity in
their homes, or other valuable collateral, but with low incomes.
Recall the story about Mr. Campbell in the Prologue. 6 ' He is a
prime example of an equity-rich, cash-poor individual who, be-
cause of the new federal Standard, will not have access to subprime
credit from national banks. A bank complying with the Standard
might well deny his application for a loan, notwithstanding the con-
siderable equity in his home. First, even if the bank reasonably
believed that despite Mr. Campbell's low income he would be able
to make the payments on the loan, loan officers might be reluctant
to grant the loan to prevent any appearance that they were basing
the loan on the foreclosure value of his home. Extending a loan to
a borrower on a fixed income would send out a red flag for closer
OCC scrutiny of the bank's lending practices. Banks do not want
to risk an OCC audit, or be labeled a predatory lender, even if only
for the interim during an investigation; the effect could be devas-
tating and cause them to lose prime market customers.
Second, if the bank extended the loan, and was later forced to
foreclose on Mr. Campbell's home, an OCC investigation could po-
tentially reach a different conclusion than the bank as to Mr.
Campbell's ability to repay the loan from income. In hindsight, an
examination into the ability of a low-income individual to pay from
his income would seem questionable, especially in the case of many
low-income individuals who face unexpected interruptions in their
cash flow. For example, suppose circumstances arose where the
Social Security administration stopped Mr. Campbell's SSI checks
on the mistaken grounds that he was no longer disabled. Mr.
Campbell would lose his sole source of income, and have no option
but to default on the loan. The question is whether OCC examin-
ers would consider such an interruption in income foreseeable, and
conclude that the bank provided the loan despite Mr. Campbell's
uncertain future income.
The OCC's goal in adopting the Standard is to prohibit the
"most egregious" type of predatory lending: loans where the lender
grants the loan with the intent of foreclosing on the borrower's col-
lateral. 161 The potential result, however, will be to effectively ban
loans to otherwise eligible subprime borrowers who, despite low
incomes, have collateral that would traditionally support a loan.
160. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
161. See Statement of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 114.
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This cannot be reconciled with the OCC's objective of ensuring fair
and equal access to financial services for all Americans, at least as
it applies to low-income Americans.
c. The Potential to Increase Predatory Lending
The institutional denial of credit to this class of subprime bor-
rowers creates a larger pool of potential victims for the unscrupu-
lous lenders. When denied a bank loan, desperate borrowers turn
to the non-bank lenders, concentrated in low-income and minority
communities.162 A study by HUD found that subprime lending is
three times more prevalent in low-income communities than higher
income communities.1 63 Since these non-bank lenders are not sub-
ject to federal oversight and examination, there exists a great po-
tential for abuse.164 According to the ACORN study, predatory
lenders systematically rely on banks to deny credit to large num-
bers of low-income individuals;165 they have found their niche.
III. PROPOSAL FOR OCC INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE STANDARD
The OCC has broad discretion to interpret and apply the Stan-
dard as it sees fit. As noted by one commentator, the results of the
regulation "will only be known as the examiners roll into banks
and ... give [it] practical definition. ' '166 While there is some com-
fort in having a single federal standard, substitution of the OCC's
Standard to replace state anti-predatory lending laws may have the
negative consequence of reducing access to subprime credit. In or-
der to ameliorate this problem, the OCC should narrowly construe
the Standard so that it only prohibits intentional equity stripping
without preventing legitimate asset-based lending to low-income
borrowers.
Not all risk-priced, asset-based loans should be labeled preda-
tory, and it is important for homeowners to benefit from the equity
in their homes and use it to meet their credit needs. The OCC has
the authority to interpret and apply the Standard as it deems ap-
propriate. The OCC should focus less on how the bank calculated
162. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Unequal Burden in
Atlanta: Income and Racial Disparities in Subprime Lending (2000), available at
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressrel/subpratl.html. HUD performed sim-
ilar studies in Baltimore, Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. Id.
163. See id.; see also OCC Working Paper, supra note 140, at 2.
164. Testimony of Comptroller Hawke, supra note 50.
165. See ACORN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 2002, supra note 40.
166. Rockett, supra note 109.
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the borrower's eligibility and how heavily the bank relied upon the
borrower's collateral, and instead construe the Standard so that it
prohibits only intentional equity stripping, where the lender had
the requisite bad intent and "an eye out" to take the borrower's
home.
Addressing the difficulties that exist in assessing a bank's intent
in extending a loan, I propose that the OCC take the following
factors into consideration when examining a bank's compliance
with their anti-predatory lending standard:
1. The time lapse before foreclosure.
A relatively short period of time between origination of a loan
and foreclosure may be an indication that the loan was not based
predominantly on the borrower's ability to repay the loan from fu-
ture income, and that the bank relied too heavily on the value of
the borrower's collateral. According to a study documenting
trends in loan foreclosures in Boston, the median age of subprime
loans at foreclosure is three years.167 The OCC should conduct a
similar survey to determine a span of time before foreclosure that
is characteristic of a predatory loan.
2. The forseeability of an interruption to income.
When examining a bank's investigation into the borrower's abil-
ity to repay the loan from future income, the OCC should not hold
the bank responsible for unforeseeable future interruptions to the
borrower's income. The determination should be made based on
the information available to the bank at the time it extended the
loan. Furthermore, the OCC should give deference to the bank's
determination, made before extending the loan, regarding a bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan from his future income. Since
banks co-exist with their customers, they are better able to assess
their customers' present and anticipated future financial situations
than remote federal regulators.
3. Whether the borrower was well informed before entering into
the loan agreement.
As noted earlier, one characteristic that distinguishes predatory
lending from legitimate subprime lending is what happens at
167. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ANALYZING TRENDS
IN SUBPRIME ORGANIZATIONS AND FORECLOSURES: A CASE STUDY OF THE BOSTON
METRO AREA (2000), available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/2000804000
192_87267.pdf.
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"ground level" interactions between the borrower and the
lender.168 The OCC should investigate whether the borrower was
informed of, and understood, the terms of the loan. While unso-
phisticated borrowers are not expected to have a comprehensive
understanding of a complex loan agreement, the lender should be
charged with a duty to ensure that the borrower has a basic under-
standing of his obligations under the agreement and the conse-
quences of default. A lender who fails to ensure that the borrower
has this minimal level of understanding is engaging in behavior il-
lustrative of predatory intent. ,
CONCLUSION
The OCC's anti-predatory lending standard, which preempts
state lending laws, places an unjustifiable restriction on the ability
of banks to extend loans to low-income individuals. By restricting
access to legitimate bank loans, application of the Standard may
effectively increase the predatory lending problem outside of the
national banking system, as borrowers are forced to seek credit in
the largely unregulated non-bank lending market, where predatory
lending is rampant. In addition, the efficacy of replacing state anti-
predatory lending laws with a single federal standard is questiona-
ble. The consequences of the regulation depend in large part upon
the OCC's interpretation and enforcement of the Standard. Thus,
the OCC should interpret the Standard so that it does not prohibit
banks from extending loans to all low-income borrowers, and pro-
hibits only those loans extended with an intent to foreclose on the
borrower's collateral.
168. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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